Opinion
No. 349659
02-27-2020
In re BELLAMY-CAMPBELL/CAMPBELL, Minors. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ACQUA SHAQUYA PATRICE CAMPBELL, also known as ACQUA SHAQUYA PATRICE MCMILLAN, Respondent-Appellant.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 17-000574-NA Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and JANSEN and M. J. KELLY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her children, AB and JC, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
In April 2017, respondent and her children were living with respondent's legal guardian in a senior-citizen complex. However, on April 13, 2017, respondent and the children were evicted from the complex because respondent was harassing other tenants. Respondent was also arrested on multiple outstanding warrants, leaving the children without proper care and custody. On the basis of respondent's homelessness and her mental-health issues, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the court to take jurisdiction over the children. Respondent pleaded to the allegations in the petition, and the court assumed jurisdiction over the children. Respondent was provided with an individualized parent-agency treatment plan, which required her to attend individual therapy, substance-abuse therapy, anger-management therapy, and parenting classes; obtain suitable housing and a legal source of income; complete a psychological evaluation; and attend parenting-time visits.
Between the July 2017 adjudication hearing and the January 23, 2019 termination hearing, respondent failed to complete all but one aspect of her parent-agency treatment plan. She obtained housing, but failed to complete any form of therapy, which was critical because she has suffered from bipolar disorder since she was a teenager. Respondent missed a significant number of parenting-time visits and appeared to retreat more and more from the children's lives as the proceedings continued. After seven termination hearings over the course of six months, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j), and it found by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the best interests of the children.
II. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it terminated her parental rights because the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children. Specifically, she contends that in light of her disability she should have been offered "specialized services." This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's decision regarding whether "reasonable efforts were made to preserve and reunify the family." In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). A trial court clearly errs when "we are definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake." In re White, 303 Mich App at 709-710.
B. ANALYSIS
"Under Michigan's Probate Code, [the DHHS] has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights." In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 59; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). "As part of these reasonable efforts, [the DHHS] must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification." Id. at 85-86. "Title II of the ADA requires that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id. at 86 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, so long as the modifications will not fundamentally alter the service provided, the DHHS must make "reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability." Id. at 86 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
On appeal, respondent claims that because she has "disabilities" and "shortcomings," the DHHS should have reasonably modified her case services plan to avoid discrimination the basis of her disability. She suggests that her disability is related to her mental-health issues. However, the record reflects that respondent was provided with a number of services aimed at reunifying her with the children. Through her parent-agency treatment plan, respondent was offered parenting classes, substance-abuse therapy, anger-management therapy, individual and family therapy, and mental-health treatment. Respondent was also provided a parent-partner to help her complete her parent-agency treatment plan, but parent-partner services were eventually terminated due to lack of participation. Nothing on the record supports a finding that respondent was physically or mentally incapable of taking advantage of those services. Moreover, although respondent asserts the caseworker "clearly had acrimony" toward her and "did nothing to really help" her accomplish her goals, it was only on the last day of the termination hearing—approximately two years after the children were made temporary court wards—that respondent suggested she might have a disability. And the record reflects that respondent was resistant to any form of assistance from the DHHS. For example, she refused to communicate with foster-care workers, which impeded her ability to benefit from services offered to her. Additionally, during parenting-time visits, respondent focused more on her anger toward the DHHS than spending time with the children. Given that the DHHS "cannot accommodate a disability of which it is unaware," id. at 87, and given that there is no indication that respondent's purported disability would prevent her from participating in and benefiting from the services offered, we discern no clear error in the court's finding that reasonable reunification efforts were made in this case.
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that there were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights. This Court reviews the trial court's findings regarding statutory grounds for clear error. In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 244; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
B. ANALYSIS
The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). Termination is proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if:
(g) The parent, although, in the court's discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
Respondent argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that there is no reasonable expectation that she will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time. We disagree.
Respondent does not argue that she was financially incapable of providing proper care and custody. At the termination hearing, she testified that she earns between $1,200 and $2,000 per month. Thus, it appears that respondent's inability to provide proper care and custody is unrelated to her finances.
