Opinion
24A-CR-735
10-07-2024
Jesse Doyle, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
Appellant Pro Se Jesse Doyle, Jr. Carlisle, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Dearborn Superior Court The Honorable Jonathan N. Cleary, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 15D01-1105-FA-10
Appellant Pro Se Jesse Doyle, Jr. Carlisle, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Samuel J. Dayton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BROWN, JUDGE
[¶1] Jesse Doyle, Jr., pro se, appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous sentence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2011, the State charged Doyle with attempted child molesting as a class A felony, two counts of child molesting while armed with a deadly weapon as class A felonies, and intimidation with a deadly weapon as a class C felony. Doyle v. State, 2013 WL 4105536, at *1-2 (Ind.Ct.App. Aug. 14, 2013), trans. denied. A jury found Doyle guilty on all counts. Id. at *2. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two class A felony child molesting while armed with a deadly weapon convictions into the class A felony attempted child molesting conviction. Id. It then sentenced Doyle to fifty years for attempted child molesting as a class A felony and four years for intimidation with a deadly weapon as a class C felony to be served concurrently. Id.
[¶3] On direct appeal, Doyle argued that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for attempted child molesting and his convictions for child molesting while armed with a deadly weapon and that the trial court erred in merging his two convictions for child molesting with his attempted child molesting conviction instead of vacating the convictions. Id. In light of the State's concession, this Court vacated the two merged convictions for child molesting while armed with a deadly weapon. Id. We also found that the State provided sufficient evidence to sustain Doyle's conviction for attempted child molesting as a class A felony. Id. at *3.
[¶4] On December 17, 2013, Doyle filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Doyle v. State, 2020 WL 2028263, at *2 (Ind.Ct.App. Apr. 28, 2020), trans. denied. On June 16, 2018, the post-conviction court denied Doyle's petition. Id. at *3. On appeal, we affirmed the post-conviction court. Id. at *6.
[¶5] On February 20, 2024, Doyle filed a Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence and argued that, in order to rise to the level of an A felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(A)(1) required that he knowingly performed sexual intercourse with a child under fourteen years of age and "[b]ecause [he] did not meet the requirements of I.C. 35-42-4-3(A)(1) by performing sexual intercourse with the victim, he was improperly charged, convicted, and sentenced erroneously." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 3. He argued that, based on the express wording of the probable cause affidavit and the victim's testimony, he "should have been charged under I.C. 35-42-4-3(B), for Level C Child Molesting by Rubbing and Fondling." Id. That same day, the court denied Doyle's motion.
The Appellant's Appendix is not chronologically paginated. Ind. Appellate Rule 51(C) provides that "[a]ll pages of the Appendix volume, including the front page (see Rule 51(E)), shall be consecutively numbered at the bottom starting with numeral one on each volume's front page." We cite the page numbers as they appear consecutively in the PDF of the Appendix.
Discussion
[¶6] Doyle phrases the issue as: "Whether the charges and subsequent conviction, while abhorrent, warrant revision because they lack statutory authority as to the penetration element of I.C. 35-42-4-3(a)(1)?" Appellant's Brief at 4. He asserts that "[t]he facts and information procured from interviews, investigations, and reports prior to trial, in addition to the victim's own statements and testimony, unambiguously establish that [he] never, at any time made contact with H.H.'s vagina or other sexual organs." Id. at 8. He requests that this Court "vacate his convictions" and, "[a]lternatively, this Court should revise his charges from the Level A Child Molestation charge to the Level C Child Molestation by Rubbing and Fondling, which reflects his crime accurately." Id. at 11.
[¶7] Generally, we review a trial court's decision on a motion to correct erroneous sentence only for an abuse of discretion. Fry v. State, 939 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
[¶8] An inmate who believes he has been erroneously sentenced may file a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15. Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1250-1251 (Ind. 2008). Ind. Code § 35-8-1-15 provides:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
[¶9] In Robinson v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court noted that a motion to correct erroneous sentence is available only when the sentence is "erroneous on its face." 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004) (citations omitted). The Court emphasized that "a motion to correct an erroneous sentence may only arise out of information contained on the formal judgment of conviction ...." Neff, 888 N.E.2d at 1251 (citing Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 793-794). A motion to correct erroneous sentence may be only used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Claims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. Id. Sentencing claims that are not facially apparent "may be raised only on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by post-conviction proceedings." Id. "Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, and the 'facially erroneous' prerequisite should . . . be strictly applied ...." Id. The Court also held that the "sentence" that is subject to correction under Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15 "means the trial court's judgment of conviction imposing the sentence and not the trial court's entries on the Department of Correction's abstract of judgment form." Id. at 794.
[¶10] To address Doyle's claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction or that the class of his conviction should be reduced would require consideration of proceedings before, during, or after his sentencing. Thus, these claims are not properly presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. We find no abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. State, 806 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Ind. 2004) (holding that trial court properly denied defendant's motion to correct erroneous sentence and noting that a motion to correct erroneous sentence is available only to correct sentencing errors clear from face of the judgment).
[¶11] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.