Opinion
4:23-cv-00193-SHL-SBJ
2023-12-07
Sarah DICKEY, Plaintiff, v. MAHASKA HEALTH PARTNERSHIP; Kevin DeRonde; Timothy Breon; David Langkamp; Amber Coffey; Greg Gordy; and Marsha Riordan, Defendants.
Devin Ceres Kelly, Roxanne Barton Conlin, Roxanne Conlin & Associates, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff. Mary E. Funk, Frank B. Harty, Logan Jay Eliasen, Nyemaster Goode PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
Devin Ceres Kelly, Roxanne Barton Conlin, Roxanne Conlin & Associates, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Mary E. Funk, Frank B. Harty, Logan Jay Eliasen, Nyemaster Goode PC, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OR FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
STEPHEN H. LOCHER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I. INTRODUCTION.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff Sarah Dickey's employment discrimination claims for, inter alia, allegedly failing to satisfy the pleading and legal standards set forth in the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act ("IMTCA"). The IMTCA does not, however, apply to employment discrimination claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and thus cannot serve as a basis for dismissal. The Court further concludes that Dickey has stated plausible claims for relief for sex and disability discrimination (but not religious discrimination) against Defendants Mahaska Health Partnership ("MHP"), Kevin DeRonde, Timothy Breon, and David Langkamp. The Court therefore DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 32) as to those claims against those Defendants.
Dickey has not stated plausible claims for religious discrimination against any Defendant, nor has she stated plausible claims on any theory against Defendants Amber Coffey, Greg Gordy, and Marsha Riordan. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to those claims and Defendants. Nothing in this ruling precludes Dickey from moving for leave to amend to try to address the deficiencies described below.
II. BACKGROUND.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well-pled facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019). The recitation of facts in the Background section is designed to be consistent with this standard and should not be construed as findings of fact for any other purpose.
Dickey is a 45-year-old former employee of MHP. (ECF 30, ¶ 9.) She began working for MHP in March 2018 as Executive Director of Human Resources. (Id., ¶ 18.) Her title later changed to Chief Human Resources Officer, although the position was functionally the same. (Id., ¶¶ 19-20.) Dickey alleges that MHP and members of its administration have a history of taking discriminatory acts against female employees and based on employees' religious views. (Id., ¶ 21.) She alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of sex, religion, and/or disability, including retaliation theories.
A. Allegations Relating to Sex Discrimination.
Dickey's allegations regarding sex discrimination fall loosely into two categories:
(i) general allegations about the workplace environment; and (ii) specific allegations revolving around the departure of female physicians from the emergency department. As to the former, Dickey alleges that non-party David Cornelder, a physician, spoke poorly about female physicians. (Id., ¶ 22.) Defendant Timothy Breon, a physician who serves as MHP's Chief Medical Officer, frequently belittled women in the workplace, said men were "easier" to work with, and treated female Nurse Anesthetists poorly, including throwing office equipment across the room while yelling at them. (Id., ¶¶ 23-25.) Dickey never witnessed or heard of Breon doing these things to male Nurse Anesthetists. (Id., ¶ 25.) Defendant Kevin DeRonde — MHP's Chief Executive Officer and Dickey's immediate supervisor (id., ¶¶ 26-27) — terminated women for cursing or using swear words but not men (id., ¶ 40). DeRonde hired a male candidate as Chief Financial Officer even though everyone else on the Executive Team preferred the female candidate. (Id., ¶ 41.)
