Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. TC021041. Josh M. Fredericks, Judge.
Law Offices of Eddie W. Shaw and Eddie W. Shaw, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, Michael D. Allen and Aaron M. Fontana, for Defendants and Respondents.
RUBIN, ACTING P. J.
Gladys Derrick and her granddaughter, Telisha Dennard, appeal from the trial court’s judgment sustaining the demurrer by Los Angeles County and other defendants to the women’s wrongful death action involving Derrick’s son and Telisha Dennard’s father, decedent Darrell Dennard. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Mario Moreno belonged to the gang “La Florentia 13.” In August or September 2004, he was convicted in Los Angeles Superior Court of possession of a sawed-off shot gun. The presentencing report by Los Angeles County Probation Department described Moreno as a “danger to the community.”
The court sentenced Moreno to one year in county jail. At the time, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department had an early-release program to reduce overcrowding in county jails. The program applied only to nonviolent offenders thought to pose little risk to the community. Appellants’ complaint alleges, however, that the sheriff’s department did not properly screen prisoners for early release, and instead routinely released thousands of prisoners, some of whom, like Moreno, endangered the community.
Six days after the sentencing court remanded Moreno to county jail, the sheriff’s department released him under its early release program. Within days, and perhaps the very day he was released, Moreno drove on October 11, 2004, to rival gang territory in South Los Angeles. While there, he shot and killed 53-year-old Darrell Dennard while Dennard stood in a parking lot. Dennard had no previous dealings with Moreno and no gang affiliation. His survivors included his mother, appellant Gladys Derrick, and his daughter, appellant Telisha Dennard.
On March 27, 2006, Moreno was sentenced to prison for Dennard’s murder. At the sentencing hearing, appellants learned for the first time that the sheriff’s department had released Moreno under its early release program six days into his one-year sentence. Appellants thereafter filed a claim with the county in September 2006 under the Government Tort Claims Act, apparently for the county’s negligence in releasing Moreno. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) The county rejected the claim in November 2006.
In May 18, 2007, appellants filed their complaint (followed by a first amended complaint) that is at issue in this appeal. The complaint alleged multiple causes of action against Moreno and respondents Los Angeles County, the county’s Board of Supervisors, and Sheriff Lee Baca, for Dennard’s death. Its first cause of action alleged violation of Government Code section 815.6, which makes a public entity liable for injuries caused by its unreasonable failure to discharge “a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment” designed to protect against the type of injury that occurred. According to appellants, the sheriff’s early release of violent inmates like Moreno violated section 815.6 because the county designed the program to apply only to nonviolent inmates in order to avoid crimes such as Dennard’s murder. The second cause of action alleged negligence by respondents because they knew, or should have known, Moreno was a dangerous gang member unsuitable for early release. The third cause of action alleged respondents’ intentional or negligent breach of duty in releasing Moreno caused Dennard’s wrongful death. The fourth, and final, cause of action alleged respondents’ enactment of the early release program contributed to Dennard’s murder, thus resulting in the deprivation of Dennard’s constitutional rights by state authorities acting under color of law. (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983).)
Government Code section 815.6 states, “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”
Respondents demurred on several grounds to appellants’ complaint. They argued the complaint was untimely because the statute of limitations for wrongful death is two years, but appellants filed their complaint more than two years after Dennard’s murder. They also argued that an amalgam of Government Code statutes shielded them from liability for injuries that released prisoners caused to others. (Gov. Code, §§ 820.8 [public employees not liable for injury caused by another], 845.8 [public entities and employees not liable for injury caused by parole and probation decisions], 846 [public entities and employees not liable for injury caused by their failure to arrest or hold someone].)
The trial court overruled respondents’ demurrer that the statute of limitations barred appellants’ complaint. The court sustained without leave to amend, however, respondents’ demurrer that the Government Code immunities barred appellants’ first three causes of action. The court further ruled that appellants’ fourth cause of action for violation of Dennard’s constitutional rights under section 1983 failed to allege respondents, as opposed to Moreno, had violated Dennard’s rights. The court entered judgment for respondents. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, we read the complaint’s allegations liberally. We will reverse if the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, or could be amended to do so. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 884.) Furthermore, we review the court’s judgment for its correctness. Thus, the trial court’s stated reasons for its judgment do not limit our review. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment if it is correct on any ground supported by the record, even if not cited by the trial court. (In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624, 632; MacGregor Yacht Corp. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 448, 460.)
Appellants’ lawsuit arises from Dennard’s murder. Because appellants’ injury and the gravamen of the action are Dennard’s wrongful death, the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury or wrongful death applies to the complaint’s first three state law causes of action. (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 22-23; McLeod v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1165 [“ ‘The gravamen of a complaint and the nature of the right sued upon, rather than the form of the action or relief demanded, determine which statute of limitations applies’ ”]; Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1207 [“What is significant for statute of limitations purposes is the primary interest invaded by defendant’s wrongful conduct”].) Additionally, a two-year statute of limitations applies to the fourth cause of action alleging violation of Dennard’s constitutional rights under color of law by state authorities because the federal statute adopts California’s statute of limitations for personal injury. (Fink v. Shedler (9th Cir. 1999) 192 F.3d 911, 914 [“Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. Rather, federal courts apply the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations for section 1983 claims”]; accord Wilson v. Garcia (1985) 471 U.S. 261, 269, superseded on other grounds by statute in Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (2004) 541 U.S. 369, 379-380 [“the length of the limitations period, and closely related questions of tolling and application, are to be governed by state law”].)
