Opinion
January 29, 1990
Appeal from the Court of Claims (Rossetti, J.).
Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof which denied that branch of the application which was for leave to file a late notice of intention to file a claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6), and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
On December 4, 1987, Sonia DeFilippis was operating her car eastbound on the Southern State Parkway when a car owned by Michael Alexopoulos and driven by Vasiliki Alexopoulos crossed the median and collided with her car. As a result of injuries she sustained, Sonia DeFilippis died four hours later.
In the beginning of January 1988, the claimant Libiro DeFilippis filed a probate petition with the Surrogate's Court seeking, inter alia, letters testamentary. On March 11, 1988, 98 days after the cause of action to recover damages for pain and suffering accrued, the court issued letters testamentary to Libiro DeFilippis, who served a notice of intention to file a claim to recover damages for wrongful death. Receipt of the notice was acknowledged by the Court of Claims on April 4, 1988 and by the State of New York on April 5, 1988.
On or about August 29, 1988, the claimant brought the instant application for leave to file a late notice of intention to file a claim to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering (see, Court of Claims Act § 10, [6]), and, in the alternative, sought a declaration that the notice of intention to file a claim already filed was timely as to a cause of action to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering based upon the applicability of the tolling provision found within CPLR 210 (a). The motion was denied in its entirety.
The claimant failed to interpose a written notice of intention to file a claim based upon the decedent's conscious pain and suffering within the 90-day time limitation provided in Court of Claims Act § 10 (3). For that reason the Court of Claims properly refused to declare that the notice which was filed was timely as to the cause of action to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering. The 90-day notice requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite which must be strictly applied (see, Greenspan Bros. v. State of New York, 122 A.D.2d 249; Luciano v. Fanberg Realty Co., 102 A.D.2d 94, 97; Byrne v. State of New York, 104 A.D.2d 782, 784; Perry v. State of New York, 64 A.D.2d 799, 800).
The Legislature was cognizant that a wrongful death action could only be instituted by a properly appointed legal representative, and it therefore extended the period for filing a claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim to 90 days following the appointment of an executor or administrator (Matter of Johnson v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 136, 138-139). However, with respect to claims based upon the conscious pain and suffering of the decedent, notice may be given by any interested person (cf., Matter of Johnson v. State of New York, supra; see also, Antoine v. State of New York, 103 Misc.2d 664, 668-669). While tolls and extensions pursuant to the CPLR extend the time to apply for leave to serve a late notice of claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) (see, Cohen v Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256, 263), those tolls and extensions have no applicability to the statutory period for service or filing of a timely notice of claim or notice of intention to file a claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (1) or Court of Claims Act § 10 (3) (see, Nicholas v. City of New York, 130 A.D.2d 470, 471; Barnes v. County of Onondaga, 103 A.D.2d 624, 627, affd 65 N.Y.2d 664; Barrett v State of New York, 143 Misc.2d 619, 625-626). The Appellate Division, Third Department, has recently had occasion to consider this point and has come to the same conclusion (Kaplan v. State of New York, 152 A.D.2d 417). Thus, the claimant's notice of intention to file a claim to recover damages for conscious pain and suffering was untimely.
However, the Court of Claims improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the claimant leave to file a late notice of intention to file a claim pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) (see, Innis v. State of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 654, 655; Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v. New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 N.Y.2d 979, 981). We agree that among the pertinent statutory factors to be considered, no acceptable excuse existed for the late filing of the notice of intention (see, Matter of Johnson v. State of New York, 49 A.D.2d 136, 138-139, supra), but we note that the delay was minimal, and there was a lack of prejudice to the State, which had previously extensively investigated the claim, and had notices of intention to file claims from the other litigants. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Claims, the claimant's submissions were sufficient to demonstrate a meritorious cause of action based upon the failure to provide a median barrier on the parkway (see, Zalewski v. State of New York, 53 A.D.2d 781, 782; see also, Richardson, Evidence, §§ 196, 253, at 170, 220 [Prince 10th ed]; § 253, at 109 [1972-1985 Supp]). The claimant satisfied the majority of the factors enumerated within section 10 (6), and we find that, under the circumstances of this case, permission to file a late notice of intention to file a claim was warranted.
We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Rosenblatt, JJ., concur.