From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Doe v. Johnston

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
Sep 25, 2008
No. A119025 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2008)

Opinion


JOHN DOE, JR., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MICHAEL JOHNSTON et al., Defendants and Respondents. JOHN DOE, JR., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MICHAEL JOHNSTON et al., Defendants and Respondents. Nos. A119025, A121090 California Court of Appeal, First District, First Division September 25, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. 06-452581, 05-438600

Swager, J.

John Doe, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s orders in two related cases, granting the Cambridge Housing Authority’s (CHA) and Michael Johnston’s motions to quash service of summons and the complaints. We affirm both orders.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Two separate but in substance essentially identical actions were initiated by appellant in the trial court and are before us in these two consolidated appeals: the first (Doe I) (A121090), was filed on February 10, 2005, although the operative pleading is the second amended complaint filed on November 29, 2005; the second (Doe II) (A119025), was filed on May 25, 2006. The complaints named as defendants Joy Conde, Tony Ucciferri, Sandra Campbell, the San Francisco Housing Authority (SFHA), Michael Johnston, and the CHA. Johnston is the CHA’s director. The pleadings state that the CHA issued appellant a “section 8 housing assistance voucher” in 2001 in the state of Massachusetts. Under federal regulations appellant’s voucher entitled him to “port” – that is, to relocate – to another state, and in 2004 he relocated to San Francisco. The CHA paid the SFHA to administer the voucher.

The chronology of the cases and appeals became confusing due to a delay in the filing of the first order granting respondents’ motion to quash in Doe I. For that reason, the second action filed became the first action to be appealed. We will thus refer to the first action filed as Doe I, even though it is the second appeal in time, and the second action filed – albeit the first appeal – as Doe II. Regrettably, this does not alleviate the confusion, but at least it identifies the individual actions where necessary.

The complaints allege the SFHA served appellant with a proposed notice of termination on January 24, 2005, and despite his request for a stay of the termination until he received a hearing, wrongfully terminated his housing assistance the following day. The complaints further assert that respondents are all liable “under section 1983” for temporarily terminating his housing assistance in January of 2005, without first affording him a hearing as specified in the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development guidelines. For termination of his housing assistance without a prior hearing appellant alleges causes of action for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment, as well as for violations of Massachusetts and California statutory laws.

Plaintiff does not specify what code this section refers to, but we assume he is alleging a claim under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983).

The Doe II complaint acknowledges that his housing assistance had been reinstated by the SFHA, but seeks the benefits that were withheld from him.

The complaints also allege that the SFHA “stole” or otherwise unlawfully obtained appellant’s “financial documents” from a third party, “BVA, Inc.,” without his consent or a subpoena, and respondents, including Johnston, violated appellant’s privacy rights by disclosing unspecified derogatory, false information to BVA, Inc., and other third parties regarding the reasons for termination of his housing assistance. Appellant asserts that defendants are liable to him under the “federal privacy act (5 U.S.C. 552a),” “section 1983,” and for misappropriation, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and defamation. The allegation is also made that defendants are liable to him under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failing to provide him with a “reasonable accommodation” for his disability in the process that resulted in termination of his voucher. The complaints both include requests for compensatory damages, “punitive and exemplary and triple damages,” attorney fees, costs, and injunctive or other declaratory relief.

BVA, Inc., is not identified, other than as a “contractor for [San Francisco Redevelopment Authority (SFRA)],” and is not listed as a defendant in the actions.

On August 29, 2006, respondents Johnston and the CHA filed a motion in Doe I to quash service of summons and the complaint (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a)(1)) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Respondents claimed that they did not reside or do business in California, nor did they have minimum contacts with the state. After appellant filed opposition and a hearing was held on September 26, 2006, the motion to quash was granted, and the Doe I action against respondents Johnston and the CHA was dismissed. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for recusal of the trial court judge and for reconsideration of the dismissal of the action against respondents Johnston and the CHA for lack of personal jurisdiction. Respondents opposed the motion for reconsideration and requested sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (d). The court denied the request for reconsideration and awarded respondents sanctions in the amount of $850.

However, through some form of inadvertent delay, the order granting the motion and dismissing the action was not filed until February 15, 2008. Before respondents’ motion to quash was granted, the trial court sustained the demurrer of the SFHA to the second amended complaint without leave to amend for failure to state a cause of action, and the action was dismissed. Appellant’s motion to reconsider the dismissal of the action against the SFHA was subsequently denied. Those rulings are not before us in the Doe I appeal.

On March 14, 2007, respondents Johnston and the CHA filed a motion to quash service of summons and the complaint based on the lack of personal jurisdiction in Doe II. That same day, defendants Conde, Ucciferri, Campbell and the SFHA filed a demurrer to the Doe II complaint. On June 4, 2007, the trial court granted the CHA and Johnston’s motion to quash, and dismissed the action against them. On December 5, 2007, the court denied the demurrer as moot.

