Opinion
CR-20-0934
08-05-2022
Emenike Okachi Downey v. State of Alabama
Appeal from Houston Circuit Court (CC-19-2561)
On Return to Remand
MINOR, JUDGE
This appeal requires us to decide as a threshold matter whether the defendant, Emenike Okachi Downey, properly reserved his right to appeal his guilty-plea conviction for second-degree sodomy, see § 13A-6-64, Ala. Code 1975, and his resulting sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. If Downey did properly reserve his right to appeal, we must then determine whether the circuit court correctly denied Downey's motions to suppress his August 8, 2019, statement to law enforcement as well as evidence obtained from a search and seizure of his cellular telephone. We conclude that Downey did properly reserve his right to appeal his guilty-plea conviction and that the circuit court properly denied Downey's motions to suppress. We affirm.
Between February and May 2020, Downey filed five pro se motions to suppress what he claimed was illegally seized evidence. (C. 31-32, 38-43, 65-66.) Because Downey was represented by counsel during that time, the circuit court either refused to consider those motions (C. 34, 70) or stated that it would address the motions at trial. (C. 47-49.) In June 2020, Downey moved to represent himself, and after a Faretta inquiry, the circuit court granted Downey's request and appointed Downey's then-counsel to serve as standby counsel. (C. 84.) In July 2020, Downey moved to suppress evidence acquired from his cellular telephone because, he said, he did not consent to a search of his phone, and law-enforcement officials did not obtain a warrant to search his phone. (C. 96-97.) Twice in November 2020, Downey moved to suppress the statement he made to police on August 8, 2019, because, he said, deputies lacked probable cause to detain him and thus he had been illegally arrested in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. (C. 173-74, 181-83.)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Downey also made statements to police again on August 15, 2019, and September 4, 2019, but he did not move to suppress either of those statements.
The circuit court held a hearing on Downey's motions at which it heard testimony from Downey and Sgt. Jason Grantham, an investigator for the Houston County Sheriff's Office ("HCSO"). Sgt. Grantham testified that on August 8, 2019, he advised HCSO deputies to "make contact with [Downey] to detain him and bring him up for questioning" (R. 8) after receiving a complaint that Downey had sexually abused his stepdaughter. HCSO deputies located Downey at his house, handcuffed him, and transported him in a patrol vehicle to HCSO. According to Sgt. Grantham, deputies detained Downey in a manner typical for suspects who are questioned in felony-offense investigations (i.e., handcuffed and transported by patrol vehicle), but they did not arrest Downey. Deputies placed Downey, who was still handcuffed, in an interview room where Sgt. Grantham advised Downey of his Miranda rights, and Downey signed a form acknowledging that he understood those rights. (C. 376.) Sgt. Grantham confirmed that he "fully advised [Downey] of all of his rights on that form and gave him an opportunity to speak with [Sgt. Grantham] voluntarily" (R. 11), that he did not threaten, induce, or coerce Downey into speaking to him, and that Downey "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[d] his right to remain silent." (R. 12.) Sgt. Grantham testified that, even though Downey was handcuffed during questioning, he was free to invoke his Miranda rights at any time. When questioned by the court, Sgt. Grantham stated that he did not promise Downey probation or a suspended sentence, that Downey did not appear to be under the influence of any mind-altering substances or to be suffering from mental illness, that Downey appeared to understand his rights, and that Downey did not ask for an attorney. Sgt. Grantham obtained an arrest warrant for Downey only after interviewing him, and a Houston County grand jury indicted Downey for second-degree sodomy in December 2019.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Downey testified that, on the night of August 8, 2019, deputiesarrived at his house, asked Downey his name, took his cellular telephone out of his hands, handcuffed him, placed him in a patrol car, and transported him to HCSO where Sgt. Grantham interrogated him. According to Downey, deputies did not explain why they handcuffed him or where they were taking him, and he did not consent to being detained. Downey stated that he was never told that he was free to leave, that he knew the deputies would physically restrain him if he tried to leave, that the handcuffs prevented him from leaving, that he was handcuffed for the entire interview with Sgt. Grantham, and that deputies did not give him the option to meet them at HCSO or to come in for questioning later. On cross-examination, Downey admitted that he voluntarily signed a waiver-of-rights form after Sgt. Grantham explained it to him but stated: "I was told I needed to sign the first form before I could find out why I was at the police department." (R. 37.)