Respondent failed to participate in and benefit from her parent-agency treatment plan, which "is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and custody." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Under respondent's parent-agency treatment plan, she was required to complete parenting classes, individual and family therapy, substance-abuse counseling, random drug screens, anger-management therapy, attend parenting-time visits, and obtain and maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income. Respondent obtained housing, but failed to complete any other aspect of her parent-agency treatment plan. Although respondent provided a certificate showing that she completed parenting classes, the DHHS was unable to verify the authenticity of the certificate. Respondent was terminated from individual and family therapy and substance-abuse counseling despite multiple referrals. Respondent only completed 5 of 60 drug screens, two of which tested positive for drugs. Respondent failed to complete anger-management despite four referrals, and her anger issues were apparent throughout the case. She exhibited "irate behavior" at parenting-time visits, often becoming aggressive with foster-care workers and staff, and engaged in aggressive behavior in front of the children. On several occasions, respondent threatened to physically harm a foster-care worker. The threat prompted the worker to file a police report against respondent. Agency incident reports and a zero-tolerance letter were also drafted in response to respondent's behavior at the parenting-time visits. Despite the incident reports and police reports, respondent's aggressive behavior continued.
With regard to parenting-time visits, the record reflects that at times during the case she failed to attend any visits for up to five months at a time. When she did attend the visits, she would bring friends or family with her, which sometimes resulted in arguments between respondent, her friends or family, and the DHHS staff. On a few occasions, security was called to remove respondent's friends from the premises. Further, there was testimony that during the parenting-time visits, respondent would not pay much attention to the children and that, overall, she rarely paid JC any attention at all. Thus, even if respondent had completed 12 weeks of parenting classes (as she claimed), she did little to demonstrate any benefit from the classes.
For these reasons, we discern no error in the court's finding that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).
Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant termination of parental rights. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). Accordingly, we decline to review whether termination was also proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a), (c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). --------
IV. BEST INTERESTS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondent argues that the termination of her parental rights was not in the best interests of the children. This Court reviews a trial court's decision regarding a child's best interests for clear error. In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 226; 894 NW2d 653 (2016).
B. ANALYSIS
To determine whether the termination of a parent's rights is in the child's best interests, the trial court should weigh all of the available evidence, In re White, 303 Mich App at 713, and consider the entire record, including any evidence introduced by any party, In re Medina, 317 Mich App at 237. Factors that the trial court may consider in making this determination include "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Medina, 317 Mich App at 237 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Respondent argues that termination of her parental rights was not in the children's best interests because she had a bond with the children. Yet, the bond was weakened by respondent's failure to consistently attend parenting time and by her inattention to the children at the visits she did attend. Furthermore, the bond between a parent and a child is only one factor that the trial court can consider. It is not dispositive. Even in cases where a strong bond exists between a parent and a child, termination can still be in a child's best interest. In this case, the children were removed from respondent's care in April 2017 because respondent was homeless and had untreated issues with mental health. Despite two years of services and multiple referrals, respondent failed to complete her parent-agency treatment plan. Respondent's failure to address her issues with mental health and anger are particularly concerning because such issues create an unstable and volatile environment that is unhealthy for young children. Respondent also failed to attend parenting-time visits for up to five months at a time, which caused the children substantial pain and disappointment.
Respondent also argues that the trial court failed to address each minor child separately to determine whether it was in their best interest to terminate respondent's parental rights. Yet, the trial court addressed each minor child separately, recognizing their different situations.
JC was placed with his biological father. Prior to that placement, he was borderline diabetic and exhibiting anger issues. After being placed with his father, JC lost 25 pounds and began earning good grades. JC's permanency plan was for his father to have full custody, and although JC's father did not want respondent's parental rights to be terminated, he recognized that respondent failed to take any necessary steps toward regaining custody of JC. Given respondent's lack of progress, JC's need for stability, permanence, and a healthy environment, we discern no clear error in the court's finding that termination of respondent's parental rights to JC was in JC's best interests.
AB's permanency plan was to remain with RS in a fictive-kin placement, and RS stated that she would adopt AB. The record reflects that AB suffered from seizures, constipation, and a speech impediment when she first moved in with RS. AB currently attends speech therapy to address her impediments and no longer has seizures or constipation. With RS, AB has a stable, safe, and healthy environment—something she lacked when living with respondent and something that there is no indication that respondent can provide her with within a reasonable period of time.
The trial court did not err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Kelly