DISCUSSION

Our review of the issues before us is complicated by the procedural morass we are confronted with as the result of the unusual path the two cases have taken to this court. Appellant’s notice of appeal in Doe II (A119025) states that he is appealing from the “dismissal for service” order entered on June 4, 2007. While he also appears to contest the court’s December 5, 2007 order denying the demurrer as moot, he did not file a notice of appeal pertaining to that order. Accordingly, we will not address the court’s ruling on the demurrer.

After briefing was completed in Doe II, appellant filed his appeal in Doe I (A121090), in which he challenges the delayed order filed by the trial court on February 15, 2008, granting CHA and Johnston’s motion to quash service of summons on the substantively identical complaint. He also filed an appeal from the court’s March 10, 2006 order in that same action, granting SFHA’s demurrer without leave to amend.

We have granted respondents’ motion to consolidate the two appeals. We have also by separate order granted a motion to dismiss the appeal from the March 10, 2006 order in Doe I as untimely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104.)

I. Standard of Review.

In both appeals appellant challenges the trial court’s rulings that respondents Johnston and the CHA are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. He claims that respondents had sufficient contacts with the state due to the payment by the CHA to the SFHA of both appellant’s housing costs and an “administration fee.” Appellant also points out that the CHA continued to be the “issuing” agency for the housing voucher, and retained the right under “section 8’s rules” to control the “major decisions of the assistance,” including “how many bedrooms” he was authorized to occupy. Finally, appellant maintains that the allegations in the complaints of disclosures by Johnston on behalf of the CHA “to San Francisco landlords in violation of the privacy act is sufficient for specific personal jurisdiction.”

The process of determining whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant “is essentially an evidentiary one and the applicable standard of appellate review is the familiar substantial evidence rule. Therefore, if there is conflicting evidence presented by the parties, we are called upon to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence [citations], and, in doing so, we resolve all conflicts in the relevant evidence ‘against the appellant and in support of the order’ [citation].” (Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad Ltd. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1454 (Paneno).) “ ‘ “When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deduction for those of the trial court.” ’ [Citation.]” (Kazanteno v. Cal.-Western etc. Ins. Co. (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 361, 363.) Absent conflicts in the evidence, jurisdiction is a question of law which we review under the de novo standard of review. (Paneno, supra, at p. 1454.)

II. The Issue of Collateral Estoppel.

Before resolving the merits of the personal jurisdiction issue we first briefly confront respondents’ claim in the Doe II appeal that the prior ruling on the motion to quash in Doe I was determinative and binding in the second case. While the order entered in Doe II on June 4, 2007, does not reveal the trial court’s reasoning, the ruling appears to have been based on a determination that the issue of jurisdiction had already been decided in Doe I, in which Johnston and the CHA prevailed on their motion to quash the summons and complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found the determination made in Doe I that the CHA and Johnston were not subject to California jurisdiction barred relitigation of that same issue in Doe II. The court also found that the request for sanctions in the earlier case did not constitute a general appearance because it “was merely a statutorily permitted incident of defendants’ litigation of their position that the court lacked jurisdiction and sought only what the court might grant under [Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (d)] consistent with that position.”

In this consolidated appeal we must of course resolve the issue of personal jurisdiction in Doe I in any event, but we conclude that when the trial court ruled on the motion to quash in Doe II collateral estoppel principles did not apply. “ ‘ “Traditionally, collateral estoppel has been found to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous proceeding ‘if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding].’ . . .” [Citations.]’ (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1240 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544]; see also Lyons v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1015 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 174].) ‘In addition to these factors, . . . the courts consider whether the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a “full and fair’ opportunity to litigate the issue.’ (Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 880 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 446].)” (Rodgers v. Sargent Controls & Aerospace (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 82, 90.)

While the parties and issues here are identical, the essential element of a final judgment was missing when the motion to quash in Doe II was presented. The trial court had not yet executed the order granting the motion to quash in Doe I. “A trial court’s oral ruling on a motion does not become effective until it is filed in writing with the clerk or entered in the minutes. [Citations.] Accordingly, the trial court may properly file a written order differing from its oral rulings when the rulings have not been entered in the minutes of the court. [Citation.] Furthermore, when the trial court’s minute order expressly indicates that a written order will be filed, only the written order is the effective order.” (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1170.) While the register of actions reflects that the order was signed in open court, the reporter’s transcript clearly indicates that the court directed respondents to submit a new order, as their proposed order erroneously indicated that all parties had been represented by counsel.

At the hearing on April 17, 2007, counsel for the CHA and Johnston indicated that the court signed the order in January 2007. This appears not to have been the case as counsel submitted a new request for the court to sign the order on December 12, 2007. As noted above, the order was finally signed on February 15, 2008.

