Opinion
C.A. No. C-06-107.
March 22, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS
In this action, plaintiff is seeking immediate injunctive relief to prevent the State of Texas from revoking his probation in a state criminal proceeding. For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that plaintiff's action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or alternatively, as premature.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Three Rivers, Texas. He is suing the State of Texas to prevent it from revoking his state probation. A Spears hearing was conducted on March 20, 2006. The following allegations were made in plaintiff's original complaint or at the hearing.
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that testimony given at a Spears hearing is incorporated into the pleadings).
On August 27, 2004, the Dallas County district court issued a capias for plaintiff's arrest pursuant to the State's motion to revoke probation in Criminal Cause No. FO153803K. See (D.E. 1, Attach. 1). On February 9, 2005, the State lodged a detainer against plaintiff. (D.E. 1, Attach. 2). On April 20, 2005, plaintiff filed with the district court a motion for a revocation hearing. (D.E. 1, Attach. 3). Plaintiff never received a file-stamped copy of his revocation motion, despite the fact that he had submitted a copy to be returned to him. On August 5, 2005, he filed a motion to dismiss the revocation of his probation based on the State's failure to timely execute on the capias and the district court's failure to conduct a revocation hearing within twenty days. (D.E. 1, Attach. 5).
On October 21, 2005, plaintiff filed a "motion for issuance of mandamus order" with the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals to compel the Dallas County district court to conduct a revocation hearing. (D.E. 1, Attach. 6). On November 7, 2005, the Fifth Court of Appeals denied his request. (D.E. 1, Attach. 7). Plaintiff appealed the denial of his request for mandamus relief to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; that appeal was still pending at the time he filed his federal lawsuit.
According to plaintiff, he is scheduled to be released from federal custody on March 20, 2006, on a state detainer related to the motion to revoke his probation. In addition, he has an I.N.S. detainer lodged against him.
The Spears hearing was held on March 20, 2006, and plaintiff was still in federal custody.
Plaintiff claims that his due process rights have been violated by the State's failure to (1) execute the capias; (2) conduct a revocation hearing; or (3) dismiss the motion to revoke. He seeks an order from this Court: (1) ordering the Dallas County district court to dismiss the State's pending motion to revoke his probation; (2) instructing the Dallas County Sheriff to recall the warrant and detainer lodged against him; and (3) ordering the Fifth Court of Appeals to vacate its order denying his request for mandamus relief.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction.
Federal district courts are courts of limited statutory jurisdiction. See Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1997); Veldhoen v. United States Coast Guard, 35 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1994). The only federal statute conferring the authority on the federal district courts to issue writs of mandamus is 28 U.S.C. § 1361. That statute specifically provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."Dunn-McCampbell, 112 F.3d at 1288 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1361). Plaintiff identifies the respondent here as the State of Texas; however, his pleadings suggest that he is actually attempting to compel actions by the Dallas County district court, the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals, and the Dallas County Sheriff's Office. None of these entities are federal officers, agents or employees. As such, none of the possible respondents are subject to the statutory mandamus authority of the federal district courts. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that plaintiff's action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
B. Standing and ripeness.
Plaintiff argues that he has not had a revocation hearing, but he admits that his parole has not yet been revoked. That is, he has not yet suffered any injury as a result of the capias filed against him or the State's pending motion to revoke.
Two doctrines of justiciability, standing and ripeness, assure that federal courts will only decide Article III cases or controversies. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2005). To have standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, id. (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004)), and typically, "`must submit to the challenged policy' before pursuing an action to dispute it."Id. (citing Ellison v. Connor, 153 F.3d 247, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1988)). The ripeness doctrine distinguishes between matters that are "hypothetical" or "speculative" from those that are "poised for judicial review." Id. at 14 (citing United Trans. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir. 2000)).
In this case, plaintiff charges that he has not been afforded a revocation hearing; however, he admits that his parole has not yet been revoked. Although plaintiff argues that the State was required to give him a hearing within twenty days of his request for one, he has suffered no injury as a result of the State's inaction on his case. Even if this Court had jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims, which it does not, the matter is not yet ripe nor has plaintiff suffered any injury. Thus, in the alternative, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed as premature.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that plaintiff's action be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, as premature.