Summary
In State v. Baye (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 348, the Supreme Court noted that the admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Summary of this case from State v. MalletOpinion
No. 98-2554.
Submitted March 31, 1999.
Decided April 28, 1999.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 99854.
In 1985, appellant, James Michael Douglas, was convicted of murder and a firearm specification, and was sentenced to a prison term of fifteen years to life plus an additional three years of actual incarceration.
In September 1998, Douglas filed a voluminous petition in the court of appeals for a writ of habeas corpus to compel his immediate release from prison. Douglas claimed in his petition, as subsequently amended, that he was entitled to the writ because of the ex post facto imposition of new parole rules and guidelines and implementation of Am. Sub. S.B. No. 2, overcrowding and unnecessarily hostile prison conditions, his placement in solitary confinement, a conspiracy of state officials against granting him parole, an invalid guilty plea to his criminal offenses, and an invalid indictment concerning the firearm specification.
The court of appeals sua sponte dismissed his petition.
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
James Michael Douglas, pro se. Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Stuart W. Harris, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Douglas asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his habeas corpus petition. For the following reasons, Douglas's assertion lacks merit.
First, application of the challenged statutes, rules, and guidelines to Douglas does not constitute ex post facto imposition of punishment. State ex rel. Henderson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. Corr. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 267, 268, 690 N.E.2d 887, 888; State ex rel. Crigger v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 270, 272, 695 N.E.2d 254, 256.
Second, state prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement have an adequate legal remedy by way of an action under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code. See State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 89, 9192, 637 N.E.2d 306, 309.
Third, Douglas's claims of conspiracy and bias are not cognizable in habeas corpus. Cf. Wireman v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 322, 528 N.E.2d 173, 174.
Fourth, the issue of whether Douglas made an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea is a matter to be resolved by motion to withdraw the guilty plea, direct appeal, or postconviction proceedings, rather than in habeas corpus. See Pollock v. Morris (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 117, 117-118, 518 N.E.2d 1205, 1206; cf. State ex. rel. Tran v. McGrath (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 45, 46-47, 676 N.E.2d 108, 109.
Fifth, habeas corpus is not the appropriate action to challenge the validity or sufficiency of an indictment. State ex rel. Raglin v. Brigano (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 410, 696 N.E.2d 585.
Finally, habeas corpus is generally appropriate in the criminal context only if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from prison. State ex rel. Smirnoff v. Greene (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 165, 167, 702 N.E.2d 423, 425. At best, Douglas's claims relate to an earlier consideration of parole rather than entitlement to immediate release from prison. Crigger, 82 Ohio St. 3 d at 272, 695 N.E.2d at 256.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.