As to the emergency department, Dickey's allegations revolve around the "mass firing" of four female emergency room physicians, all of whom DeRonde planned to replace with male physicians. (Id., ¶¶ 32-39, 42-46.) DeRonde allegedly made disparaging comments about a female physician in the emergency department, Dr. Montgomery, and made comments about needing to "fix" the department. (Id., ¶¶ 32-34.) In late 2021, MHP sent termination notices to three female physicians in the emergency department and "railroaded" a fourth into retiring. (Id., ¶¶ 36-37.) The only male in the department, Dr. Cornelder, did not receive a termination notice, and the departing physicians were replaced with a male physician, Dr. Martin, who had no emergency room experience. (Id., ¶ 38.) DeRonde "made clear" that he wanted to hire men and believed women "did not fit into the workplace culture." (Id., ¶ 39.) DeRonde had contracts in place with Dr. Martin and three other male physicians to replace the departing female physicians before he even notified the MHP Board of Trustees of the terminations and retirement. (Id., ¶ 45.) Defendant Breon planned to pay Dr. Martin more than his female colleagues, although Dickey warned him against doing so. (Id., ¶ 44.)
DeRonde ended up resigning following "community backlash" over the mass firing of the female emergency room physicians. (Id., ¶ 46.) During a meeting about DeRonde's conduct between Dickey and MHP executive Gene Williamson, Breon "burst into" the room, berated Dickey (without treating Williamson, who was male, in a similar fashion), and refused to let Dickey leave to use the restroom. (Id., ¶¶ 47-48.) Later, when the Board of Trustees investigated DeRonde, Dickey expressed her belief that his actions were discriminatory against women. (Id., ¶ 51.) Defendants Breon and David Langkamp — the President of the MHP Board of Trustees — pushed to have DeRonde reinstated, which included Langkamp asking an MHP employee to report negative things about Dickey. (Id., ¶¶ 13, 52.) The employee refused. (Id.) Langkamp then took matters into his own hands by reporting to the Board that Dickey "could not be trusted." (Id., ¶ 53.)
In what was apparently a four-to-three vote, the MHP Board of Trustees ended up reinstating DeRonde. (Id., ¶¶ 54-56.) The three dissenters resigned from the Board and expressed concerns about MHP's employment practices. (Id., ¶¶ 57-61.) Following DeRonde's reinstatement, Dickey had anxiety and panic attacks, for which she took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") in October 2021. (Id., ¶ 62.) She sought treatment at
the University of Iowa's clinic, which she tried to keep secret from Defendants. (Id., ¶ 63.) However, MHP had access to her medical records through the service that both MHP and the University of Iowa used for managing patient records. (Id., ¶ 64.) Dickey's records were accessed three times during her FMLA leave by unknown employees of MHP. (Id., ¶ 66.)
B. Allegations Relating to Religious Discrimination.
Dickey's allegations regarding religious discrimination revolve largely around her Catholic faith. She alleges that DeRonde frequently asked her to be "submissive" and "vulnerable" to him and said she might not fit into the workplace if she would not do these things. (Id., ¶¶ 28-29.) He told her she needed to be "humble and submissive in order to fit within the culture at MHP" and asked her to proactively apologize to members of the entity's leadership for any offensive acts she may have unknowingly committed. (Id., ¶ 28.) DeRonde made numerous disparaging remarks about Dickey's religion, including: (a) laughing at her request to have a day off for Good Friday; (b) criticizing Catholics for thinking "they were better than everyone else" and refusing to allow non-Catholics to partake in communion; (c) criticizing Catholics for making a "big deal" out of everything; and (d) saying that Dickey's career advancement depended on her making herself "vulnerable" to DeRonde. (Id., ¶ 31.)
DeRonde and Breon often spoke about religion and pushed their religious ideas and practices onto employees. (Id., ¶ 67.) For example, in November 2018, Breon asked Dickey "what her testimony was." (Id., ¶ 68.) Dickey said she "was Catholic, and the rest was between her and God." (Id.) Breon brought up his religious faith in Executive Team Meetings, at least once per month. (Id., ¶ 69.) He compared Dickey and others to Jesus's disciples, described them as "disciples with loaves and fish," and advised them to follow Jesus's preaching. (Id.) Breon alienated those who did not share his religious beliefs and said he and DeRonde intended to make MHP "more Christian." (Id., ¶¶ 70-71.) Breon said the goal of becoming a Christian hospital "starts with us." (Id., ¶ 72.) Some Defendants — presumably Breon and DeRonde — created a PowerPoint presentation at a leadership meeting about why attendees should vote for Donald Trump, whose political views, in their estimation, matched their religious beliefs. (Id., ¶ 79.)