Moreno murdered Dennard in October 2004. Appellants filed their complaint more than two years later in May 2007. Their complaint was therefore untimely. It thus fails to state a cause of action and was properly dismissed. (County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 898, 912 [complaint barred by statute of limitations does not state a cause of action].)
Appellants’ complaint was arguably time barred for a second reason. When a governmental body is a defendant, the Government Tort Claims Act imposes strict timing requirements for pursuing a claim. If a plaintiff alleges a claim of wrongful death against the government, the plaintiff must file a claim with the government within six months. (Gov. Code, § 911.2 [“A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person... shall be presented... not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action”].) Appellants waited until September 2006, almost two years after Dennard’s murder in October 2004, to file their claim with Los Angeles County. Filing a timely claim with the government is ordinarily a jurisdictional prerequisite for suing the government. (Gov. Code, § 945.4; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777.) Appellants’ failure to file a timely claim with Los Angeles County thus rises as a second hurdle that their complaint cannot overcome.
Appellants contend their causes of action against respondents accrued when they learned at Moreno’s sentencing that the sheriff had freed Moreno under the county’s early release program. They allege that until the hearing they did not know, and had no reason to know, respondents were partly liable for Dennard’s death. Citing the “discovery rule” for statutes of limitations under which the statute begins to run when a plaintiff knows, or reasonably suspects, she has been injured or wronged, they contend their complaint was timely because they filed it less than two years after the sentencing hearing. (Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 634 (Grisham); Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (Norgart).)
Appellants’ contention misconstrues the discovery rule. A cause of action accrues when its elements are complete. (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 634; Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806.) Our Supreme Court explained in Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th 383, “The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time ‘when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’ or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises.’ [Citations.] In other words, it sets the date as the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements.” (Id. at p. 397.) The discovery rule’s application does not turn on when a plaintiff learns a defendant’s identity. Instead, it rests on when the plaintiff reasonably suspects or knows facts that tell him he has suffered an injury or wrong. The Supreme Court stated in Fox, “The discovery rule... allows accrual of the cause of action even if the plaintiff does not have reason to suspect the defendant’s identity. [Citation.] The discovery rule does not delay accrual in that situation because the identity of the defendant is not an element of a cause of action.” (Fox, at p. 807.)
A plaintiff who files a timely complaint has recourse if the plaintiff does not know the identity, or even existence, of all defendants. When a previously unknown defendant surfaces after a plaintiff files a complaint, the plaintiff may amend the complaint even after the statute of limitations has passed to add the defendant under provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure governing “Doe defendants.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 474; see, e.g., Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 408-409.) To avail itself of this rule, plaintiffs here needed (1) to have filed suit within two years of the killing of Darrell Dennard and to have included Doe defendants; and (2) substitute the current defendants for Does once the identity of those defendants become known to plaintiffs. Here, no complaint at all was filed within the two-year statute of limitations.
Appellants’ reliance on Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 330, is unavailing. They cite it for the proposition that their initial ignorance of having claims against respondents excuses them from complying with the statute of limitations. In that decision, a landlord provided a tenant with a defectively manufactured heater that leaked gas into the residence. One issue in Howe – and the one issue that seems to have the closest connection to appellants’ case here – was fixing the date of the tenant’s awareness of his injury so as to trigger accrual of a cause of action when the tenant did not know the heater was defective but recurrent exposure to the gas caused cumulative injuries. (Id. at pp. 338-341.) Here, in contrast, appellants know when they were injured: the day Moreno shot and killed their son and father. By waiting more than two years to file their complaint, they unfortunately waited too long.
Appellants’ loss from Dennard’s murder is grievous. His death’s senselessness distresses any member of society who has even an ounce of compassion. We affirm the dismissal of the complaint, though, because the law compels it. As soon as appellants knew of their injury, the law gave them a fixed amount of time to act to preserve their rights. During that time, they had several options that would have saved them from today’s harsh result. For example, they could have investigated to see if they had any claims against any potential defendants other than gang member Mario Moreno. Or, they could have filed a complaint against Moreno and Doe defendants (Code Civ. Proc., § 474), later to amend the complaint to add the county defendants. Or, if they believed it imprudent or pointless to sue a gang member, they could have filed a complaint naming only Doe defendants and later amended the complaint to add the county defendants. (See Wallis v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 782, 784-785; see also Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 942 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.) citing Wallis for foregoing proposition but see Bernson, at p. 930, fn. 2 [majority questioning whether dissent’s solution was workable].) Unfortunately, they chose none of these alternatives.
Because we uphold the sustaining of the demurrer on the ground the complaint is time barred, we need not address respondents’ arguments that plaintiffs’ claims are also barred by governmental immunities.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each side to bear its own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: BIGELOW, J. O’NEILL, J.
Judge of the Ventura Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.