Opinion
No. CV 02-0819558 S
April 29, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#129)
The court heard oral argument on the defendant's motion for summary judgment on March 14, 2005. Thereafter, the parties submitted supplemental briefs. After considering the parties' arguments, the court issues this memorandum of decision.
I Background
This action was commenced by a complaint dated September 13, 2002, which was served on September 18, 2002. See marshal's return of service, dated September 18, 2002. The plaintiff, who was born on July 16, 1953, alleges, in his second amended complaint (#131), that, when he was a child, between 1962 and 1963, a priest at St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church (St. Mary's), sexually assaulted and battered him, including requiring the plaintiff to perform oral sex on him and other children, sodomized him, and committed other similar acts of sexual assault and exploitation. He claims that the defendant, the Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, is responsible for his serious physical and emotional injuries and damages, and asserts claims based on negligence, recklessness, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This action was withdrawn as to St. Mary's on November 24, 2004.
After the motion for summary judgment was filed, the plaintiff filed a request to amend complaint, dated January 27, 2005, in which he omitted a claim of vicarious liability.
In the motion, the defendant asserts that all of the plaintiff's claims are time-barred by General Statute § 52-577d, which provides, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than thirty years from the date such person attains the age of majority."
On May 23, 2002, the effective date of the most recent amendment to § 52-577d, the age of majority was defined as eighteen years. General Statute § 1-1d provides, "Except as otherwise provided by statute, on and after October 1, 1972, the terms `minor', `infant' and `infancy' shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years and any person eighteen years of age or over shall be an adult for all purposes whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers, privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities as persons heretofore had at twenty-one years of age, and `age of majority' shall be deemed to be eighteen years."
The amendment was set forth in Public Acts 2002, No. 02-138, Section 2.
Based on these statutes, the defendant contends that this action is barred since it was commenced more than thirty years after the plaintiff attained the age of eighteen years on July 16, 1971.
In response, the plaintiff asserts that "[o]n September 30, 1972, the Plaintiff was nineteen (19) years of age and had not yet reached the age of majority under C.G.S. § 1-1d which at that time defined the age of majority as twenty-one (21) years of age. On October 1, 1972, an amendment to C.G.S. § 1-1d became effective which reduced the age of majority in Connecticut from twenty-one (21) to eighteen (18) years of age. Accordingly, the Plaintiff reached the age of majority on October 1, 1972 when C.G.S. § 1-1d, as amended, reduced the age of majority to eighteen (18) years of age. Under Connecticut law the Plaintiff was not the age of majority on September 30, 1972, but was the age of majority on October 1, 1972. As a result, the thirty-year statute of limitations began to accrue when the Plaintiff attained the age of majority on October 1, 1972." See plaintiff's objection to defendant's motion for summary judgment (#132), p. 4. Thus, according to the plaintiff, his action is not time-barred even though it was commenced more than thirty-one years after he reached the age of eighteen years.
II Standard of Review
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. "In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Insurance Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 405, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004).
III Discussion
The motion presents an issue of statutory interpretation. "When construing a statute, we first look to its text, as directed by Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154, which provides, `The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.' . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also seek interpretive guidance from the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the legislative policy it was designed to implement, the statute's relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Footnote omitted.) Teresa T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 742, 865 A.2d 428 (2005).
"The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tarnowsky v. Socci, 271 Conn. 284, 287 n. 3, 856 A.2d 408 (2004). "[T]he mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) CT Page 7771 Poole v. Waterbury, 266 Conn. 68, 88, 831 A.2d 211 (2003). "[L]anguage is unambiguous when it has a definite and precise meaning . . . concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Here, the parties each contend that the statutory language is plain and unambiguous.
"[W]ords in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning . . . unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802, 810, 850 A.2d 114 (2004); see also Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 162, 788 A.2d 1158 (2002), citing General Statutes § 1-1(a). It is a "well established canon of statutory construction that [i]n construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, supra, 259 Conn. 164. "We construe statutes so as not to thwart their intended purpose; . . . and in a manner that will not lead to bizarre or irrational consequences." (Citation omitted and internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 80-81, 836 A.2d 224 (2003).
Section 1-1(a) provides, "In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly."
General Statute § 52-577d's meaning and relationship to other statutes have been addressed by Connecticut's appellate courts and in the Superior Court. Our Supreme Court recently noted that General Statute § 52-577d is a statute of limitations which contains within it a repose section. See Barrett v. Montesano, 269 Conn. 787, 795, 849 A.2d 839 (2004). "A statute of limitation or of repose is designed to (1) prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale and fraudulent claims by allowing persons after the lapse of a reasonable time, to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty, free from the disruptive burden of protracted and unknown potential liability, and (2) to aid in the search for truth that may be impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeLeo v. Nusbaum, 263 Conn. 588, 596, 821 A.2d 744 (2003).
