Opinion
7:23-CV-1631-BO
03-04-2024
MARIAN ELIZABETH DUBAR, Plaintiff, v. RYAN HANKS, et al., Defendants.
ORDERAND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Robert B. Jones Jr. United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis and for frivolity review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), [DE-1, -2]; Plaintiff's motion to deposit funds with the court registry, [DE-5]; and Defendants Ryan Hanks, Crystal Graham, and Amy Youngblood's motion to dismiss, [DE-6]. Plaintiff did not respond to the motion to dismiss, and the time to do so has expired.
Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss be allowed, and the motion to deposit funds be denied as moot.
I. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. “The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition.... The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy v. Fed. Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may “apply common sense.” Nasim v. Warden., Md. House of Corr, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff Marian Elizabeth Dubar, a resident of North Carolina, brings this action against Defendants Ryan Hanks, Crystal Graham, and Amy Youngblood. Compl. [DE-1], Plaintiff alleges claims for breach of contract, breach of trust, and refusal to tender for settlement, claiming she suffered injury in the amount of $30,000.00 related to the lease of two storage units from Go Store It Self Storage in Leland, North Carolina. Id.', [DE-1-1], In support of the complaint, Plaintiff filed a Go Store It Self Storage Rental Agreement, [DE-1-1]; a November 16, 2023 Go Store It invoice to Plaintiff for past due rent and fees of $256.52, [DE-1-2]; a November 30, 2023 email to Plaintiff from Graham regarding payment to avoid auction of the storage units, [DE-1-3]; and several documents, of which the propriety and import is unclear, [DE-1-4 to -1-10], Plaintiff also filed a motion to deposit funds with the court registry, [DE-5], and a notice of violation of the public interest, [DE-13], which appears to be unrelated to her underlying claims against Defendants. Defendants Ryan Hanks, Crystal Graham, and Amy Youngblood filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. [DE-6].
An action lies within the federal district court's diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Complete diversity among the parties is required, which means that no defendant can have the same citizenship as any plaintiff. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs, v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998); Hawkins v. i-TV Digitalis Tavkozlesi zrt., 935 F.3d 211, 222 (4th Cir. 2019). The plaintiff is required to affirmatively allege facts demonstrating the court's jurisdiction in the complaint. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999).
In the present case, Plaintiff did not plead any facts to establish diversity jurisdiction. Compl. [DE-1], Furthermore, the civil cover sheet filed by Plaintiff indicates that both she and the individual defendants are residents of Brunswick County, North Carolina. [DE-1-11]. Defendants Hanks and Graham filed sworn declarations stating they are residents of North Carolina. [DE-7-1, -7-2], Plaintiff also alleged damages of $30,000.00, [DE-1], which is below the $75,000.00 threshold to invoke diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Accordingly, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship because Plaintiff failed to plead complete diversity among the parties and failed to allege that the amount in controversy exceeds$75,000.00. SeeEmritv. Jules,do. 5:23-CV-179-FL, 2023 WL 3875048,at*l (E.D. N.C. May 2, 2023) (no diversity jurisdiction where amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000), adopted by 2023 WL 3874011 (E.D. N.C. June 7, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-1514, 2023 WL 4839583 (4th Cir. July 28, 2023); Hill v. Se. Med. Clinic Red Springs, No. 7:18-CV-158-D, 2019 WL 2111528, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 22, 2019) (no diversity jurisdiction where the plaintiff and the defendant were both citizens of North Carolina), adopted by 2019 WL 2114259 (E.D. N.C. May 13, 2019), aff'd, 773 Fed.Appx. 702 (4th Cir. 2019).
Additionally, there is no federal question presented by Plaintiffs complaint. The court may exercise jurisdiction over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Here, Plaintiffs complaint alleges only breach of contract, breach of trust, and refusal to tender for settlement, all related to the lease of a storage unit, [DE-1], and none of these claims present a federal question. See Slocum v. Zen Realty, No. 5:23-CV-550-FL, 2024 WL 666329, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 16, 2024) (no federal question jurisdiction where plaintiff asserts jurisdiction on the basis of breach of contract, and the complaint does not assert a federal cause of action).
Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss be allowed, and the motion to deposit funds be denied as moot.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED, and it is RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss be allowed, and the motion to deposit funds be denied as moot.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on each of the parties or, if represented, their counsel. Each party shall have until March 18,2024 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C. Any response to objections shall be filed by within 14 days of the filing of the objections.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).