Breon sometimes prays with patients while laying his hands upon them. (Id., ¶¶ 73, 78.) Two of those patients complained to a different doctor. (Id., ¶ 78.) Breon would "testify" at executive team member meetings and speak with employees and patients about religion. (Id., ¶ 74.) He asked Dickey to share her "testimony" with him and refused to stop sharing his own "testimony" even when she said the conversation was inappropriate for work. (Id., ¶ 75.)
C. Allegations Relating to Disabilities.
Dickey was on FMLA leave from October 18, 2021, to January 3, 2022. (Id., ¶¶ 62, 80.) Breon was aware of Dickey's disability because she had to contact him to be released to return to work. (Id., ¶ 80.) Upon her return on January 3, 2022, Dickey met with Arthur Zacharjasz, MHP's Director of Occupational, Employee, and Public Health. (Id.) Zacharjasz told Dickey she could not fully return to work and had to contact Breon. (Id., ¶ 82.) When she did so, Breon told her that her position was being eliminated effective immediately. (Id., ¶ 83.) Breon refused to take questions from Dickey and closed the encounter by saying, "Many blessings." (Id.,
¶ 84.) Defendants then advertised Dickey's position to applicants. (Id., ¶ 86.)
D. Dickey's Claims.
Count I alleges discrimination based on sex, disability, and religion in violation of Iowa Code Chapter 216 (i.e., the Iowa Civil Rights Act) against all Defendants. (Id., ¶ 91.) Count I also alleges claims for retaliation. (Id., ¶ 96.) Count II alleges discrimination based on sex and religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as claims for retaliation. (Id., ¶¶ 102-03, 107.) Count III alleges claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Id., ¶¶ 112-13.) Finally, Count IV alleges a violation of Dickey's equal protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id., ¶ 126.)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Rydholm v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 44 F.4th 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). "The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to show at the pleading stage that success on the merits is more than a 'sheer possibility.'" Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). In determining plausibility, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The Court is not obligated to accept legal conclusions, however, "and [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." United States ex rel. Ambrosecchia v. Paddock Lab'ys, LLC, 855 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS.
A. The Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act Does Not Apply to Employment Discrimination Claims Against Local Government Entities.
Defendants argue, first, that the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act ("IMTCA") applies to Dickey's Count I and establishes legal standards that she has failed to meet. See Iowa Code Chapter 670. This argument arises out of Iowa Code § 670.2(1), which states that, subject to certain exceptions, "every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function." In turn, section 670.1(4) defines "tort" to mean "every civil wrong which results in wrongful death or injury to person or injury to property or injury to personal or property rights and includes but is not restricted to actions based upon negligence; error or omission; nuisance; breach of duty, whether statutory or other duty or denial or impairment of any right under any constitutional provision, statute or rule of law." Defendants argue that employment discrimination claims are "torts" for purposes of the IMTCA and therefore: (a) must satisfy heightened pleading standards; and (b) are subject to qualified immunity and other defenses set forth in the IMTCA. See Stark v. Hamelton, No. 3:18-CV-00069-RGE-SHL, 2021 WL 4056716, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 2, 2021) (explaining that Iowa Code § 670.4A was amended to "adopt[] a state law version of qualified immunity that tracks the qualified immunity doctrine as it exists under federal law"). Defendants' argument is novel. Although the IMTCA has existed since 1967, see Thomas v. Gavin, 838 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 2013), neither the Iowa Supreme Court nor Iowa Court of Appeals has ever held that it governs employment discrimination claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), which was enacted in 1965. See Iowa Code § 216.1. In other words, the two laws have co-existed for more than a half-century without an Iowa appellate court ever tying them together. During that time, Iowa appellate courts have decided employment discrimination claims against municipalities and counties under the ICRA more times than are worth listing. See, e.g., Deeds v. City of Marion, 914 N.W.2d 330, 340 (Iowa 2018) (addressing ICRA discrimination claims against municipality on the merits); City of Hampton v. Iowa Civ. Rts. Comm'n, 554 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa 1996) (same); Woodbury Cnty. v. Iowa Civ. Rts. Comm'n, 335 N.W.2d 161, 168 (Iowa 1983) (same). It is difficult to believe that Iowa appellate courts — and the parties litigating before them — repeatedly and consistently misunderstood throughout this fifty-plus-year period that they should have been looking to the IMTCA for governing legal standards and principles. See McQuistion v. City of Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 825 (Iowa 2015) (describing ICRA's evolution since 1965 in case involving municipal employer without mentioning the IMTCA).
