Opinion
X07HHDCV106094481S
07-27-2018
John DOE v. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD, et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Moukawsher, J.
1. Some Summary Judgments Justified
John Doe sues West Hartford, several doctors and a hospital for involuntarily committing him for psychiatric treatment. The defendants move for summary judgment on a variety of grounds. Some of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are granted as explained below.
2. Doe Will Have to Prove the Hospital Defendants Violated the Civil Commitment Statutes Intentionally Because All Other Claims Were Made Too Late
The first summary judgment motion (# 413) is from Hartford Hospital, its affiliate the Institute of Living, and three doctors- Mehendru, Mucha, and Washburn. The first claim is aimed at count 43 under General Statutes § 17a-550, a statute that allows lawsuits against people who violate psychiatric commitment procedures.
There is no explicit statute of limitations for claims under § 17a-550. When there isn’t one, our Supreme Court earlier this year in Bouchard v. State Employee Retirement Commission reminded us that we must find an analogous limitation period and apply it. The hospital defendants urge the court to apply the two-year medical malpractice limitation period in General Statutes § 52-584 that would make this claim untimely. Doe wants the court to apply the three-year general tort limitation period in General Statutes § 52-577 that would make this claim timely if Doe proves- as General Statutes § 52-593a allows- that the lawsuit was delivered to a marshal before the limitation period expired and served within 30 days.
The trouble for Doe is that, for most of his claims, there isn’t much need of analogy. And that’s because General Statutes § 52-584 directly applies to "negligence" "reckless or wanton misconduct" or "malpractice" by a physician. If the hospital defendants violated General Statutes § 17a-550 carelessly, recklessly, or in contravention of the applicable standard of care, General Statutes § 52-584 expressly applies and these claims are defeated by the statute’s two-year limitation period.
But Doe also claims General Statutes § 17a-550 creates a cause of action for intentional tort that would be governed by the three-year statute of limitations. And it’s hard not to see the possibility of one. The statute only says that a person must be "aggrieved" by a violation of the procedures for psychiatric commitment. Since the statute expressly allows a civil suit for damages, such a lawsuit can plainly be brought for intentional misconduct- the most culpable form. The real question is whether there is any evidence here sufficient to send the issue to a jury.
And provided we see it in the light most favorable to Doe there is sufficient evidence to go to a jury. General Statutes § 17a-542 requires the defendants to provide Doe with "humane and dignified treatment." He swears that hospital employees certified him as gravely disabled without examining him, ignored his protests, threatened him into taking medication he didn’t need and when confronted with a portion of the statutes at issue here announced that they did not have to obey that law. These and other claims are best considered by a fact finder together with the appropriate circumstantial evidence and require credibility judgments inappropriate for summary judgment. Therefore, Doe may succeed with his claims under General Statutes § 17a-550 if and only if the finder of fact ultimately finds intentional violations of General Statutes § § 17a-540 to 17a-549, inclusive. As noted previously on the record, Doe will also have to prove to the jury the lawsuit was timely filed under a three-year statute of limitations.
The court grants the hospital defendants summary judgment on any claims of malpractice, recklessness, or carelessness in complying with the civil commitment statutes found in count 43 because the limitations period to bring these claims expired before Doe sued.
3. Claim Against Dr. Theodore Mucha
Doe claims defendant Theodore Mucha, the medical director at the Institute of Living, falsely imprisoned him by not immediately releasing him under General Statutes § 17a-502(f). This statute says the superintendent or director of a hospital must immediately discharge a patient "who is later found not to meet the standards for emergency detention." This means no more than it says. It means that if it was later found- it doesn’t matter who finds it- that Doe didn’t meet the criteria to be confined at the Institute for Living, Mucha had to discharge Doe immediately.
There is no evidence anyone during Doe’s confinement found Doe didn’t meet the confinement standards. Doe admits as much but says the court should hold that the claim can stand if they "should have found" he didn’t meet the standard. Because the court may not rewrite the statute, it must hold Doe’s claim for violating General Statutes § 17a-502(f) fails because it was never found Doe didn’t meet the emergency detention standards.
Mucha is granted a summary judgment against Doe on counts 43 and 45 of Doe’s complaint.
4. Claims Against Dr. Radhika Mehendru
In count 46, Doe sues Dr. Radhika Mehendru and Hartford Hospital for intentional infliction of emotional distress. To win his claim, our Supreme Court in 2000 in Appleton v. Board of Education held that Doe must prove among other things that Mehendru’s conduct was "extreme and outrageous." Mehendru and the hospital claim no jury could find extreme or outrageous conduct here.
Doe claims Mehendru refused to authorize nurses to give Doe his blood pressure and other medications as part of Mehendru’s efforts to coerce Doe into taking drugs he didn’t need. When Doe refused, Mehendru let him know he was beginning the legal process to force medication on Doe physically. Doe claims Mehendru’s threats forced him to take medication he shouldn’t have taken.
