Opinion
22A-CR-754
01-20-2023
Eric D. Dycus, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Barbara J. Simmons Batesville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as binding precedent, but it may be cited for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable William J. Nelson, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D18-2008-CM-25409
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Barbara J. Simmons Batesville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
TAVITAS, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶1] Eric Dycus appeals his conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. Dycus argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. Finding the State's evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Issues
[¶2] Dycus raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense.
Facts
[¶3] Dycus and his sons, Daion, an adult, and D.M., a minor, had a poor relationship. On August 8, 2020, Daion and D.M. were seated outside of a church after attending a funeral for their paternal uncle. Dycus arrived at the church, and, as Dycus walked toward his sons, D.M. got up to avoid him. Dycus grabbed D.M. by the wrist. Daion then grabbed Dycus's wrist and said, "[W]e didn't come here for that. All we came here to do was pay our respects to our uncle." Tr. Vol. II p. 54. Daion then used the hand holding Dycus's wrist to "walk[]," without pushing, Dycus backwards, away from D.M. Id. at 106. Dycus then "smacked" Daion in the face and neck area twice, which caused bruising. Id. at 56. Dycus and Daion "tussl[ed]" and were eventually separated. Id. at 73.
[¶4] On August 14, 2020, the State charged Dycus with Count I, battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court held a bench trial on January 31, 2022.
[¶5] During the trial, Daion and D.M. testified regarding the altercation. Dycus asserted self-defense. Dycus testified that he "gave [Daion] a couple of love taps to get him up off of me." Id. at 95. When asked if he struck Daion in the face and neck, Dycus replied, "Maybe so." Id. at 104. The trial court found Dycus guilty of battery resulting in bodily injury.
[¶6] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on March 7, 2022, and entered a conviction on Count I. The trial court sentenced Dycus to 365 days in the Marion County Jail, all suspended. Dycus now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] Dycus argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. We disagree.
[¶8] The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any claim of sufficiency of the evidence. (citing), trans. denied. When analyzing a claim of insufficient evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. . It is the factfinder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. (citing), trans. denied. If a defendant is convicted despite his claim of self-defense, an appellate court will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. (citing).
[¶9] "Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act." (citing governs the claims of self-defense and provides, in relevant part:
(c) A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. . . .
"A claim of self-defense requires a defendant to have acted without fault, been in a place where he or she had a right to be, and been in reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm." (citing), trans. denied. "[T]he phrase 'reasonably believes' in the Indiana self-defense statute requires both a subjective belief that force was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury and that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have such an actual belief." . In addition, the amount of force used by the defendant must have been "reasonably necessary" under the circumstances. . In other words, "'[w]here a person has used more force than necessary to repel an attack the right to self-defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is that the victim then becomes the perpetrator.'" (quoting).
[¶10] "Once a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the State has the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements." (citing), trans. denied. "The State may meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by relying on the sufficiency of the case-in chief." (citing). "Whether the State has met its burden is a question for the trier of fact." (citing).
[¶11] Dycus argues that he reasonably feared bodily harm from Daion. The evidence most favorable to the judgment, however, shows that, after Dycus grabbed D.M.'s wrist, Daion grabbed Dycus's wrist and walked, without pushing, Dycus backwards, away from D.M. using one hand. Daion stated to Dycus, "[W]e didn't come here for that. All we came here to do was pay our respects to our uncle." Tr. Vol. II p. 54. Daion did not strike or push Dycus and did not use threatening words; rather, Daion disclaimed any violent intentions and only fought with Dycus after Dycus twice struck him in the face and neck area. The trial court, thus, could have reasonably concluded that Dycus's alleged fear of bodily harm was not reasonable.
[¶12] Even if Dycus did reasonably fear bodily harm, the evidence most favorable to the judgment shows that Dycus's use of force was disproportionate. Daion walked Dycus backwards using one hand, and Dycus responded by striking Daion twice in the face and neck area hard enough to cause bruising. See, e.g., (defendant's multiple strikes to the victim's face was disproportionate use of force). Based on the State's evidence, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Dycus's use of force was beyond what was necessary under the circumstances. The State, thus, presented sufficient evidence to rebut Dycus's claim of self-defense.
Because we find that the State presented sufficient evidence that Dycus did not reasonably fear bodily harm and used more force than necessary, we do not address Dycus's argument that he was not the first aggressor.
Conclusion
[¶13] The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Dycus's claim of self-defense. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶14] Affirmed.
Altice, C.J., and Brown, J., concur.