In discussing § 52-577d, our Supreme Court stated, "statutes of limitation are presumed to apply retroactively . . . Although substantive legislation is not generally applied retroactively absent a clearly expressed legislative intent, legislation that affects only matters of procedure is presumed to [be] applicable to all actions, whether pending or not, in the absence of any expressed intention to the contrary . . . Statutes of limitation are generally considered to be procedural, especially where the statute contains only a limitation as to time with respect to a right of action and does not itself create the right of action . . . Therefore, unless specifically tied to a statutory right of action or unless a contrary legislative intent is expressed, the statute of limitations in effect at the time an action is filed governs the timeliness of the claim." (Citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted.) Roberts v. Caton, 224 Conn. 483, 488-89, 619 A.2d 844 (1993).
In discussing the 1991 amendment to § 52-577d, which extended the limitations period until 17 years after such person attained the age of majority, the Supreme Court commented on its purpose. "The Connecticut legislature has recently recognized that child victims of sexual assault often do not come forward with a complaint until well after they have reached their majority . . . By enacting No. 91-240 of the 1991 Public Acts (P.A. 91-240), the legislature extended the statute of limitations for civil actions in which persons seek damages for injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse, exploitation or assault. General Statutes 52-577d had previously limited the commencement of an action in damages for such abuse to not later than two years from the date the victim had attained the age of majority, except that no action could be brought more than seven years from the date of the act complained of. The statute, by virtue of the enactment of PA. 91-240, now permits a cause of action to be commenced up to seventeen years after the victim reaches majority." (Citations omitted and footnote omitted.) Henderson v. Woolley, 230 Conn. 472, 483-84, 644 A.2d 1303 (1994).
More recently, in discussing § 52-577d after the 2002 amendment which extended the seventeen year period to thirty years, Judge Wagner noted, "The legislature intended to extend the statute of limitations of § 52-577d to allow plaintiffs sufficient time to recall the traumatic offenses . . . In enacting the surrounding legislative scheme, which includes criminal legislation, the legislature worked to achieve two goals by greatly extending the statute of limitations: (1) to provide victims with an opportunity to speak up, to talk about [the effects of the abuse], and to make sure that their voice and their concerns are heard, and (2) to prevent future acts of sexual abuse on new victims by allowing more time to prosecute offenders and alerting communities of a sexual predator's existence even long after such crime was committed . . . In so doing, the legislature intended to send a clear message to [sexual predators of children] that here in the State of Connecticut you will be prosecuted to the fullest of the law." (Citations omitted and internal quotation citations omitted.) Doe v. Shimkus, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 03-0822147 S (March 19, 2004, Wagner, J.T.R.) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 711).
Section 52-577d has been referred to as containing "plain language." Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 56 F.Sup.2d 195, 199 (D.Conn. 1999). Another court has termed it as "clear on its face." Coburn v. Ordner, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV93-0306715 (March 23, 1995, Gormley, J.) ( 14 Conn. L. Rptr. 9).
In addition, when § 52-577d was enacted in 1986, the age of majority had been eighteen since 1972. "The legislature is always presumed to be aware of all existing statutes and the effect that its action or nonaction will have on any of them." Wiseman v. Armstrong, supra, 269 Conn. 822. The legislature must be presumed to have been aware of the provisions of § 1-1d when § 52-577d was first passed and later amended.
As originally enacted in 1986, § 52-577d's limitations period was no "later than two years from the date such person attains the age of majority, except that no action may be brought more than seven years from the date of the act complained of." In 1991, § 52-577d's limitations period was extended to "seventeen years from the date such person attains the age of majority," and the reference to a period of time from the date of the act complained of was omitted. Contrary to the plaintiff's argument here for an interpretation of § 52-577d which would extend it beyond thirty years after his eighteenth birthday, our Appellate Court has stated, in discussing the 1991 amendment to § 52-577d, "Section 52-577d was subsequently amended by No. 91-240 of the 1991 Public Acts, which effectively extended the period of time in which to file an action to age thirty-five, regardless of when the act complained of occurred." Giordano v. Giordano, 39 Conn.App. 183, 191, 664 A.2d 1136 (1995).
Under the same reasoning, it is evident, from the statute's plain and unambiguous language, that in the 2002 amendment, in substituting thirty years for Public Act No. 91-240s seventeen years, the legislature extended the period of time for thirteen additional years, until a plaintiff reaches the age of forty-eight, thirty years after the age of eighteen. See Doe v. Shimkus, supra (under the current § 52-577d, "potentially forty-eight-year statute of limitations, . . . Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocese Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV93-0302072S (September 15, 1997, Thim, J.) ( 20 Conn. L. Rptr. 269) (under the former seventeen-year limitations period in § 52-577d, "[a]n action to recover damages caused by sexual abuse, exploitation or assault inflicted on a minor must be brought prior to the victim reaching his or her thirty-fifth birthday").
In reaching this conclusion, the court also is guided by Roberts v. Caton, supra, 224 Conn. 488-89, concerning the retroactive effect of statutes of limitation, including § 52-577d. This plain meaning "does not yield absurd or unworkable results." See Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154. Nothing in the language of § 52-577d, when read together with § 1-1d, indicates that the 30-year period is to be calculated differently for a person who attained the age of eighteen before § 1-1d was amended in 1972 to deem the age of majority to be eighteen years.
