Opinion
14-P-696
01-21-2015
JULIE DELORY v. PAMELA GORRASI.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, who apparently inherited the property from the decedent, challenges a lease between the decedent and the defendant that allows the defendant to live in a house in Andover until 2017. The plaintiff appeals from the Housing Court's grant of judgment for the defendant in a summary process action. We affirm.
Background. The decedent, Mary Crowe, was elderly and unmarried. She had no children and lived in a house on Pleasant Street in Andover. The defendant, Pamela Gorrasi, had two daughters and lived across the street. Gorrasi and Crowe were friends, and Gorrasi performed various services for Crowe, including transportation to medical appointments, grocery shopping, maintaining Crowe's property, and performing chores. Gorrasi never received or expected any payment.
This decision draws facts from the defendant's affidavit, which the plaintiff did not challenge below.
Gorrasi suffered financial difficulties that affected her housing. Around this time, Crowe decided to move to Maine and, apparently in a gesture of friendship, allowed Gorrasi to live in her home until August 31, 2017, after Gorrasi's youngest daughter's scheduled high school graduation date. The parties executed a lease on April 30, 2010, in the presence of two witnesses, the plaintiff, Julie Delory, and her husband.
Crowe died in 2013, and Delory apparently inherited the property. In a summary process complaint, entered on December 23, 2013, Delory sought to evict Gorrasi and claimed that she had given Gorrasi a sixty-day notice to vacate under the lease. In a motion dated January 23, 2014, Gorrasi sought summary judgment under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974). Delory filed a cross motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the judge granted judgment for Gorrasi on January 31, 2014, from which Delory appeals.
Although the parties do not dispute who owns the property, Delory has failed to include any materials in the record appendix that prove ownership. We assume, without deciding, that Delory is the landlord considering that Gorrasi's answer to the summary process complaint identified Delory as "landlord."
The order granting Gorrasi's motion contains no written explanation for the judge's reasoning, but a handwritten note appears to state: "[Allowed] after [hearing] based upon reasons articulated [in] defendant's motion and memorandum."
Summary judgment. The plaintiff argues that summary judgment for the defendant was improper because the lease unambiguously allows the lessor, Delory, the right to terminate the lease without cause. We disagree.
"Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 350 (2012). A decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Ibid.
Interpretation of a contract is a question of law for the court. GMAC Mort., LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 464 Mass. 733, 737 (2013). When interpreting contractual terms, a court will examine the intent of the parties. Siebe, Inc. v. Louis M. Gerson Co., 74 Mass. App. Ct. 544, 549 (2009). If the parties' intentions can be clearly inferred from the terms of the contract, a court will enforce those intentions if they can be carried out consistent with settled rules of law. Id. at 549-550. The parties' intent must come from a fair construction of the contract as a whole. MacDonald v. Hawker, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 869, 873 (1981). "[A]n ambiguity is not created simply because a controversy exists between parties, each favoring an interpretation contrary to the other." Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Offices Unltd., Inc., 419 Mass. 462, 466 (1995).
Here, Delory points to a provision that states under the heading Non-Performance By Party: "If the Lessor terminates this Lease without good cause and without proper notice, as outlined in this Paragraph, the Lessee shall be entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable repairs and renovations she made to the leased property during the Lease term." Delory argues that this language indicates unambiguously that the parties intended for the lessor to be able to terminate the contract without good cause at any time.
This argument is unpersuasive given the other provisions in the contract and the rather obvious intent of the parties. See Siebe, Inc. v. Louis M. Gerson Co., 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 549.
The language that Delory cites appears in the lease after a provision that allows the lessor to terminate the contract after giving the lessee multiple notices and a chance to cure any breach. Delory's interpretation renders this termination for cause provision largely superfluous because the lessor would be able to end the lease at any time at will, simply by reimbursing the lessee for repairs or renovations. Contrary to this interpretation, the first paragraph of the lease provides start and end dates and indicates that the term will run unless the lessee gives a written sixty-day notice. The lease contains no similar provision explicitly giving the lessor a similar ability to terminate at will, without cause.
The intent of Crowe and Gorrasi, in the context of the contract as a whole, supports the decision to grant summary judgment. See MacDonald v. Hawker, 11 Mass. App. Ct. at 873; Siebe, Inc. v. Louis M. Gerson Co., supra at 549-550. Gorrasi stated in her affidavit that "together we decided that my tenancy would end on August 31, 2017, unless I decided to move earlier." Delory did not challenge this fact in her opposition to summary judgment. The undisputed intent of the parties was for Crowe to help Gorrasi by providing a place to live until August 31, 2017. Delory placed no independent evidence before the judge that the parties intended the lessor to possess an ability to terminate at will. Delory's own interpretation of the contract language does not constitute such evidence. Judgment for Gorrasi as a matter of law was appropriate, see Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. at 350, and the judge properly enforced the undisputed intentions of the parties consistent with the law. See Siebe, Inc. v. Louis M. Gerson Co., 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 549-550.
For these reasons and for substantially those in the brief of the appellee, we affirm the judgment.
The appellee's request for attorney's fees and costs is denied.
So ordered.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Green & Meade, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: January 21, 2015.