According to Downey, officers from the Dothan Police Department detained him, but Sgt. Grantham disputed that assertion, stating, "I never talked to Dothan PD. It was Houston County." (R. 17.)
Downey argued that his August 8, 2019, statement should be suppressed because, he said: (1) he had been illegally arrested in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when deputies handcuffed him at his house, and (2) his statement had not been voluntary because Sgt. Grantham asked him "where [he] would like to be in ten years[,]" which he interpreted as an "offer of leniency" and an offer of a 10-year sentence. (R. 42.) In response, the State argued: (1) that Downey had not been illegally arrested but had merely been detained and transported to HCSO; (2) that, even if Downey had been arrested, he was aware of his Miranda rights and did not invoke them before giving his statement; and (3) that Sgt. Grantham testified that he made no threats, inducements, or coercions in exchange for Downey's statement.
The circuit court denied Downey's motions to suppress his statement to law-enforcement officials. Noting that the State did not intend to introduce any statements Downey made before he was Mirandized, the court found that, even if Downey had in fact been arrested, the arrest was not illegal because probable cause to arrest existed at that time. The court also found that there was no evidence indicating that Sgt. Grantham promised Downey anything and that Downey's own testimony and the waiver-of-rights form showed that his statement was voluntary. Downey then pleaded guilty to second-degree sodomy, and the court sentenced him to 20 years' imprisonment.
As we discuss below, while Downey reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress both the cellular-telephone evidence and his statement, Downey preserved the right to appeal only the motions to suppress his statement.
Before addressing the merits of Downey's arguments, we must determine whether Downey properly reserved his right to appeal. The State argues that Downey did not reserve that right because "he failed to expressly reserve the issue before he entered his guilty plea and because he failed to [move to] withdraw his guilty plea." (State's brief, p. 10.) The State is correct that Downey expressed his intent to reserve his right to appeal only after he had entered his plea and the circuit court had adjudicated him guilty and that Downey did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. In response to the State's position, Downey asked this Court "to remand this case to determine if there was a preexisting agreement that Downey would preserve this issue for appellate review." (Downey's reply brief, p. 8.) By order issued April 21, 2022, we remanded this case with instructions for the circuit court to clarify whether Downey and the State had a preexisting agreement that allowed Downey to reserve his right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress. Downey v. State (Ms. CR-20-0934, April 21, 2022).
On remand, the circuit court complied with our instructions, finding:
"Based on a review of the record, discussion with the Assistant District Attorney and this Court's recollection of the events, it is the opinion of this Court that Downey specifically reserved his right to appeal the suppression issue. (See T.R. p. 67.) The Court and Assistant District Attorney were aware that [Downey] intended to reserve the suppression issue prior to the entry of the guilty plea. While the State was aware Downey was going to reserve the suppression issue, there was no specific agreement between the parties, and the State did not specifically object to [Downey] reserving this issue."
(Record on return to remand, pp. 7-8.) "Pursuant to Rule 14.4(a)(1)(viii)[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] and Rule 26.9(b)[, Ala. R. Crim. P.], a defendant may appeal a guilty-plea conviction if: (1) the defendant 'expressly reserved the right to appeal with respect to a particular issue or issues' before entry of the plea, Rule 14.4(a)(1)(viii), or (2) the defendant 'has timely filed a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and the motion has been denied,' Rule 26.9(b)(4)(ii)."