The court is unpersuaded by the plaintiff's argument that, if the legislature meant to measure the thirty-year period from the age of eighteen, it would have inserted that language in § 52-577d. This contention ignores the fact that, as stated above, the court must presume that, when § 52-577d was enacted and amended, the legislature was aware that, in § 1-1d, it stated that age 18 is to be deemed the age of majority. See Wiseman v. Armstrong, supra, 269 Conn. 822. The legislature did not have to say that again in § 52-577d to make it clear.
In advancing his argument for a different meaning, the plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish the Appellate Court's 1995 decision in Giordano v. Giordano, supra. Rather, the only case law he cites which addressed § 52-577d is a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which, in dictum, states, "As the district court observed . . . until October 1972 the age of majority in Connecticut was twenty-one. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1d. Accordingly, [the plaintiff], who turned twenty-one on August 3, 1968, had until 1985 to bring this action . . ." Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 418 (1999) (" Martinelli"). The quoted passage occurs in a discussion concerning tolling, an issue which is not before this court. See id., 196 F.3d 418-19. Also, the CT Page 7775 Martinelli court's decision did not mention Giordano v. Giordano, supra, which had been decided over four years prior to its issuance.
Similarly, in its post-verdict ruling, the district court in Martinelli did not mention Giordano v. Giordano, supra. Its reference to § 52-577d also occurs in a discussion of tolling, concerning the plaintiff's invocation of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The district court stated, "[u]nder Connecticut law, the statute of limitations in actions to recover for personal injury to a minor caused by sexual abuse is limited to seventeen years after the person attains the age of majority. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577d . . . Mr. Martinelli, born on August 3, 1947, did not file suit until July 27, 1993 — almost 25 years after he reached the age of majority." (Footnotes omitted.) CT Page 7777 Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 10 F.Sup.2d 138, 144 (D.Conn. 1998).
In contrast, in an earlier ruling in the same case, on a motion for summary judgment, the district court stated, "There is no dispute that plaintiff attained the age of majority on August 3, 1965. Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on July 27, 1993, nearly 28 years after he turned 18." Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 989 F.Sup. 110, 114 (D.Conn. 1997). In its 1998 decision the district court did not discuss the inconsistency between its 1997 and 1998 rulings. Clearly, the plaintiff in Martinelli reached the age of 21 before the 1972 amendment to § 1-1d.
The plaintiffs claim in Martinelli was untimely, unless tolled, regardless of whether the "age of majority" was considered to be 18 or 21. When he reached the age of majority was not at issue there. Rather, here, as stated above, the plaintiff argues that his "age of majority" for the purposes of § 52-577d should be 19 years, 2 months, and 15 days, the age he was on October 1, 1972, when the amendment to § 1-1d became effective, changing the age of majority from 21 to 18. Although the Martinelli court cites General Statutes § 1-1d, it does not discuss § 1-1d's direction that "on and after October 1, 1972, . . . `age of majority' shall be deemed to be eighteen years." Martinelli does not even imply that those who were 19 years old when the age of majority changed from 21 to 18 are to be afforded additional time to bring an action under § 52-577d.
Under these circumstances, and in view of Giordano v. Giordano, supra, and the other Connecticut decisions cited above, this court finds the reference to Martinelli to be unpersuasive.
Also unpersuasive are the plaintiff's references to cases from other states. None of the cases from other states cited by the plaintiff concern sexual abuse of a minor. None dealt with the concept of providing sufficient time, after a victim of childhood sexual abuse reaches adulthood, to come forward. Accordingly, their interpretations of statutes concerning the age of majority do not even rise to the level of "limited utility in the interpretation of our [statutes]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Savings Bank v. Meadow Lakes Realty Co., 243 Conn. 601, 612, 706 A.2d 465 (1998).
See Lampiasi v. St. Vincent's Hospital and Medical Center of New York, 51 N.Y.2d 913, 415 N.E.2d 981, 434 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1980) (medical malpractice); DeHart v. Anderson, 178 Ind.App. 581, 383 N.E.2d 431 (1978) (automobile accident); Willey v. Brown, 390 A.2d 1039 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 1978) (personal injury action concerning alleged faulty construction of lawnmower); Ledwell v. The May Co., 54 Ohio Misc. 43, 377 N.E.2d 798 (Ct. Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County 1977) (personal injury action arising from shooting); Arnold v. Davis, 503 S.W.2d 100 (Supreme Court of Tennessee 1973) (automobile accident).
In view of the lack of ambiguity in the statutory language at issue, resort to "extratextual sources" is not required here. See Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154.
There can be no doubt about the seriousness of the plaintiff's allegations. In 2002, the legislature recognized that such allegations warranted an extended statute of limitations. It extended the limitations period for thirty years after a victim attains age eighteen, the age of majority. The statute of limitations is not longer than that. Since the plaintiff's action was commenced more than thirty years after he attained the age of 18, it was begun after the expiration of the limitations period. Accordingly, it is time-barred.
CONCLUSION
There is no genuine dispute as to any material fact concerning the statute of limitations issue raised by the defendant's motion. The movant has shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. It is so ordered.
BY THE COURT
ROBERT B. SHAPIRO JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT