Opinion
No. CV 03-0822147 S
March 19, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This six-count complaint dated February 10, 2003 seeks damages from the defendant administrator of the Estate of George E. Reardon, M.D. for engaging in unwanted sexual contact, during office visits with the plaintiff, commencing in 1974, when the plaintiff was sixteen years old, through 1980. Dr. Reardon died on September 6, 1988 and this action was instituted on January 8, 2002.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that this action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 45a-375, since the action was commenced three years and four months after Dr. Reardon's death.
Plaintiff claims that the applicable statute of limitations is that set forth in General Statutes § 52-577d under which the plaintiff would have until his forty-eighth birthday, which has not occurred, to commence this action.
I
In construing two seemingly conflicting statutes, we are guided by the principle that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law. Accordingly, if two statutes appear to be in conflict but can be construed as consistent with each other, then the court should give effect to both. Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 32, 818 A.2d 37 (2003). The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search to determine the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter. Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 734 (2003). It is a well-recognized rule of statutory construction that the legislature is presumed to know all the existing statutes, the judicial interpretation of them, and the effect that its action or nonaction will have on them. Mack v. Saars, 150 Conn. 290, 298 (1963).
II
Section 45a-375(c) reads in relevant part, "[N]o claim may be presented and no suit on such claim may be commenced against the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of such estate but within (1) two years from the date of the decedent's death or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim . . . would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur."
"A statute of limitation or of repose is designed to (1) prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise." Deleo v. Nusbaum, 263 Conn. 588, 596, 821 A.2d 744 (2003).
The purpose of the statute of limitations contained in § 45a-375 seems clear.
The legislative history reveals that its purpose is to protect the beneficiaries of estates from being held liable in the future. 30 H.R. Proc., Pt. 22, 1987 Sess., p. 8135. In response to a constitutional defect, Public Act 89-202 amended the last date for presenting a claim from two years from the date of the appointment of the first fiduciary to the date of decedent's death. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary Part 4, 1989 Sess., p. 1339. Limiting the period to bring claims to two years not only protects beneficiaries from suit, but also promotes the strong legislative policy of the probate code that favors the speedy administration of estates. See Matey v. Estate of Dember, 256 Conn. 456, 478, 774 A.2d 113 (2001). Furthermore, the language of § 45a-375 clearly asserts its relationship to other existing regulations: the language "whichever shall first occur" cuts short competing statutes of limitations.
III
Section 52-577d reads in relevant part, "[N]o action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of majority."
The legislative history of § 52-577d reveals that the legislature plainly recognized that "victims of abuse and exploitation may take an extended period of time to bring an action" because such victims suppress memories of the abuse for long periods of time. Todd M. v. Richard L., 44 Conn. Sup. 527, 534, 696 A.2d 1063 (1995) (commenting on the legislative purpose behind the 1991 extension of the same statute of limitations from two to seventeen years). The legislature intended to extend the statute of limitations of § 52-577d to allow "plaintiffs sufficient time to recall the traumatic offenses." Id. In enacting the surrounding legislative scheme, which includes criminal legislation, the legislature worked to achieve two goals by greatly extending the statute of limitations: (1) to provide victims with an "opportunity to speak up, to talk about [the effects of the abuse], and to make sure that their voice and their concerns are heard," and (2) to prevent future acts of sexual abuse on new victims by allowing more time to prosecute offenders and alerting communities of a sexual predator's existence even long after such crime was committed. Id., 535 n. 5; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Part 6, 2002 Sess., p. 1575; 45 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2002 Sess., p. 3979-80. In so doing, the legislature intended "to send a clear message to [sexual predators of children] that here in the State of Connecticut you will be prosecuted to the fullest of the law." 45 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2002 Sess., p. 3980.
IV
There is no indication, however, that the legislature intended the limitations period of § 52-577d to override that of § 45a-375. In discussing the statutory scheme of § 52-577e, which creates an unlimited statute of limitations for suits against criminally convicted sexual abusers, the legislature contemplated that such a long statute of limitations would increase the likelihood that a defendant might be deceased by the time a plaintiff brought suit. The legislature noted that if the perpetrator were dead, the victim "could file a claim against the estate of the convicted person." (Emphasis added.) 45 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2002 Sess., p. 4056. However, no specific discussion took place as to whether such a plaintiff could bring suit after the statute of limitations contained in § 45a-375 had run. It is unlikely that if the unlimited period of § 53-577e was not considered to override — § 45a-375(c) in the case of a convicted perpetrator, that the legislature intended for the limited period of § 52-577d to override § 45a-375(c) in the case of a decedent who, as here, apparently has not been convicted of prior offenses. The legislature could easily have said so if it intended § 52-577d to override § 45a-357(c).
The plaintiff argues that the application of § 45a-375 in this case would work injustice because it bars the plaintiff's otherwise valid claim specifically preserved by § 52-577d. Given the legislative intent, however, to allow victims the opportunity to confront their abusers in court and to prevent future victimization of minors through prosecution and alerting neighborhoods, it seems clear that neither of these issues will be promoted by allowing the plaintiff to seek redress against the decedent's beneficiaries who are not at fault for the decedent's alleged actions. This would be particularly true in this action where serious claims of wrongdoing in private quarters cannot be rebutted because the alleged tort feasor has long been deceased.
Moreover, in such circumstances, the goals of allowing the victim to confront his abuser as an adult and preventing future harms to new victims would likewise be unachievable.
Out of state cases cited by plaintiff, such as the medical malpractice case of Coffey v. Bresnahan, 127 N.H. 687, 506 A.2d 310 (1986), are mostly inapplicable to the facts in this case because they involved different statutes.
Coffey involved a six-year medical malpractice statute and a two-year estate statute and the court permitted an action by an allegedly incompetent minor plaintiff to proceed against a still open estate on considerations of "equity and justice," the inability of the plaintiff to discover the alleged malpractice and the probability of insurance coverage being available to pay any verdict.
Such factors are not apparent in this case and in any event have little weight in supporting the application of a potentially forty-eight year statute of limitations in this case against the application of the two-year limitation for decedent's estates in view of the state's long established interest in the speedy administration of estates. See Tappin v. Homecomings Financial Network, Inc., 265 Conn. 741, 758-59, 830 A.2d 711 (2003); Matey v. Estate of Dember, supra, 256 Conn. 478.
Because this action was started long after the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 45a-375 expired, defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.
Wagner, JTR.