Ingram v. State, 882 So.2d 374, 376 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). "' "To reserve an issue for review, a defendant must express his or her intention, before the guilty plea is entered, to appeal the issue in question. Because a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects occurring before the
entry of the plea, by entering a plea of guilty a defendant is presumed to have abandoned all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the plea on the right to appeal in question by expressly reserving it before the entry of the plea. See, e.g., Prim v. State, 616 So.2d 381 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). Reserving an issue for appeal avoids the waiver effect of the guilty plea, but it does not preserve the issue for appellate review. Thus, in the guilty-plea context, an issue relating to a defect occurring before the entry of the plea must both be preserved by a timely and specific motion and/or objection and an adverse ruling from the trial court and reserved for appeal before the entry to the plea."' "Knight v. State, 936 So.2d [544,] 546-47 [(Ala.Crim.App.2005)] (quoting Mitchell v. State, 913 So.2d 501, 505 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (footnote omitted))." Treslar v. State, 948 So.2d 570, 572 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). "In Lewis v. State, 911 So.2d 35 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), we remanded that case for the trial court to clarify whether the appellant and the State had had a preexisting agreement to allow the appellant to preserve her argument for appellate review. In doing so, we quoted the following from Rivers v. State, 666 So.2d 33 (Ala.Crim.App.1994):
"'In Prim v. State, 616 So.2d 381, 382-83 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993), this Court explained that a defendant is required to reserve any issue on which he wishes to appeal before entering his guilty plea:
"'"[B]ecause a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in proceedings occurring before the plea,
Martin[ v. State, 579 So.2d 69, 70 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991)], and 'a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which preceded it in the criminal process,' Tollet[ v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)], an unconditional plea must be taken to represent the defendant's decision to [forgo] any challenge to events occurring before the plea. If the defendant does not intend to [forgo] such challenges, he must make that intent clear before he enters his plea."
"'(Emphasis added.)
" 'The appellant, citing Sawyer v. State, 456 So.2d 110 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982), rev'd after record supplemented, 456 So.2d 112 (Ala. 1983), requests that he be allowed to supplement the record or that we remand this cause to the trial court to allow the appellant to establish that the court and the district attorney were aware of his intent to appeal the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. Because the record is unclear, we remand this cause to the trial court. On remand, the trial judge is to supplement the record to reflect whether there was a pre-existing agreement among the parties that the appellant had reserved the suppression issue for appeal.'
"666 So.2d at 34."Fuqua v. State, 912 So.2d 290, 291-92 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).
The record shows that Downey expressed his intent to reserve his right to appeal only after he had entered his plea and the circuit court had adjudicated him guilty and that Downey did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. (R. 60-67.) But despite the circuit court's finding on remand that Downey and the State had no specific agreement about whether Downey would reserve the issue for appeal, evidence of a preplea reservation of the right to appeal appears repeatedly throughout the record. The State did not object when Downey expressed his intent to reserve his right to appeal, and the court stated: "Okay. You can reserve your right to appeal the suppression issue." (R. 67.) After sentencing Downey, the circuit court twice informed him during the proceeding that he had 42 days within which to appeal. (R. 67, 69.) The court also granted Downey's request for appointed appellate counsel before concluding the proceeding. (R. 69.) The circuit court later issued a written order stating: "Notice of appeal of adverse ruling on motion to suppress is noted, and was preserved on the record. Attorney Adam Parker is appointed to represent [Downey] on appeal." (C. 349.) The record also shows that the court left blank the section on Downey's sentencing order that states: "No issues reserved for appeal." (C. 339.) On remand, the circuit court expressly acknowledged that both the court and the State "were aware that [Downey] intended to reserve the suppression issue prior to the entry of the guilty plea." (Record on return to remand, pp. 7-8.)
