Opinion
No. 310, 2001
Decided: February 15, 2002
Court Below: Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for Sussex County Cr. A. Nos. 00-09-0026 thru 0030
Affirmed.
Unpublished opinion is below.
JOHN DUNCAN, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 310, 2001 In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: January 8, 2001 Decided: February 15, 2002
Before WALSH, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
ORDER
MYRON T. STEELE, Justice.
This 15th day of February 2002, on consideration of the briefs of the parties it appears to the Court that:
1) In May 2001, a Superior Court jury convicted Appellant, defendant-below, John J. Duncan, Jr. of one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree and one count of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. This is Duncan's direct appeal.
2) In August 2000, the State charged Duncan by information with several offenses including Reckless Endangering in the First Degree and an accompanying felony gun charge. In Count Four of its information, the State alleged that Duncan "created a substantial risk of death to Steven E. Evans by firing a .22 caliber rifle at [the] victim." After retiring for deliberation following the trial, the jury requested that the trial judge clarify the meaning of the word "at" in Count Four. The jury asked whether "at" meant "directly at the victim or in the general area of the victim." After consultation with the attorneys, the trial judge stated that, although he was not specifically defining the term "at," the answer to the jury's question was in the area of the victim, so long as it met the requisite elements of the offense, namely that the action created a substantial risk of death.
The jury then returned a verdict of guilty.
3) Appellant argues that the trial judge erred as a matter of law when he instructed the jury in this manner. Duncan contends that the instruction provided the jury with a definition of the word "at" that was inconsistent with the word's commonly accepted meaning. Del. C. Ann. tit. 11 § 221(c) instructs the courts to give all terms used in the Criminal Code their commonly accepted meaning, unless they are specifically defined elsewhere in Title 11. Although the word "at" is not located within the text of the Reckless Endangering statute, the State has an obligation to prove not only that a defendant committed each element of the crime as listed in the Code, but also that the defendant violated those elements in a manner consistent with the facts set forth in the indictment or information. To this end, it is similarly appropriate for a jury to apply the commonly accepted meaning to an undefined term appearing in the factual discussion of the information.
4) Duncan argues that the only commonly accepted meaning of the word "at," under these circumstances, indicates the distinct target of the shooter's aim.
While this is one accepted definition of the term, we find that it is not the only commonly accepted meaning and to construe it as such would be to do so overly narrowly. Although it may have been more prudent for the trial judge to read the verbatim definition most consistent with the intent of the statute to the jury, instead of rephrasing that definition, we find that the trial judge's instruction adequately reflects the commonly accepted meaning of the word that includes not only the distinct target but the general direction of the "target" as well. Indeed, "at" is commonly used as the term of general proximity and can be defined as "to or toward the direction of." Appellant further claims that the term "in the general area" supplied by the trial judge is too indefinite to give the jury proper guidance concerning the limits of that area. We conclude, however, that the trial judge's specific limitation that the jury could only return a guilty verdict if it found that Duncan's shot came sufficiently close to the target met the statutory element that his action must have been likely to cause death.
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1984).
5) The purpose of any jury instruction, including supplemental instructions is to reasonably inform the jury of the law. Because the trial judge defined the term "at" in a manner consistent with a commonly accepted meaning of the word, and because his supplemental instruction adequately informed the jury of the relevant law, we find that he did not err when he gave the jury instruction in question.
Baker v. Reid, 57 A.2d 103, 109 (Del. 1947).
6) Given our conclusion above, we do not need to address Appellant's argument that the trial court's supplemental instruction constituted a constructive amendment to the information.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS SO ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.