Still, the Court must analyze Defendants' argument the same way it would analyze any other issue of statutory interpretation: by starting with the statutory language. This analysis shows, first, that the Iowa Legislature chose to have the IMTCA apply only to "torts," rather than using broader language. Section 670.2(1), for example, states that each municipality is "subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees . . ." (emphasis added). The Legislature did not say that each municipality would be "subject to liability for its wrongful acts and those of its officers and employees" or use other broad language that would express an intent to move beyond the traditional boundaries of tort law. This word choice is important because the Court cannot locate a single Iowa Supreme Court case describing a statutory employment discrimination claim under the ICRA as a "tort." See also Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 822 N.E.2d 667, 688 (2005) ("It cannot be said, however, that claims arising under [employment discrimination statutes] are causes of action in tort."). To the contrary, the Iowa Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ICRA preempts employment-related tort claims like wrongful discharge, thus recognizing a distinction between statutory discrimination claims and "torts." See, e.g., Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1985) (holding that ICRA preempts tort claims for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of employment relationship); Greenland v. Fairtron Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Iowa 1993) (holding that ICRA preempts tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the "outrageous conduct" is discrimination). The Iowa Legislature's decision to limit the application of the IMTCA to "torts" therefore weighs heavily against Defendants' novel attempt to apply IMTCA standards to discrimination claims under the ICRA. See, e.g., State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 502 (Iowa 2007) ("Generally, we interpret statutes consistent with their normal meaning, and we refrain from an interpretation that is strained.").
Nonetheless, Defendants argue that the definition of "tort" in section 670.1(4) is broad enough to include statutory discrimination claims regardless of whether such claims are typically considered "torts."
Specifically, the IMTCA defines "tort" to include "every civil wrong which results in. . . injury to person or injury to property or injury to personal or property rights...." Iowa Code § 670.1(4). In essence, Defendants argue that the Legislature decided to define "tort" to include tort and non-tort claims alike.
This argument fails to attach appropriate significance to the Legislature's decision to use the word "tort" in the first place. Suppose the Legislature enacted a "Dog Leash Law" and defined "dog" as "every domesticated four-legged creature with a tail, regardless of whether it is capable of barking." Although this definition arguably could be interpreted to include "cats," such an interpretation would make it almost impossible to understand why the Legislature bothered to use the word "dog" at all. So it is with the IMTCA's use of the word "tort." See Boggs, 741 N.W.2d at 502. By starting with that word, the Legislature tapped into a long history of tort law that it presumably knew and understood. See State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Iowa 2012) ("[W]e assume the legislature is familiar with the existing state of the law when it enacts new legislation.") This Court must exercise great caution before concluding the Legislature intended to deviate from that long history by including non-torts in the definition of "tort," as "a statute will not be presumed to overturn long-established legal principles, unless that intention is clearly expressed or the implication to that effect is inescapable." Victoriano v. City of Waterloo, 984 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Wilson v. Iowa City, 165 N.W.2d 813, 822 (Iowa 1969)).