Whether this is extreme and outrageous conduct turns on factual findings about the context. To threaten a person with physical force to take medication a doctor knows the patient doesn’t need may be deemed outrageous. To withhold blood pressure medication a patient needs for the purpose of forcing him to take medications he doesn’t need may also be considered outrageous. Likewise, it may be outrageous to threaten a patient with indefinite confinement when you know he shouldn’t be confined at all. In short, if, as Doe claims, the hospital defendants knew they were wrongly confining him, some of their conduct might easily be deemed outrageous. On the other hand, if they made the right call about Doe’s condition the law specifically permits them to hold him against his will and even hold him down and force on him the appropriate medication. A jury will have to decide between the parties’ differing versions of the events.
Therefore, summary judgment on count 46 is denied.
5. Doe’s Claims Against the West Hartford Police
a. The Claim Against Lt. Melanson
In the eighth amended complaint counts 1-38 and 47-48, Doe makes several claims against West Hartford and its police, including for violating his Fourth Amendment rights, assault and battery, false imprisonment, intimidation based on bigotry or bias, intentional infliction of emotional distress, deprivation of his equal rights and privileges as a disabled person, conspiracy and for injunctive relief concerning the relevant police reports. The West Hartford police defendants move for summary judgment on many of the counts alleged against them (# 419).
Lieutenant Donald Melanson moves for summary judgment. It is undisputed that Melanson arrived after most of the struggle at Doe’s home was over. Doe claims, however, that as a supervisor on the scene, Melanson should have stopped things from continuing. Doe claims that in Melanson’s presence he was being dragged half naked down the stairs handcuffed and crying that the cuffing was not needed and was injuring him because of his osteoporosis. Consequently, Melanson can’t claim he was absent for all the conduct Doe complains of. Assuming Doe was being assaulted and his rights violated on that trip out of the building, Melanson- admittedly the senior supervisory police official on the scene- would have had the responsibility to stop it. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 2003 held in Richardson v. Goord, supervisors may be liable in § 1983 actions for failing to right wrongs being committed or for supervising their subordinates with gross negligence.
A person with a duty to act who fails to perform that duty may be liable for the consequences. A police supervisor has a duty to supervise. If, as Doe claims, Melanson utterly failed in that duty, he may be responsible for any injury done to Doe as a consequence. Doe claims the duty was violated. Melanson denies it. The rest is for a jury.
Melanson’s motion for summary is denied.
b. The Claim Against Sergeant Silano
Before Melanson got to the scene, Sergeant Silano was in charge. For the same reasons as with Melanson, Silano’s motion for summary judgment is denied.
c. The claim Against Officer Sullivan
There is nothing to support making defendant Sullivan responsible for assault and battery. Doe’s motion papers make no claim that Sullivan assaulted Doe or had supervisory authority over those who allegedly did. Indeed, Doe hasn’t supported any of his claims against Sullivan with evidence sufficient to create an issue for the jury. Accordingly, there is no claim against Sullivan to submit to the jury. Summary judgment will enter in favor of Officer Sullivan on all claims. (Counts 4, 10, 16, 22 and 28.)
D. The Claims of Bigotry and Bias
Doe claims the West Hartford defendants all acted against him out of bigotry and bias against the mentally disabled. Doe claims relief for this under General Statutes § § 52-571c, 53a-181j, 52-571a and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
But no reasonable jury could find from the record before the court that the West Hartford defendants acted out of animus toward the disabled. Doe simply claims these defendants engaged in wrongdoing and speculates that it must be because of animus against the mentally disabled. There is no thread of support for these claims even the most gossamer.
At best, it is based on asking why else would the police commit these claimed wrongs. But other possible reasons are staring Doe in the face (again assuming there was any wrong done at all) such as a misguided desire to protect Doe and others from harm- including themselves. There is enough evidence to let a jury decide if the police engaged in other kinds of misconduct. But there is no affirmative evidence to support the alleged bias claim and no way from this record for a reasonable jury to conclude that the lack of alternative explanation means bigotry motivated the alleged misconduct. No matter how you slice the applicable standard Doe must have evidence of one or these or the other and Doe has neither.
Summary judgment is granted against Doe on counts 19 to 24 and 31 to 36. Summary judgment is also granted on count 48, alleging a civil conspiracy to deprive equal rights and privileges under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) because there can be no conspiracy claim when there is no underlying wrong.
e. The claims Against West Hartford and its Police Chief
Doe also claims West Hartford and its police chief are liable for their deliberate indifference to the police department’s ongoing practice of violating the constitutional rights of mentally disabled citizens. This liability is asserted under § 1983 as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in 1978 in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services.
