Opinion
No. 90-1131
Submitted October 17, 1990 —
Decided January 9, 1991.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Conviction for bribery.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 89-67.
Respondent, Charles H. McClenaghan, was convicted of bribery in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County on May 12, 1989, and was subsequently sentenced to a one-year prison term, which was suspended, two and one-half years' probation, a $5,000 fine, and two hundred hours of community service. On August 23, 1989, we indefinitely suspended respondent from the practice of law under Gov. Bar R. V(9)(a)(iii) for conviction of a felony and referred the matter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. See 45 Ohio St.3d 705, 543 N.E.2d 1288. On November 2, 1989, Disciplinary Counsel filed a complaint against respondent, charging him with three violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility in each of two counts.
Count I alleged that respondent's conviction for bribery violated DR 1-102(A)(3) (illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on one's fitness to practice law).
Count II alleged that respondent, a former Superintendent of the Division of Real Estate, Ohio Department of Commerce, who was affiliated with the Institute of Real Estate Education, Inc., approached an examiner for the Division of Real Estate, requesting copies of present and future examinations. Respondent later paid this examiner $500 for the exams. The transaction was recorded, and respondent was subsequently arrested, and charged with and convicted of bribery as set forth in Count I. Count II also charged respondent with violating DR 1-102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4), and 1-102(A)(6).
Respondent admitted the allegations against him in his answer and requested a hearing so that he could present mitigating evidence in his behalf. The hearing was held before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court on April 19, 1990. At the hearing, respondent accepted responsibility for his actions and submitted into evidence the indictment, judgment orders of conviction, sentencing memorandum and supplemental memoranda filed for consideration in his bribery case. The sentencing memorandum contained many character references.
The panel found that the seriousness of respondent's conduct warranted an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The board adopted the findings of fact and recommendation of the panel and also recommended that costs be taxed to respondent.
In accordance with Gov. Bar R. V(19), this court ordered respondent to show cause why the board's recommendation should not be adopted. Respondent's counsel replied that the board's recommendation should not be adopted based on a comparison of respondent's case with two recent Ohio Supreme Court disciplinary cases in which definite suspensions were imposed: Disciplinary Counsel v. Dodge (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 132, 556 N.E.2d 1147, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Baker (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 142, 556 N.E.2d 466. Respondent's counsel argued that the conduct of respondents in Baker and Dodge was of a more severe nature than the conduct of respondent in this case; thus, the penalty in this case should be confined to a definite suspension. Relator answered that an indefinite suspension was in keeping with the penalty previously imposed for bribery, citing Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gloeckner (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 83, 1 OBR 120, 437 N.E.2d 1197, and Bar Assn. of Greater Cleveland v. Italiano (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 204, 24 OBR 431, 494 N.E.2d 1113.
J. Warren Bettis, disciplinary counsel, and Mark H. Aultman, for relator.
Sam B. Weiner, for respondent.
We agree with relator that precedent supports imposing an indefinite suspension on respondent for his bribery conviction. Moreover, we find insufficient mitigating evidence to reduce that penalty. Respondent, formerly a high-ranking public official, bribed an employee in the division he had once headed. Letters of support do not easily mitigate such conduct. Therefore, we hereby adopt the recommendation of the board and indefinitely suspend respondent from the practice of law. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, HOLMES, DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, H. BROWN and RESNICK, JJ., concur.