Based on the above, we hold that Downey properly reserved this issue for appellate review. See, e.g., Ex parte Mullins, 920 So.2d 589 (Ala. 2005) (finding that trial judge's comments coupled with prosecutor's lack of objection reserved issue for appellate review although defendant did not specifically reserve issue before entering guilty plea); see also Ex parte LaPointe, 926 So.2d 1055, 1059 (Ala. 2005) ("Because the trial judge undertook on his own initiative to conclude the proceedings with the explanation, '[t]hat is all subject to the reservation of the right to appeal the youthful-offender [issue],' it is obvious that LaPointe had timely reserved the right to appeal the denial of youth-offender status in conformity with the procedure provided in the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure."). Thus, we turn to Downey's arguments on appeal.
This claim appears as Issues I and II in Downey's brief on appeal.
Downey argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motions to suppress evidence obtained from what he claims was an illegal search and seizure of his cellular telephone. Downey has not preserved this argument for appellate review.
While represented by counsel, Downey filed three pro se motions to suppress evidence obtained from his cellular telephone. In response to Downey's first motion, the circuit court ordered that Downey must submit the motion through his attorney. In response to Downey's second motion, the court determined that motion would "be addressed at trial." (C. 49.) In response to Downey's third motion, the court held that Downey "has an attorney and shall proceed through counsel. This Court will not allow pro se motions where [Downey] is represented by counsel." (C. 70.) After the circuit court granted Downey's request to represent himself, Downey filed a fourth pro se motion to suppress the cellular-telephone evidence. After holding a hearing, the circuit court noted on a case-action-summary sheet: "In open court [Downey] withdraws his motion to suppress." (C. 106.) Moreover, at the hearing on Downey's motions to suppress, Downey argued only that his statement to police-not evidence obtained from his cellular telephone-should be suppressed.
The record does not include a transcript of this hearing, but two entries on the same case-action-summary sheet show that a hearing was held on Downey's motion to dismiss and motion for a speedy trial on the same date Downey withdrew his motion to suppress the cellular-telephone evidence. (C. 106.)
"'Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and timely raised at trial.' Newsome v. State, 570 So.2d 703, 717 (Ala.Crim.App.1989). 'An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and presented.' Pate v. State, 601 So.2d 210, 213 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).' [T]o preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be presented to the trial court by a timely and specific motion setting out the specific grounds in support thereof.' McKinney v. State, 654 So.2d 95, 99 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (citation omitted). 'The statement of specific grounds of objection waives all grounds not specified, and the trial court will not be put in error on grounds not assigned at trial.' Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1987)."Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793, 794-95 (Ala. 2003).
"'This court will not review the merits of a motion presented by the appellant at trial unless the court below has issued a ruling adverse to the appellant on the motion. Knight v. State, 623 So.2d 376, 379 (Ala. Cr. App. 1993). It is the appellant's duty to preserve the record for appeal by invoking a ruling from the trial court. White[ v. State], 589 So.2d [765,] 766 [(Ala.Crim.App.1991)].'"Knight v. State, 936 So.2d 544, 546 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Berryhill v. State, 726 So.2d 297, 302 (Ala.Crim.App.1998)).
"'Although Rule 31(a), Ala. R. App. P, prohibits a party represented by counsel from filing a pro se brief, there is no specific rule addressing such a matter in the trial courts. However, disregarding a defendant's pro se pleading or motion is not generally subject to criticism when the defendant is represented by counsel. See Pardue v. State, 571 So.2d 320, 329-30 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), reversed on other grounds, 571 So.2d 333 (Ala. 1990). Although no Alabama appellate court decisions specifically address the particular issue raised in this case, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a defendant is not entitled to file pro se pleadings or motions when represented by counsel. See Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097, 1107 (11th Cir. 2012); Martin v. State, 797 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) ("'The trial court therefore has the authority to require a defendant who is represented by counsel to act through counsel.'"). See also cases cited in Salser v. State, 582 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The only exception to this rule applies to pro se motions requesting discharge of counsel. See Finrock v. State, 84 So.3d 431, 433-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).'"Gaston v. State, 265 So.3d 387, 406-07 (Ala.Crim.App.2018) (quoting Trimble v. State, 157 So.3d 1001, 1006-07 (Ala.Crim.App.2014)).