Nothing in the IMTCA clearly or inescapably shows that the Iowa Legislature intended the word "tort" to encompass statutory discrimination claims or other claims that typically would not be considered "torts." Although section 670.1(4) defines "tort" to include "any civil wrong," it goes on to use traditional tort law terminology like "negligence," "nuisance," and "breach of duty" without once mentioning discrimination. The same is true in section 670.4, which establishes exceptions and defenses to municipal tort liability. It uses a derivative of the word "negligence" a dozen times and revolves almost entirely around common law tort defenses like assumption of risk. See Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(o). It never mentions discrimination. Given that municipal and county employers have been subject to statutory liability for employment discrimination under the ICRA for more than fifty years, the omission of any reference to discrimination claims in the IMTCA is conspicuous. See Meinders v. Dunkerton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 645 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2002) ("[L]egislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion, and the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others not so mentioned." (quoting Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 289 (Iowa 1995))). If the Iowa Legislature intended to superimpose IMTCA standards or defenses onto ICRA discrimination claims, one would have expected far more clarity in the statutory language. See Hines v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 330 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1983) ("[W]e also assume that if the legislature sought to remedy a specific evil it would have clearly so indicated.").
This leads to another significant problem with Defendants' argument: the fact that their interpretation of the IMTCA would undermine the ICRA in the context of government employers. The definition of "employer" in the ICRA expressly includes "the state of Iowa or any political subdivision, board, commission, department, institution, or school district thereof, and every other person employing employees within the state." Iowa Code
§ 216.2(7). Thus, the Legislature clearly intended for municipalities and other government entities to be governed by the statute. The ICRA then goes on, in extensive detail, to define unfair employment practices, id. § 216.6, wage discrimination, id. § 216.6A, unfair practices in the context of accommodations or services, id. § 216.7, unfair or discriminatory practices in housing, id. § 216.8, additional unfair or discriminatory practices in housing, id., § 216.8A, and unfair or discriminatory practices in education, id. § 216.9. The ICRA also establishes an administrative regime to review and adjudicate complaints regarding unfair or discriminatory practices. Id. §§ 216.3, 216.5, 216.15, 216.17. At no point in any of these lengthy statutes does the ICRA suggest that discrimination claims against municipalities or other government entities are governed by a higher or different standard than those against private actors. Instead, the statutory language establishes the opposite: the same standards apply to public and private entities alike. Yet Defendants' reading of the IMTCA would mean that discrimination claims against municipal employers will fail unless, inter alia, the employers violate "clearly established" law — a burden that does not apply to private employers. See Iowa Code § 670.4A(1)(a), (3). Defendants' interpretation also would give municipal employers a host of other defenses to discrimination claims that do not exist for private employers. See Iowa Code § 670.4. In effect, Defendants' position is that the IMTCA implicitly repealed governing ICRA standards as applied to municipalities and replaced them with something far less favorable to alleged victims of discrimination. "Repeal by implication will not be sustained unless legislative intent to repeal is clear in the language used and such a holding is absolutely necessary." Good v. Crouch, 397 N.W.2d 757, 760 (Iowa 1986) (internal punctuation omitted). The Court cannot conclude the Legislature clearly expressed its intent to partially repeal or amend the ICRA when it enacted and amended the IMTCA, nor is such a holding absolutely necessary. See Victoriano, 984 N.W.2d at 182 (refusing to interpret recent amendments to the IMTCA as undermining long-established pleading rules).
Ironically, Defendants' interpretation of the IMTCA would hurt municipalities themselves in many scenarios. The purpose of the IMTCA is to "allow[] people to assert claims against municipalities that otherwise would have been barred by governmental immunity." Sutton v. Council Bluffs Water Works, 990 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 2023). If the word "tort" is interpreted to include statutory non-tort claims, it means municipalities will no longer have immunity as to those non-tort claims even when the relevant statute does not expressly abrogate governmental immunity. See Iowa Code § 670.2(1) (waiving sovereign immunity only as to "torts"). Thus, for example, Defendants' interpretation of the IMTCA, if accepted, might mean an aggrieved party could sue a municipality under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act (Iowa Code Chapter 714H) or other state and federal statutes. Again, the Court cannot conclude this is what the Legislature had in mind. Cf. Victoriano, 984 N.W.2d at 182.
Lest any doubt remain, the timing and context of the most recent amendments to the IMTCA make clear that the Iowa Legislature's focus was not employment discrimination claims under the ICRA, but rather constitutional tort claims under the Iowa Constitution. The relevant history starts in 2017, when the Iowa Supreme Court held in Godfrey v. State that aggrieved parties could bring direct constitutional tort claims under the Iowa Constitution against government officials. 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), overruled by Burnett
v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023). In subsequent years, the Iowa Supreme Court fleshed out the parameters of so-called "Godfrey claims," including in a 2018 decision holding that such claims are not subject to the same qualified immunity standards that apply under federal law. See Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d 259, 281 (Iowa 2018). In other words, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that tort claims arising under the Iowa Constitution should be easier to prove than analogous claims arising under the United States Constitution. See id. at 279-81. The following year, the Iowa Supreme Court provided additional clarity on municipal immunity for state constitutional tort claims, again without adopting the federal qualified immunity standard. See Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 929 N.W.2d 691, 697-98 (Iowa 2019).
Against this backdrop, it is obvious that the Legislature amended section 670.4A in 2021 for, inter alia, the purpose of legislatively overruling the Baldwin decisions and establishing that federal pleading and qualified immunity standards would apply to state law tort claims against municipalities. This purpose has nothing to do with statutory discrimination claims arising under the ICRA, which are governed by a separate and distinct set of legal, procedural, and administrative rules. Cf. Victoriano, 984 N.W.2d at 182. The legislative history therefore aligns with the statutory language in demonstrating that the Legislature did not intend for employment discrimination claims under the ICRA to be governed by the IMTCA.
One question remains: if the Legislature did not intend for statutory discrimination claims to be governed by the IMTCA, why did it define "tort" to include "every civil wrong . . . includ[ing] but . . . not restricted to actions based upon negligence; error or omissions; nuisance; breach of duty, whether statutory or other duty or denial or impairment of any right under any constitutional provision, statute or rule of law." Iowa Code § 670.1(4). In the Court's view, the answer is clear when the statutory and historical context described above are taken into account. The Legislature was worried that Iowa courts might treat claims that traditionally would have been considered "torts" as being outside the IMTCA simply because some of those claims now can be raised under the Iowa Code or Iowa Constitution. See, e.g., Iowa Code Chapter 668 ("Liability in Tort — Comparative Fault"); Iowa Code Chapter 657 ("Nuisances"). The Legislature wanted to make clear that those "torts" are still subject to the IMTCA, regardless of how they might be artfully pled. This does not mean, however, that a statutory employment discrimination claim that has never been considered a "tort" suddenly becomes one for purposes of the IMTCA simply because it arises under the Iowa Code. Such an interpretation would stretch the meaning of the word "tort" beyond what the language of the IMTCA permits.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants are not entitled to raise qualified immunity or other IMTCA defenses to Dickey's ICRA claims except insofar as those defenses also would be available under the ICRA itself. (The Court will apply the IMTCA's pleading standards to Dickey's claims, but not because of the IMTCA itself; rather, those standards apply because they are the same as the applicable pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Nahas v. Polk Cnty., 991 N.W.2d 770, 777 (Iowa 2023).)
B. Dickey Has Stated Plausible Sex and Disability Discrimination and Equal Protection Claims Against MHP, DeRonde, Langkamp, and Breon.
