Opinion
December 12, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Barry Salman, J.).
Since economic loss resulting from breach of contract does not constitute injury to property within the meaning of CPLR 1401 (Board of Educ. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw Folley, 71 N.Y.2d 21; Dormitory Auth. v Caudill Rowlett Scott, 160 A.D.2d 179, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 706) the claims for contribution asserted by Grace and Baker against Engineering Controls should have been dismissed. Nor does plaintiff's malpractice claim against Baker permit contribution, since that claim arises out of Baker's failure to fulfill contractual obligations, not its failure to perform in a manner equal to the standard of care in the profession (see, Robinson Redevelopment Co. v Anderson, 155 A.D.2d 755). Grace's second cause of action and Baker's sixth cause of action against Engineering Controls should have been dismissed as time-barred pursuant to the four-year Statute of Limitations applicable to the sale of goods (UCC 2-725 ) and the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to actions to recover for property damages (CPLR 214), since the third-party complaints are based upon a contract with Engineering Controls for the sale of the waste heat boilers together with component parts and other equipment, rather than a contract for installation services. (Triangle Underwriters v Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737.) Finally, while Grace can rely on paragraph 18 of the purchase order with Engineering Controls for its claim in express indemnification against Engineering Controls, a claim in implied indemnification is not available to Baker. Baker is not charged by plaintiff with vicarious liability for Engineering Controls' actions, but rather is alleged to be partially at fault for failing to properly design the boilers (Dormitory Auth. v Caudill Rowlett Scott, supra).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Wallach, Ross and Smith, JJ.