Summary
In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Gloeckner (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 83, 84, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: "A certified copy of a judgment entry of conviction of an offense shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that offense in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney based upon the conviction."
Summary of this case from Reynolds v. Ohio State Bd. of ExaminersOpinion
D.D. No. 82-14
Decided July 21, 1982.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Acts warranting.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.
On November 20, 1981, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (board) held a private hearing in this cause pursuant to a complaint filed by relator, Columbus Bar Association. The complaint charged respondent, George N. Gloeckner, with violations of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4), (5) and (6), DR 7-102(A)(8) and DR 7-109(C) of the Code of Professional Responsibility by engaging in conduct involving a crime of moral turpitude.
The parties stipulated to the relevant facts as follows:
"1. Respondent on May 9, 1980, in Franklin County Common Pleas Court Case No. 80 CR 02332, after trial without a jury, was found guilty of violating Ohio Revised Code Section 2923.03, to wit: complicity to bribery.
"2. Respondent on June 26, 1980, was sentenced to one to ten years in prison, with the sentence suspended and placed on one year probation which has been completed without incident.
"3. The conviction stands without any pending appeal.
On March 24, 1981, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County affirmed respondent's conviction in case No. 80AP-456. Respondent's motion for leave to appeal to this court was overruled on June 24, 1981, case No. 81-766.
"4. On July 15, 1980, the Ohio Supreme Court indefinitely suspended Respondent from the practice of law pursuant to the provisions of Section 8(a)(iii) of Rule V of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio, wherein the Court stated,
"`George N. Gloeckner was found guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude * * *.'"
Upon its review of the evidence adduced at the hearing and the stipulations, the board concluded that respondent had breached the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
The matter is now before this court for consideration of the board's report and respondent's objections to the recommended sanction.
Mr. David S. Bloomfield, for relator.
Mr. Andrew S. Wentworth, II, for respondent.
The board recommended respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of law "because of the seriousness of the crime of which respondent was convicted." Respondent contends that in reaching its conclusion the board did not fully take into account certain mitigating circumstances attending his conviction. Specifically, respondent points to the tenuousness of his connection with the individual who actually solicited the bribe, the isolated nature of the criminal incident in light of respondent's otherwise exemplary record, and the fact that the state had offered to reduce the charges against respondent to a misdemeanor in pre-trial plea negotiations to support his position that a lesser sanction be imposed. Nevertheless, as we stated in Bar Assn. v. Chvosta (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 429, at page 430 [16 O.O. 3d 452], "[r]espondent does not contend that he was not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
"Gov. R. V(8)(b) states:
"`A certified copy of a judgment entry of conviction of an offense shall be conclusive evidence of the commission of that offense in any disciplinary proceedings instituted against an attorney based upon the conviction.'
"This rule makes it clear that a disciplinary proceeding is not an appropriate forum in which to collaterally attack a criminal conviction."
Respondent stands convicted of a felony crime of moral turpitude. The evidence and arguments relating to mitigating circumstances that were submitted to the board and are now before this court cannot undo respondent's felony conviction.
None of the cases involving one-year suspensions cited by respondent in his brief dealt with a felony conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. For that reason, the cited cases are distinguishable from the case at bar. The general rule, from which we do not deviate herein, is that indefinite suspension or disbarment is the appropriate disciplinary sanction to be imposed on an attorney who has been convicted of felony crime involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Fatica (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 40 [57 O.O. 2d 158].
Respondent directs our attention to Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Weisenberger (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 1 [22 O.O. 3d 34]; Bar Assn. v. York (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 485 [20 O.O. 3d 404]; Lake County Bar Assn. v. Needham (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 116 [20 O.O. 3d 102]; Mahoning County Bar Assn. v. Walsh (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 177 [20 O.O. 3d 190]; Bar Assn. v. Nesbitt (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 108 [23 O.O. 3d 157]; and Toledo Bar Assn. v. Kitchen (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 338 [23 O.O. 3d 310].
After a careful examination and review of the record in this cause, this court concurs with the findings and conclusion of the board.
It is the judgment of this court that respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
Judgment accordingly.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN and KRUPANSKY, JJ., concur.