Doe’s claims here must fail because they are unsupported by anything sufficient to send to a jury. Doe only claims there was a state study and that some state recommendations have been made to better prepare the police in this state to handle mentally disabled citizens. No evidence connects this study and these recommendations to West Hartford. There has been a general state government concern about improving efforts in this area and concern that some mentally disabled citizens have been mistreated or could be better treated. But this suit is against West Hartford and it isn’t enough to say that West Hartford could have had some special training programs but didn’t. It isn’t enough to speculate that after a good program the officers in this case might have talked longer to Doe’s spouse or proceeded with more caution here. To create a triable issue of fact, Doe must at least offer evidence that West Hartford and its chief have been indifferent to an ongoing problem in that specific town.
See Amnesty America v. West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2004); Jones v. East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Villante v. Dept. of Corrections, 786 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1986).
Doe hasn’t done this and, even assuming (without deciding) that it would be enough, Doe hasn’t supported in any way his claim that the chief in this case knew of the officers’ actions here and should be responsible for consciously choosing to do nothing about them. There is no evidence that the chief knew about this as it was happening.
And Doe can’t bootstrap his way into this claim either. He may not point as evidence of bigotry to West Hartford’s disagreement with Doe’s claims in this lawsuit and its failure after the incident to make changes. The town believes it did nothing wrong and didn’t need to make changes. This cannot be evidence of indifference to an ongoing problem. Denying a problem isn’t evidence of a problem.
Therefore, summary judgment will enter against Doe on counts 37 and 38 of the complaint.
6. Doe’s Claims Against His Doctor
Doe sues his doctor, Dale James Wallington, and his business in counts 39 to 42. Wallington moves for summary judgment on the claims asserted against him (# 381.)
First, Doe claims Wallington invaded his privacy by shedding a false light of publicity onto his private medical affairs. But it is undisputed that Wallington only discussed Doe’s medical condition with Doe’s wife and the hospital staff that was trying to treat him. As stated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E as adopted by our Supreme Court in 1982 in Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican American, Inc., publicity must be given and "publicity" means the harmful information must be communicated to "so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."
No reasonable jury could find that by speaking with Doe’s wife and hospital officials Doe’s medical information was "substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." The undisputed audience for Willington’s statements was the minimum group appropriate for the circumstances. Regardless whether the information was true, regardless whether it was highly negative, the information must be substantially certain to become public knowledge before Doe can win an invasion of privacy claim against Wallington. Nothing in the record would support this conclusion.
Wallington and his company are granted a summary judgment against Doe on count 39.
As to count 4 o for violation of the psychiatrist-patient privilege, a cause of action is allowed under General Statutes Sec. 52-146j(b). That section provides: "(b) Any person aggrieved by a violation of sections 52-146d to 52-146j, inclusive, may prove a cause of action for civil damages." Since those sections are the patient confidentiality provisions, a cause of action for intentionally violating these sections must be allowed under the same reasoning that applied to the claims concerning wrongful psychiatric commitment under General Statutes § 17a-550.
Summary judgment is denied as to count 40.
As he did with Mehendru, Doe also claims Wallington intentionally inflicted on him emotional distress and therefore must prove extreme and outrageous conduct. As with Mehendru, whether this is extreme and outrageous conduct turns on factual findings about the context. Doe claims Wallington, with no basis in anything Doe ever did or said, concocted a story about manic and bipolar behavior and pushed it down the throat of Doe’s wife and hospital officials. He says this triggered Doe being forcibly dragged from his home and locked away in a mental institution where he was degraded for over two weeks. If Doe is right, a reasonable person might indeed exclaim that the behavior was outrageous. Whether Doe or Wallington is right is a question best left to a jury.
Therefore, summary judgment on count 41 is denied.
The same analysis applies to Doe’s claim against Wallington for false imprisonment. Our Supreme Court in 1999 in Rivera v. Double A Transportation, Inc. held that a person may be liable for false imprisonment if, at a minimum, an act of "a rather extreme brand of recklessness" results in another’s confinement. Again, it is best that a jury choose between the two starkly different views of events and that it decide any degrees of culpability needed.
Therefore, summary judgment on count 42 is denied.
7. Conclusion: A Mixed Result
Summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants on counts 4, 10, 16, 22, 28, 19-24, 31-39 and 48. Summary judgment under count 43 is granted in favor of defendant Mucha and for all other claims in that count with the exception of any claims for intentional misconduct. Summary judgment under count 45 is granted in favor of defendant Mucha. Otherwise, the pending motions # 381, 413 and 419 are denied. To the extent that the plaintiff’s oppositions (# 455, 457 and 459) to the defendants’ motions for summary are considered motions (as they are incorrectly labeled on the docket listing), these motions are also denied because of the fact disputes recited here.