Downey was represented by counsel when he filed his first three pro se motions to suppress evidence obtained from his cellular telephone. Because he was represented by counsel, he had no right to have those pro se motions considered by the court. As for the fourth pro se motion filed after the court allowed Downey to represent himself, the record shows that Downey withdrew that motion. Nor did Downey raise this specific issue during the hearing on his motions to suppress, and he did not object to the circuit court's failure to rule on those motions. Because he did not receive an adverse ruling on those motions, Downey failed to preserve this argument for appellate review. See Click v. State, 695 So.2d 209, 227 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) ("When an appellant fails to obtain an adverse ruling, the issue is not preserved for review."). Thus, he is due no relief on this issue.
This claim appears as Issue III in Downey's brief on appeal.
Downey argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his motions to suppress his August 8, 2019, statement to law-enforcement officials because, he claims: (1) his statement was obtained after he was illegally arrested and (2) "he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights." (Downey's brief, p. 15.) Downey argues that he was arrested when he was handcuffed because he reasonably believed he could not leave at that point and that the arrest was illegal because it occurred at his house and there was not probable cause and exigent circumstances. Downey also argues that the totality of the circumstances in his case show that Sgt. Grantham coerced him to waive his Miranda rights before he made his statement.
Because Downey did not argue before the circuit court that exigent circumstances did not exist at the time of the alleged arrest, we question whether he preserved this specific argument for appellate review. See Ex parte Frith, 526 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1987). As we discuss below, however, Downey's argument lacks merit.
Downey moved three times to suppress his statement. Downey's first motion alleged: (1) that his Miranda rights "were never fully explained to him"; (2) that he was never advised that he would be waiving his Miranda rights when he signed the waiver-of-rights form; (3) that officers did not consider his mental state or that he was not a citizen of the United States; and (4) that Sgt. Grantham told him "that he needed to sign the paper before the detective could talk with him."(C. 38.) Downey's second motion alleged that deputies illegally arrested him when, without probable cause, they detained him at his house and transported him to HCSO for questioning. Downey's third motion alleged that deputies violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution when, without probable cause or judicial authorization, they seized him at his house and transported him to HCSO for interrogation. Downey argued that when deputies handcuffed him without providing an explanation, he believed he was not free to leave.
Although Downey filed this pro se motion while he was represented by counsel, the circuit court considered the merits of this motion at the hearing on his motions to suppress, and Downey received an adverse ruling on that motion. Thus, this issue is preserved. See Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So.2d 793 (Ala. 2003), and Knight v. State, 936 So.2d 544 (Ala.Crim.App.2005).
After a hearing, the circuit court found that, even if Downey had been arrested, the arrest was not illegal because probable cause to arrest Downey existed at that time. The court also found that there was no evidence indicating that Sgt. Grantham promised Downey anything and that Downey's own testimony and the waiver-of-rights form showed that his statement was voluntary.
"'"The trial court's finding on a motion to suppress a confession is given great deference, and will not be overturned on appeal unless that finding is palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence." Baird v. State, 849 So.2d 223, 233 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). See also McLeod v. State, 718 So.2d 727, 729 (Ala. 1998) ("The trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the great weight of the evidence or is manifestly wrong."). "'"'In reviewing the correctness of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court makes all the reasonable inferences and credibility choices supportive of the decision of the trial court.'"'" Minor v. State, 914 So.2d 372, 388 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (quoting Kennedy v. State, 640 So.2d 22, 26 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), quoting in turn, Bradley v. State, 494 So.2d 750, 760-61 (Ala.Crim.App.1985), affd, 494 So.2d 772 (Ala. 1985)).'"DeBlase v. State, 294 So.3d 154, 212 (Ala.Crim.App.2018) (quoting Floyd v. State, 289 So.3d 337, 390-91 (Ala.Crim.App.2017)).
