Opinion
01-CV-0816E(Sr)
February 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
On November 3, 2003, defendants filed a motion seeking leave to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim that would add (1) a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 and (2) promissory estoppel claims purportedly assigned to Hamot Medical Center ("HMC") by Medicor Associates. On December 1, 2003, plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") seeking relief from this Court's Memorandum and Order dated June 28, 2003 ("the June 28 Order") — to wit, reconsideration of the June 28 Order, which denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to HMC's promissory estoppel claim. These motions were argued and submitted on January 23, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, both motions will be denied.
Although plaintiffs cite to "this Court's July 2, 2003 Order," such appears to refer to the June 28 Order, which was entered on the docket on July 1.
"Although leave to amend `shall be freely given when justice so requires,' [FRCvP 15(a)], such leave will be denied when an amendment is offered in bad faith, would cause undue delay or prejudice, or would be fufile." Consequently, district courts have discretion to deny a motion seeking leave to file an amended pleading where such would cause undue delay or prejudice. Defendants filed their motion seeking leave to file an amended counterclaim more than two years after this case was filed and well after the February 14, 2003 deadline for discovery and the April 7, 2003 deadline for summary judgment motions. Defendants seek to add two counterclaims after this Court had resolved the parties' summary judgment motions in the June 28 Order. Consequently, if this Court were to grant the defendants' motion, discovery would have to be re-opened and this case — which is presently ready for the scheduling of a trial date — would be further delayed. Moreover, defendants offer no reason why they waited more than two years to add their section 1104 claim, which appears to be based on facts that they had in their possession when they filed their Answer and Counterclaims on December 26, 2001. In any event, defendants' proposed amendment would both prejudice plaintiff and delay this action beyond what is reasonable in light of the stage of the litigation. Accordingly, defendants' motion seeking leave to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim will be denied.
Leonelli v. Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1198 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Foman v. Dauis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
See Cresswell v. Sullivan Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The [district] court plainly has discretion, however, to deny leave to amend where the motion is made after an inordinate delay, no satisfactory explanation is offered for the delay, and the amendment would prejudice the [non-moving party]."), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1222 (1992); see also Krumme v. Westpoint Stevens, Inc., 143 F.3d 71, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) ("One of the most important considerations in determining whether amendment would be prejudicial is the degree to which it would delay the final disposition of the action. Furthermore, a proposed amendment *** [is] especially prejudicial *** [when] discovery had already been completed and [non-movant] had already filed a motion for summary judgment.") (citations and internal quotations omitted); Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 685-686 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of leave to amend because undue delay existed where motion to amend was filed 2.5 years after case commenced and three months before trial); NAS Electronics, Inc. v. Transtech Electronics PTE Ltd., 262 F. Supp.2d 134, 150-151 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying leave to amend pleading on the grounds that, inter alia, (1) the moving party "waited nearly two years to seek leave to file an Amended Complaint," (2) amendment would be "prejudicial because it is brought at a late stage of the litigation after discovery has been completed and only in response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment" and (3) defendant would be prejudiced by reopening discovery); Cuccolo v. Lipsky, Goodkin Co., 1994 WL 381596, at *l-2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying leave to amend pleading on the grounds that, inter alia, such amendment (1) would require additional discovery after the time for discovery had ended, (2) would delay a case that was "trial ready", (3) was untimely made 1.5 years after plaintiffs possessed information that would have permitted them to seek to amend and (4) lacked satisfactory explanation for the delay).
Although this Court's April 19, 2002 Scheduling Order did not include a deadline for amending pleadings, such Order implicitly required pleadings to be amended before the deadline for summary judgment. Consequently, defendants must show good cause for the requested amendment. See Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 204 F.3d 326, 340-341 (2d Cir. 2000).
Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he longer the period of an unexplained delay, the less [that] will be required of the nonmoving party in terms of a showing of prejudice. In determining what constitutes `prejudice,' we consider whether the assertion of the new claim would: (i) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; [or] (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute.") (citations omitted); Cahill v. O'Donnell, 75 F. Supp.2d 264, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Our Circuit has consistently found prejudice and denied amendments where discovery has already been completed and summary judgment motions have been filed.").
See Parker, supra note 5, at 341 (finding no good cause for amendment where moving party possessed all the information necessary when the action was commenced and failed to explain the inordinate delay in seeking amendment); Cresswell, supra note 4, at 72 ("The burden is on the party who wishes to amend to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay ***.") (citation omitted).
Moreover, defendants will not be prejudiced with respect to the proposed Medicor claims because they may litigate them in state court. See Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Only denial of leave to amend on the merits precludes subsequent litigation of the claims in the proposed amended complaint. *** Here, the denial of leave to file the second amended complaint was clearly not based on the merits, but rather on the procedural ground of untimeliness.") (citation omitted).
This Court need not address futility as an additional basis for denying defendants' motion.
Plaintiffs seek relief from the June 28 Order under FRCvP 60(b)(6) on the ground that their motion for summary judgment was denied on a ground not addressed by the parties. Consequently, plaintiffs seek reargument of their motion for summary judgment, contending that summary judgment should be granted with respect to HMC's promissory estoppel claim. Plaintiffs, however, do not address the standard governing FRCvP 60(b)(6). Relief under FRCvP 60(b)(6) may be granted where there exists either (1) extraordinary circumstances or (2) an extreme and undue hardship. Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986). Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this standard. Indeed, plaintiffs merely contend that this Court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment with respect to HMC's promissory estoppel counterclaim. The mere contention, however, that this Court erred in applying the law in its June 28 Order in denying plaintiffs' summary judgment motion is insufficient to satisfy the FRCvP 60(b)(6) standard. Id. at 107 (finding that no extraordinary circumstances existed where the moving party contended that the district court misapplied the law because "a Rule 60(b)(6) motion may not be used as a substitute for appeal").
See also Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cty. of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 90-91 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that "applicability of [FRCvP 60(b)(6)] is fairly circumscribed: a motion to vacate, alter or amend a judgment thereunder `should be used only in extraordinary circumstances'" and that "it is proper to invoke [FRCvP60(b)(6)] upon a showing `that the judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship'"); Socialist Rep. of Romania v. Wildenstein Co., Inc., 147 F.R.D. 62, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Rule 60(b)(6) may be invoked only when there are extraordinary circumstances justifying relief, when the judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship, and when the asserted grounds for relief are not recognized in clauses (1)-(5) of the Rule.") (internal quotations omitted).
See also Bell v. New York, 2001 WL 422848, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying a FRCvP 60(b)(6) motion that was based on moving party's contention that the subject order was "legally incorrect").
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs satisfied the FRCvP 60(b)(6) standard, their request for reargument would be denied because plaintiffs did not bring to this Court's attention any authority that causes this Court to doubt the continuing validity of the June 28 Order. Indeed, as noted in the June 28 Order, HMC's promissory estoppel claim would establish liability on the basis of plaintiffs' representations — not based on the policy or an extension of coverage thereunder. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for relief under FRCvP 60(b)(6) will be denied.
Consequently, plaintiffs' argument concerning equitable estoppel is inapplicable.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motion seeking leave to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim is denied, that plaintiffs' motion for relief pursuant to FRCvP 60(b)(6) is denied, that the parties shall appear before Part III of this Court on April 2, 2004 at 3:00 p.m. (or as soon thereafter as they may be heard) to set a date for trial and that the caption of this case shall be changed to read