The ruling in Doe I then did not become final when the order was ultimately filed on February 15, 2008, because thereafter appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. “[A]ccording to California law, a judgment is not final for purposes of collateral estoppel while open to direct attack, e.g., by appeal.” (Abelson v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 776, 787; see also Lomeli v. Department of Corrections (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 788, 797.) The Doe I judgment becomes final only “when the appeal process is completed.” (Martin v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 688, 699.) As the appeal in Doe I is still pending there is no final judgment which must be given binding, preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. (People v. Summersville (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1068.)

III. The Issue of Personal Jurisdiction .

We turn to the merits of the jurisdictional issue. We agree with Johnston and the CHA that appellant has not made a sufficient showing to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. “ ‘California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitution of California and the United States.’ [Citation.]” (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1061 (Snowney); Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) That means a foreign defendant who has not been served with process in California may be subject to jurisdiction if the defendant has the requisite “minimum contacts” with the state such that the assertion of jurisdiction would not offend “ ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316; Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.) “In other words, the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” (Paneno, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1455.)

“Under the minimum contacts test, ‘[p]ersonal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.’ [Citation.]” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414.) “A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial . . . continuous and systematic.’ [Citations.] In such a case, ‘it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the forum.’ [Citations.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434, 445–446.) No assertion of general jurisdiction has been made in the cases before us. (Id., at p. 446.)

Because appellant does not claim general jurisdiction, we only consider whether specific jurisdiction exists. “If the nonresident defendant does not have substantial and systematic contacts with the forum state, the defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction if (1) ‘ “the defendant has purposefully availed [itself] of forum benefits” ’ with respect to the matter in controversy, (2) ‘ “the ‘controversy is related to or “arises out of” [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum,’ ” ’ and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice. [Citations.]” (DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1090.)

The United States Supreme Court explained the meaning of “purposeful availment” in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462: “This ‘purposeful availment’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, [citations], or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person,’ [citation]. Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State. [Citations.] Thus where the defendant ‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within a State, [citation], or has created ‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents of the forum, [citation], he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by ‘the benefits and protections’ of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.” (Id. at pp. 475–476, fns. omitted.)

“When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that all necessary jurisdictional criteria have been met. The plaintiff can meet this burden only by the presentation of competent evidence in affidavits or declarations and authenticated documentary evidence. [Citation.] Affidavits or declarations consisting primarily of vague assertions of ultimate fact rather than specific evidentiary facts are not sufficient.” (Paneno, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1454.) Nor is hearsay evidence sufficient. (Judd v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 38, 43.) Once the plaintiff has established jurisdictional facts, “the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Paneno, supra, at p. 1454.)

Appellant has not satisfactorily demonstrated that the CHA or Johnston, as nonresident defendants, purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in this state. The CHA’s sole place of business is in Massachusetts, and neither the CHA nor Johnston sought to conduct business activities in California. The record demonstrates that respondents’ sole connection to California was created by the unilateral decision of appellant to move to this state and transfer his housing assistance benefits with him. Any administrative decisions made by respondents were incident to their contact and relationship with appellant in Massachusetts, not any volitional conduct by them in California. Moreover, much of the conduct complained of by appellant was undertaken by the SFHA and the other named defendants in California, not by the CHA or Johnston in Massachusetts. The single purposeful alleged act by the CHA and Johnston was the disclosure of information to BVA, Inc. By that act respondents did not purposefully avail themselves of forum benefits or commit the type of deliberate, significant conduct or contact that subjects them to California’s jurisdiction. (Nobel Farms, Inc. v. Pasero (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 654, 661.)

We decline appellant’s invitation to apply the “effects” test for defamation cases as set forth in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783 as the complaints are not primarily based on allegations of defamation.

IV. Jurisdiction by General Appearance .

Appellant also claims that the CHA and Johnston submitted to the court’s jurisdiction in Doe II by including an attorney fee provision in their proposed order, and by requesting sanctions in Doe I pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (d). He claims that respondents thereby “waived” any objection to personal jurisdiction and “made a general appearance” in the case.

California courts have long held “a party waives any objection to the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction when the party makes a general appearance in the action.” (Roy v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 337, 341.) A general appearance operates as a consent to jurisdiction of the person. (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 52.) Section 1014 reads: “A defendant appears in an action when the defendant answers, demurs, files a notice of motion to strike, files a notice of motion to transfer pursuant to Section 396b, moves for reclassification pursuant to Section 403.040, gives the plaintiff written notice of appearance, or when an attorney gives notice of appearance for the defendant. . . .” The statutory list of acts constituting a general appearance in section 1014 “is not exclusive; ‘rather the term may apply to various acts which, under all of the circumstances, are deemed to confer jurisdiction of the person. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.) “[A] defendant may appear in ways other than those specifically designed in section 1014.” (Slaybaugh v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 216, 222.)