Illegal-Arrest Argument
Downey cites Marshall v. State, 992 So.2d 762 (Ala.Crim.App.2007), in support of his argument that he was "arrested" when deputies handcuffed him at his house. This Court stated in Marshall:
"In cases such as this one where there has not been a formal arrest, '"an objective test is used to determine whether the suspect's freedom of action has been restricted by the police in any significant manner."' Barksdale v. State, 788 So.2d 898, 903 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), quoting Hooks v. State, 534 So.2d 329, 348 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). '"'The only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his position.'"' Id., quoting Hooks, 534 So.2d at 348, quoting in turn United States v. Jonas, 786 F.2d 1019, 1022 (11th Cir. 1986). The United States Supreme Court has long held that 'a person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)."992 So.2d at 767-68.
Downey cites Wilson v. State, 142 So.3d 732 (Ala.Crim.App.2010), in support of his argument that his arrest was illegal because it occurred at his house and there was not probable cause and exigent circumstances. This Court stated in Wilson:
"Based on the sanctity of home ... the Fourth Amendment gives greater protection from in-home warrantless arrests. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-602, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Under that greater protection, 'a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home for the purpose of effectuating a felony arrest is ... unreasonable and prohibited by the Fourth Amendment unless the State proves both probable cause and exigent circumstances.' Washington v. State, 992 So.2d 145, 158-59 (Ala.Crim.App.2005); see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 587-88, Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002), Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), Ex parte Moffitt, 844 So.2d 531, 533 (Ala. 2002)."142 So.3d at 766.
As the State points out, though:
"Even when an individual does not voluntarily exit his home and is arrested by law-enforcement officers without exigent circumstances, the exclusionary rule does not require the exclusion of all evidence obtained as a result of that arrest. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978) ('declining] to adopt a "per se or 'but for' rule" that would make inadmissible any evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest'). For instance, in New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 17-21, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applied in Payton[ v. New York],
445 U.S. [573] at 587-88 [(1980)], does not require the suppression of a confession made outside of the home by a defendant who was arrested in the home upon probable cause but without exigent circumstances in violation of Payton. The Court explained that the requirement that the police have a warrant or probable cause and exigent circumstances 'is imposed to protect the home, and anything incriminating the police gathered from arresting [a defendant] in his home, rather than elsewhere....' Harris, 495 U.S. at 20. Thus, when officers effectuate a warrantless, in-home arrest with probable cause but no exigent circumstances, the exclusionary rule operates only to exclude evidence obtained in the home during the unlawful arrest. Id.; see also Ex parte Rieber, 663 So.2d 999, 1002-03 (Ala. 1995) (stating that 'even if there had been no exigent circumstances surrounding [the defendant's in-home] arrest, his statement, as well as the evidence discovered as a result of his statement . would have been admissible under the rule stated in New York v. Harris'); Williams v. State, 830 So.2d 45, 50 (Ala.Crim.App.2001)."142 So.3d at 766-67.
Here, deputies had probable cause to arrest Downey for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. See Dixon v. State, 588 So.2d 903, 906 (Ala. 1991) ("Probable cause exists if facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect has committed a crime."). Sgt. Grantham testified that he had received complaints from Downey's wife and stepdaughter, who lived in the same house as Downey, that Downey had sexually abused his stepdaughter. Even if Downey was illegally arrested in his home based on probable cause but without accompanying exigent circumstances in violation of Payton, supra,
On appeal, Downey does not argue that deputies lacked probable cause to arrest him; instead, Downey argues only that the State failed to establish exigent circumstances to justify his warrantless, in-home arrest.
"the exclusionary rule would not require suppression of his [statement] because his [statement] was given at the police station as opposed to in his home. As stated above, in Harris, 495 U.S. at 21, the United States Supreme Court limited Payton and held that 'where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of Payton.' See also Ex parte Rieber, 663 So.2d at 1002-03; Williams, 830 So.2d at 50."Wilson, 142 So.3d at 767-68. Because the exclusionary rule does not require the suppression of Downey's statement, the circuit court did not err when it denied Downey's motions to suppress because Sgt. Grantham obtained Downey's statement at HCSO, not in Downey's house, following the arrest. Thus, he is due no relief on this issue.
Involuntary-Waiver-of-Rights Argument
Downey argues that "[t]he totality of the circumstances in the present case reveals a situation where Downey was coerced and deceived into signing the Miranda forms" because he gave his statement "while he was still in handcuffs and after he was taken from his home at night without his consent and with the reasonable belief that he could not leave." (Downey's brief, pp. 16-17.) Downey also argues that Sgt. Grantham coerced him into waiving his Miranda rights when Sgt. Grantham told Downey that he must sign a waiver-of-rights form before Sgt. Grantham could explain why Downey was being questioned at HCSO.
"'To establish a proper Miranda predicate, the State must prove that "the accused was informed of his Miranda rights before he made the statement" and that "the accused voluntarily and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before making his statement." Jones v. State, 987 So.2d 1156, 1164 (Ala.Crim.App.2006). "Whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made depends on the facts of each case, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including the characteristics of the accused, the conditions of the interrogation, and the conduct of the law-enforcement officials in conducting the interrogation." Foldi v. State, 861 So.2d 414, 421 (Ala.Crim.App.2002).'"Floyd v. State, 289 So.3d 337, 390-91 (Ala.Crim.App.2017) (quoting Wilkerson v. State, 70 So.3d 442, 460 (Ala.Crim.App.2011)). The State must prove the Miranda predicate by a preponderance of the evidence. See Smith v. State, 795 So.2d 788, 808 (Ala.Crim.App.2000).
The record shows that Downey was advised of his Miranda rights before he gave his statement. As noted above, Sgt. Grantham testified that, before questioning Downey at HCSO, he advised Downey of his Miranda rights, and Downey signed a form acknowledging that he understood those rights. Sgt. Grantham denied threatening, inducing, or coercing Downey into giving a statement and confirmed that Downey "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[d] his right to remain silent." (R. 12.) Sgt. Grantham testified that, although Downey was handcuffed during questioning, he was free to invoke his Miranda rights at any time. Sgt. Grantham stated that he did not promise Downey probation or a suspended sentence, that Downey did not appear to be under the influence of any mind-altering substances or to be suffering from mental illness, that Downey appeared to understand his rights, and that Downey did not ask for an attorney. Downey also testified on cross-examination that he voluntarily signed a waiver-of-rights form after Sgt. Grantham explained it to him. The record includes the waiver-of-rights form that Downey signed on August 8, 2019:
"Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
"1. You have the right to remain silent.
"2. If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say, can and will be used against you in a court of law.
"3. You have the right to talk to an attorney and have one present with you while you are being questioned.
"4. If you cannot afford to hire an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish.
"5. You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements."(C. 376.) Downey also noted on the form that he had received 12 years of education and signed his name under an acknowledgment of rights that stated: "I, the undersigned, acknowledge and understand what my rights are. No threats or promises have been made to me." Id.
Although Downey argues that he was coerced into signing the form because Sgt. Grantham told Downey that he must do so before Sgt. Grantham could explain why Downey was being questioned, Downey was still free to remain silent even after signing the form. The totality of the circumstances show that Downey was properly informed of his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived those rights before giving his statement to Sgt. Grantham. The circuit court did not err when it denied Downey's motions to suppress because he was coerced into waiving his Miranda rights. Thus, he is due no relief on this issue.
Based on the above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
AFFIRMED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, and Cole, JJ., concur.