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Diaz v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Dec 4, 2015
# 2015-015-099 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Dec. 4, 2015)

Opinion

# 2015-015-099 Claim No. 125853 Motion No. M-86940

12-04-2015

FREDERICK DIAZ 86-B-2129 v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Frederick Diaz, Pro Se Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esquire Assistant Attorney General


Synopsis

Discretionary determination of prison hearing officer formed no basis for wrongful confinement claim.

Case information

UID:

2015-015-099

Claimant(s):

FREDERICK DIAZ 86-B-2129

Claimant short name:

DIAZ

Footnote (claimant name) :

Defendant(s):

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Footnote (defendant name) :

Third-party claimant(s):

Third-party defendant(s):

Claim number(s):

125853

Motion number(s):

M-86940

Cross-motion number(s):

Judge:

FRANCIS T. COLLINS

Claimant's attorney:

Frederick Diaz, Pro Se

Defendant's attorney:

Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esquire Assistant Attorney General

Third-party defendant's attorney:

Signature date:

December 4, 2015

City:

Saratoga Springs

Comments:

Official citation:

Appellate results:

See also (multicaptioned case)

Decision

Claimant, proceeding pro se, moves for summary judgment on his cause of action for wrongful confinement pursuant to CPLR 3212.

Claimant is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. He alleges that he was wrongfully confined to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and the Mental Heath Unit following a disciplinary hearing in which he was found guilty of harassing the Grievance Supervisor at Great Meadow Correctional Facility. The remaining charges including making threats, violation of facility correspondence rules and interference with an employee were all dismissed and the Hearing Officer imposed a penalty of 60 days confinement to the SHU and loss of privileges. Claimant alleges that although the penalty was modified, he was nevertheless confined to either the SHU, the Mental Health Unit or to his cell on keeplock status from November 15, 2014 through February 1, 2015, a period of 78 days. The disciplinary charges arose as a result of two letters, authored by the claimant, in which he was critical of the manner in which his grievances had been processed. Following an administrative appeal, the guilty determination was reversed and all references to the matter expunged from claimant's prison record.

Claimant alleges that the frustration and angst brought about by the unfair disciplinary process resulted in his need for observation in the Mental Health Unit following his admission to the SHU.

Claimant contends that damages are warranted on his wrongful confinement claim because although the Hearing Officer granted his request to call the Grievance Supervisor as a witness on his behalf at the hearing, she would not permit him to ask the witness any of the questions he prepared relating to the manner in which grievances are required to be processed on the ground they were irrelevant (see claimant's Exhibit A, ¶ 9). He also alleges as a basis for his claim that the Hearing Officer acted improperly when she turned off the tape recording of the hearing in order to berate him for asking too many questions (id. at ¶ 10). According to the claimant, the defendant's conduct violated its own rules or regulations thereby warranting summary judgment in his favor.

"The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case" (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Such a showing must be made by the tender of proof in admissible form (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). Failure to make a prima facie showing requires denial of summary judgment, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

It is well-settled that actions of correctional facility employees taken in furtherance of authorized disciplinary measures are quasi-judicial in nature and entitled to absolute immunity (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 218-220 [1988]; Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Mitchell v State of New York, 32 AD3d 594 [3d Dept 2006]). The Court of Appeals in Arteaga made clear that "actions of Correction Department employees in preparing and filing misbehavior reports, confining inmates, and making dispositions following Superintendents' hearings entail discretionary decisions in furtherance of general policies and purposes where the exercise of reasoned judgment can produce different acceptable results" (Arteaga at 219). Only where a correctional facility employee acts outside the scope of his or her authority or violates the governing statutes or regulations does the State lose its defense of absolute immunity (Arteaga at 220-221). No such facts have been alleged here.

The applicable regulation permits an inmate to call witnesses on his behalf at a hearing "provided their testimony is material, is not redundant, and doing so does not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals" (7 NYCRR 254.5 [a]). While the Hearing Officer may have abused her discretion in denying claimant's request to question the Grievance Supervisor regarding the manner in which grievances are required to be processed, thus providing a basis for reversing or annulling her determination, her ruling was nevertheless an act of discretion as to which the State is absolutely immune (Shannon v State of New York, 111 AD3d 1077 [3d Dept 2013]; Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 852 [2013]; Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765, 766 [3d Dept 2001]). Here, unlike the facts in Diaz v State of New York, (UID No. 2006-036-008 [Ct Cl, Schweitzer, J., June 20, 2006]), in which the inmate was deprived of his right to call witnesses without explanation, claimant was permitted to call the witness he requested but not permitted to ask questions which the Hearing Officer deemed irrelevant (cf. Matter of Benito v Calero, 102 AD3d 778 [2d Dept 2013]). While the Hearing Officer's curtailment of claimant's questions may have been an improvident exercise of discretion, it was nevertheless a discretionary act for which the State retains absolute immunity from liability.

Nor is there any statutory or regulatory prohibition against stopping a tape recording during the course of a hearing in order to have an off-the-record conversation with an inmate. While the entire disciplinary hearing is required to be recorded (7 NYCRR 253.6 [b]), the off-the-record conversation with the claimant was not part of the hearing and was not relied upon by the Hearing Officer in reaching her determination. To the extent claimant may have disagreed with what was conveyed in the off-the-record conversation, he could have and should have placed his objections on the record.

Although the defendant did not cross move for summary judgment, this court is empowered to search the record and award summary judgment to the non-moving party with respect to an issue that was the subject of another party's summary judgment motion "without the necessity of a cross-motion" (CPLR 3212[b]; Dunham v Hilco Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 425 [1996]; 63-65 Corp. v Prevosti, 28 AD3d 469, 470 [2d Dept 2006]). Accordingly, notwithstanding claimant's well-written motion papers, the Court finds that the undisputed facts establish that summary judgment dismissing the claim is appropriate.

Based on the foregoing, claimant's motion for summary judgment is denied and, upon searching the record, summary judgment dismissing the claim is granted and the claim is dismissed.

December 4, 2015

Saratoga Springs, New York

FRANCIS T. COLLINS

Judge of the Court of Claims The Court considered the following papers:

1. Notice of motion dated June 24, 2015;
2. Affidavit of Frederick Diaz sworn to June 24, 2015 with exhibits;
3. Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich dated September 11, 2015 with exhibits;
4. Reply of Frederick Diaz dated September 15, 2015 with exhibits;
5. Letter from Frederick Diaz dated September 28, 2015 with exhibits.


Summaries of

Diaz v. State

New York State Court of Claims
Dec 4, 2015
# 2015-015-099 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Dec. 4, 2015)
Case details for

Diaz v. State

Case Details

Full title:FREDERICK DIAZ 86-B-2129 v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Court:New York State Court of Claims

Date published: Dec 4, 2015

Citations

# 2015-015-099 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. Dec. 4, 2015)