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denying plaintiff's motion to amend based on the court's determination that the proffered claims would not be legally viable upon re-filing
Summary of this case from Doe ex rel. Doe v. BradleyOpinion
C.A. No. 97C-06-063 JRS
June 27, 2002
ORDER
On this 27th day of June, 2002, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on January 7, 2002, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 31, 2002, Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer filed on June 10, 2002, Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery filed on January 28, 2002, and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint filed on January 31, 2002, and the responses thereto, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on January 7, 2002 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is undisputed that neither party was a participant in the alleged assault on Plaintiff. In a previous decision in this matter, Judge Quillen dismissed plaintiff's claims against Warden Sherese Brewington-Carr and Deputy Warden Rafael Williams due to their lack of involvement in the alleged infraction. Judge Quillen indicated that further development of the record may lead to the dismissal of other defendants. The current record establishes that Sergeant Moody and Lieutenant Conquest-Davis had no involvement in the alleged assault. Accordingly, with respect to the claims against Sergeant Mary Moody and Lieutenant Conquest-Davis, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
See Dickens Dep. at 83-4 (Nov. 19, 2001); see also Affidavit of Sergeant Mary Moody at ¶ 9 (Jan. 4, 2001).
Dickens v. Carr, et al., Del. Super., C.A. No. 97C-06-063, Quillen, J. (Oct. 8, 1999) (Letter Op. at 4).
2. Defendants maintain that C/O Adams and Green also were not present during the alleged incident. Mr. Dickens, however, maintains that both Adams and Green were participants in the alleged assault. Because there is a factual dispute surrounding their involvement, the Court will not dismiss them from this action at this time. There are material issues of fact that remain in dispute making summary judgment inappropriate. "A summary judgment [motion] may not be granted under Rule 56 unless there are no material issues of fact." Accordingly, except as noted above, Defendants' January 7, 2002, Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979) (citation omitted).
3. Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer is GRANTED. Accordingly, the amended answer, attached to Defendants' motion to amend answer as Exhibit A, is the operative responsive pleading.
4. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 31, 2002, is DENIED. On a motion for summary judgment, the movant initially bears the burden of showing that no material issues of fact are present. Only after this initial burden is met does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate the existence of material issues of fact. The record, as it stands, fails to support Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Defendants have failed to present affidavits or other verified (sworn) evidence to support their affirmative defense that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Consequently, the burden on summary judgment has not shifted to Plaintiff and he is under no obligation to demonstrate the existence of a material factual dispute with respect to the exhaustion of remedies issue.
Id.
Id. at 681.
See Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(e).
5. In the interest of judicial economy, the Court will grant Defendants leave to file a renewed Motion for Summary Judgment with appropriate supporting papers within fourteen (14) days of this Order. Plaintiff may file his response to any renewed motion within fourteen (14) days of service of the renewed motion upon him. If Defendants do not refile, the Court will issue a scheduling order with various event deadlines, including a new trial date.
6. Nothing in this Order should be construed as a decision on whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), applies to § 1983 claims brought in State courts. The Court has specifically reserved decision on this issue.
The Court is compelled to note that it seems somewhat illogical, as a practical matter, that the PLRA would apply to this § 1983 claim if it had been brought in a Federal court but would not apply to the same claim brought in this State court, especially in light of the fact that defendants could remove this § 1983 claim from this Court to the Federal court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441, thereby rendering the issue moot. It is not clear to the Court whether this reality has been addressed in the decisions from other jurisdictions which have determined the applicability of the PLRA to § 1983 claims brought in state courts. Nevertheless, the Court will address this question as well as any others implicated by the PLRA affirmative defense only if properly called upon to do so.
7. The Court reserves decision on Plaintiff's Motion for Discovery pending the final resolution of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
8. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff seeks to join Captain George Martino based on an affidavit appended to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in which Captain Martino acknowledges his presence at the alleged assault on Plaintiff and avers that he ordered the use of the stun-gun to subdue plaintiff. As Captain Martino has acknowledged his involvement in the incident which is the genesis of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, the motion to amend complaint to add Captain Martino as a party is GRANTED.
The State has not argued that the amendment would run afoul of the applicable statute of limitations, nor has it engage in a "relation back" analysis. Accordingly, the Court has not considered these issues in connection with Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint.
9. The motion to amend complaint is DENIED with respect to the proffered claims against Officers Toner and Wilhelm and Wardens Rafael Williams and Sherese Brewington-Carr. Plaintiff alleges that Officers Toner and Wilhelm unlawfully committed him to the Department of Corrections in violation of his Due Process rights by "having Clerk of Municipal Court set bond on Plaintiff by telephone without appearing before magistrate, justice of the peace, or judge to answer to or plead to said charges." Plaintiff seeks to add Warden Williams and Deputy Warden Brewington-Carr in relation to an apparent habeas corpus claim. From the vague description of the claims against Officers Toner and Wilhelm and Wardens Rafael Williams and Sherese Brewington-Carr proffered in plaintiff's motion to amend, it appears that these claims are not appropriate in the context of this § 1983 action.
When a proposed amendment to a complaint is, on its face, not legally viable, the Court may deny a motion to amend even if the other predicates of Rule 15 are satisfied. See F.D.I.C. v. Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 874 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The futility of amendment is one of the factors that a trial court may consider in denying a motion to amend") (citations omitted).
(D.I. 56)
The Court notes that Plaintiff did not attach a proposed amended pleading to his motion. Consequently, the Court has attempted to decipher the nature of the proposed amended claims from the motion papers themselves.
IT IS SO ORDERED.