Once Dickey's claims are properly understood as not being subject to qualified
immunity or other IMTCA defenses, the Court concludes she has stated plausible claims for relief for sex and disability discrimination, retaliation, and under the equal protection clause as against MHP, DeRonde, Langkamp, and Breon. To state a claim for relief on her ICRA claims, Dickey must state sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible inference that she was discriminated against on account of her sex, religion, and/or disability. See Iowa Code § 216.6. The same is true for her claims under Title VII (which prohibits discrimination based on sex and religion) and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (which prohibits discrimination based on disability). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); id. § 12112(a). Similar requirements also apply to her claim for employment discrimination based on sex and religion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the equal protection clause. See Hager v. Ark. Dep't of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2013). "[I]t is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case [of discrimination] at the pleading stage." Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1056 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013)). However, the elements of a prima facie case "are part of the background against which a plausibility determination should be made." Id.
As to disability discrimination, under both the ICRA and ADA, Dickey would have to establish the following elements to prove a prima facie case: (1) she has a condition that qualifies as a disability; (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Simonson v. Trinity Reg'l Health Sys., 336 F.3d 706, 708-09 (8th Cir. 2003). Although not required to do so, Dickey has plausibly alleged facts sufficient to establish each of these elements. Dickey alleges that she took FMLA leave in October 2021 due to panic attacks and anxiety resulting from the controversy in the emergency department. Defendants do not appear to contest that these medical conditions meet the definition of "disability" under the ICRA and ADA, and Dickey has alleged, at minimum, that MHP and Breon were aware of them. When Dickey returned from leave, however, she was immediately terminated, purportedly on the basis that her position had been eliminated — only for MHP to then advertise the same position to applicants. If proven, these facts, interpreted in the light most favorable to Dickey, would allow an inference that she was terminated either because of her disability or in retaliation for her decision to take FMLA leave, particularly given: (a) the temporal proximity between her leave and termination; and (b) MHP's shifting explanations for the termination. See, e.g., Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiff may establish prima facie discrimination by, inter alia, showing that an employer "shifted its explanation of the employment decision"). Dickey therefore has done enough to state a plausible claim for relief for disability discrimination under the ICRA and ADA (Counts I and III, respectively) against Breon, DeRonde, and Langkamp, all of whom are alleged to have had direct involvement in the events leading to her termination. See Cook v. George's, Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 2020) (reversing dismissal of disability discrimination claim). Likewise, Dickey has stated a claim in Counts I and III against MHP under principles of respondeat superior. (ECF 30, ¶ 17.)
As it relates to sex discrimination under the ICRA and Title VII, Dickey would either need to allege direct discrimination or establish the following elements: "(1) she belongs to a protected
class; (2) she was qualified to retain the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination." Boston v. TrialCard, Inc., 75 F.4th 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2023). As with her claims of disability discrimination, the Court concludes Dickey has done enough to survive a motion to dismiss on her claims of sex discrimination against MHP, DeRonde, Breon and Langkamp. She plausibly alleges that she belongs to a protected class and was qualified to retain her job, and thus those elements are not at issue. As to the other elements, "[a] plaintiff can establish an inference of discrimination in multiple ways, such as by showing . . . biased comments by a decisionmaker, or that the employer . . . shifted its explanation of the employment decision." Mayorga v. Marsden Bldg. Maint., LLC, 55 F.4th 1155, 1162 (8th Cir. 2022). Here, Dickey alleges that she was terminated immediately upon returning from a leave of absence that arose out of her involvement in addressing alleged sex discrimination against other MHP employees. She also alleges that DeRonde, Breon, and Langkamp directed statements or actions toward her that — when inferences are drawn in Dickey's favor, as they must be — reflect discriminatory animus toward her sex. Moreover, she alleges that MHP changed its reasoning for her termination, initially informing her the position was "being eliminated" but later advertising it to other applicants. These allegations are enough to state a plausible claim for discrimination on the basis of sex under the ICRA and Title VII. See Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1056 ("[T]he elements of a prima facie case [of discrimination] may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim." (quoting Rodriguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 54)). Similarly, Dickey has stated a plausible claim for retaliation because she alleges that she was terminated shortly after raising concerns about what Dickey perceived as discriminatory treatment of female physicians in the emergency department. See Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1020-21 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that Title VII prohibits retaliation in a broad range of circumstances, including when an employee raises concerns in good faith about the employer's compliance with anti-discrimination or other laws).
For similar reasons, the Court concludes that Dickey has stated plausible claims for sex discrimination under section 1983 and the equal protection clause, which are evaluated in a manner similar to Title VII claims. See Hager, 735 F.3d at 1014. Defendants argue that Dickey's equal protection claim fails because she has not identified similarly situated employees who were treated differently. This is not, however, a mandatory requirement under binding Eighth Circuit precedent; instead, it is simply one of "multiple ways" a plaintiff can establish an inference of discrimination in an equal protection or Title VII claim. See Mayorga, 55 F.4th at 1162. Moreover, a plaintiff need not establish an "inference" of discrimination at all if she provides "direct evidence of [sex] discrimination." Gilani v. Matthews, 843 F.3d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 2003)). As explained above, Dickey has stated a plausible claim for sex discrimination under the ICRA and Title VII based on allegations that include both direct discrimination and circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination. The same allegations are sufficient to state a plausible equal protection claim for sex discrimination against MHP, DeRonde, Breon, and Langkamp. C. Dickey Has Not Stated Plausible Religious Discrimination Claims Against Any Defendant, Nor Has She Stated Plausible Discrimination Claims on Any Theory Against Defendants Coffey, Gordy, and Riordan.
Unlike Defendants DeRonde, Breon, and Langkamp, all of whom were allegedly involved to some degree or another in direct interactions with Dickey leading to her termination, Dickey's pleading does not identify anything that Defendants Coffey, Gordy, and Riordan did except vote to reinstate DeRonde following the issues in the emergency department. Beyond that one act, Coffey, Gordy, and Riordan are, at most, simply lumped together with others whenever Dickey's pleading uses the word "Defendants." This is not enough to state a claim against them for discrimination or retaliation under the ICRA, Title VII, the ADA, or the equal protection clause. See Henson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.4th 1075, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding that plaintiff failed to state colorable discrimination claim against defendant who was identified in only two isolated places in complaint). The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to those three Defendants. Dickey may either move forward without them or seek leave to amend her pleading (which will be freely granted, consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) to state with greater particularity what they did to contribute to the alleged discrimination and retaliation.
The Court also GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to Dickey's claims for religious discrimination, except this time the Motion is granted as to all Defendants. In contrast to her sex and disability discrimination claims, Dickey's allegations as to religious discrimination are scattershot and disconnected from her eventual termination. At most, she alleges events occurring as far back as 2018 in which DeRonde and/or Breon criticized her Catholic faith, tried to impose their own religious views on her and other employees, or took actions that made patients uncomfortable. Nothing in the pleading plausibly ties these allegations to her termination in January 2022. See Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 998 F.3d 789, 798-99 (8th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of discrimination complaint where plaintiff alleged that employees were treated differently based on sex but did not tie those allegations to her own termination). Again, Dickey may either move forward on just sex and disability discrimination theories or may seek leave to amend her pleading to establish a plausible connection between her religion and termination. This might include, for example, allegations showing greater temporal proximity between her termination and the allegedly inappropriate workplace comments about religion. As those allegations are not present in the current version of the pleading, she has failed to state a claim for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See id.
V. CONCLUSION.
The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF 32). Dickey's religious discrimination claims are dismissed as to all Defendants, as are all of her claims against Defendants Coffey, Gordy, and Riordan. In all other respects, Dickey's claims under the ICRA, Title VII, the ADA, and the equal protection clause will proceed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.