“As a general rule, a defendant makes a general appearance when he or she takes any part in the action or proceeding.” (In re Marriage of Fitzgerald & King (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1428.) “A general appearance occurs where a party, either directly or through counsel, participates in an action in some manner which recognizes the authority of the court to proceed. It does not require any formal or technical act.” (Mansour v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1756; see also Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., supra, 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.) “ ‘[I]f a defendant by his appearance insists only upon the objection that he is not in court for want of jurisdiction over his person and confines his appearance for that purpose only, then he has made a special appearance, but if he raises any other question, or asks any relief which can only be granted upon the hypothesis that the court had jurisdiction of his person, then he . . . made a general appearance.’ [Citation.]” (Bank of America v. Harrah (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 639, 641.)

“ ‘The nature of the appearance made . . . is not determined by the intentions of the party making the motion. Whether an appearance is general or special depends upon the relief sought.’ [Citation.]” (In re Krystle D. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1778, 1797.) If a moving party “seeks relief on any basis other than lack of personal jurisdiction, he or she makes a general appearance.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1037; see also Pfeiffer v. Ash (1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 102, 104.) “ ‘What is determinative is whether defendant takes a part in the particular action which in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.’ [Citation.] ‘The appearance will be considered “general” in nature if the defendant acts in a manner, “showing . . . a ‘purpose of obtaining any ruling or order of the court going to the merits of the case’.” ’ [Citation.]” (Nam Tai Electronics, Inc. v. Titzer (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1307.) We are “thus required to analyze the defendant’s papers to determine if any affirmative relief could be granted on the merits, which is a general appearance.” (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 54.)

The CHA and Johnston did not file a motion for attorney fees in Doe II in connection with their motion to quash. Although their proposed order contained a provision for attorney fees, the court crossed out that provision before executing the order. Thus, no attorney fees were awarded in Doe II. Nor would such an award have been proper. (See Berard Construction Co. v. Municipal Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 710, 716 (Berard) [no statutory authority for the award of attorney fees, as costs, or of costs in general, in connection with a grant of a motion to quash].)

Respondents, however, did request an award of attorney fees as sanctions (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (d)) in Doe I in conjunction with their opposition to appellant’s motion for reconsideration, and the court awarded respondents sanctions in the amount of $850. Nevertheless, for several reasons we find that the request for sanctions did not constitute a general appearance. First, respondents’ motion to quash had already been granted based on a finding that no personal jurisdiction existed. Respondents cannot be found to have made a general appearance after the court had already dismissed the action against them for lack of jurisdiction. Further, the award of sanctions under section 1008 did not rest on the merits of the underlying case, but rather on plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of the jurisdictional issue that had already been determined by the court in respondents’ favor. In requesting sanctions in Doe I the CHA and Johnston did not invoke the authority of the court to proceed with the litigation beyond the jurisdictional issue, and never recognized the authority of the court to proceed against them in the underlying action. Finally, their motion for sanctions made within the confines of appellant’s request for reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to quash was incident to a statutory right and “no more inconsistent with the concept of special appearance than is the main motion . . . .” (Berard, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d 710, 717; see also Dial 800 v. Fesbinder, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 54.) Essentially, respondents’ motion for sanctions was nothing more than a request for statutorily authorized costs incurred in the pursuit of their special appearance to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, not an application for any other relief. We cannot construe the motion for sanctions as a waiver of the claim of absence of jurisdiction which respondents expressly and consistently articulated. (Berard, supra, at p. 720.) The purpose of the exemption that grants respondents the right to pursue a motion to quash and to oppose a motion for reconsideration of it without making a general appearance would also by defeated if we were to find that they must surrender their right to seek sanctions as provided by statute. (Ibid.) We therefore conclude that respondents did not make a general appearance or waive their right to challenge the jurisdiction of the court.

Section 1008 specifies the grounds and showing that must be made in support of a motion for reconsideration, and in subdivision (d) provides: “A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7. In addition, an order made contrary to this section may be revoked by the judge or commissioner who made it, or vacated by a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending.” Section 128.7, in turn, specifies that a pleading, petition or motion must meet the following conditions: “(b) . . . [¶] (1) It is not being presented primarily for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. [¶] (2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law. [¶] (3) The allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. [¶] (4) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. [¶] (c) If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. In determining what sanctions, if any, should be ordered, the court shall consider whether a party seeking sanctions has exercised due diligence.”

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed.

We concur: Marchiano, P. J., Stein, J.


Summaries of

Doe v. Johnston

California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division
Sep 25, 2008
No. A119025 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2008)
Case details for

Doe v. Johnston

Case Details

Full title:JOHN DOE, JR., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MICHAEL JOHNSTON et al.…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, First Division

Date published: Sep 25, 2008

Citations

No. A119025 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 25, 2008)