Opinion
Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-PL-3049
03-20-2023
Thomas DECOLA, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Dennis L. & Joyce J. STEINHILBER and Wendell E. & Betty L. Werner, Appellees-Defendants.
Appellant Pro Se: Thomas DeCola, North Judson, Indiana Attorney for Appellees: Andrew E. Lucas, Martz & Lucas, LLC, Valparaiso, Indiana
Appellant Pro Se: Thomas DeCola, North Judson, Indiana
Attorney for Appellees: Andrew E. Lucas, Martz & Lucas, LLC, Valparaiso, Indiana
Foley, Judge.
[1] Dennis and Joyce Steinhilber ("the Steinhilbers") and Wendell and Betty Werner ("the Werners") (both couples collectively, "Appellees") own parcels of land adjacent to property purchased by Thomas DeCola ("DeCola"). After years of litigation, the Appellees secured summary judgment orders in their favor. Specifically, the trial court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether Appellees had any cognizable property interests in his land and found DeCola's claim for easements to be res judicata. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] DeCola purchased four parcels of land, apparently at tax sales, in November 2018. On July 1, 2020, DeCola filed an action to quiet title on the four parcels of land. Among the dozens of named defendants were the Werners and the Steinhilbers. The Steinhilbers filed a motion to dismiss the action pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), which the trial court granted on September 29, 2020. On October 14, 2020, DeCola filed a "Verified Amended Complaint Against the Steinhilbers." Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 45. The Steinhilbers filed a second motion to dismiss. The trial court granted that second motion to dismiss on May 11, 2022.
The complaint purports to be filed by DeCola on behalf of "Argento, LLC" an entity of which DeCola represented himself to be the "Principal." Appellees’ App. Vol. II p. 3. On appeal, however, DeCola appears "pro se." Appellant's Br. p. 3. His brief makes no mention of "Argento, LLC." The record appears to suggest that, at some point, DeCola transferred the title to his four parcels of land to himself personally, and the trial court subsequently substituted DeCola as the plaintiff and dismissed "Argento, LLC" from the case. We also note that the action was initially filed in the Porter Superior Court but was transferred to the Porter Circuit Court early in the litigation.
[3] DeCola filed an "Amended Complaint" four days later. Id. at 75. This version of the action sought for the first time, in addition to quieting title, a "judicial declaration upon the implied easements of necessity to gain access to the three (3) landlocked tracts ...." Id. at 77. The certificate of service for this version of the complaint reflects that DeCola served only the Steinhilbers, Snyder Farms, Inc., and another family named the Sajderas. The Werners were not initially served. In response, the Steinhilbers filed a motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2022. In their motion, the Steinhilbers argued that "no evidence exists as to the interest Mr. DeCola is attempting to clear[,]" and that "Res Judicata bars Mr. DeCola from reasserting his claim to an easement by necessity ...." Id. at 80. At this point, the litigation had been continuing for some two years.
[4] The Steinhilbers alleged that at no point during those two years had DeCola asserted what interest in his property he was actually attempting to clear. In other words, there were no allegations that the Steinhilbers even had an interest in DeCola's property. Of note to this appeal, the Steinhilbers also pointed out that DeCola had previously sued them seeking an easement by necessity and that the suit had been dismissed. The Werners filed a motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2022, as well and echoed the res judicata argument made by the Steinhilbers. The trial court granted both motions on December 21, 2022. DeCola now appeals.
The previous suit was filed under cause number 64D05-2110-PL-9544. In the present case the Steinhilbers designated the trial court's order of dismissal from the prior case. DeCola did not present any evidence of unity of title at the time his tracts were separated from those belonging to Appellees. The trial court in the prior case noted that such evidence was required and concluded that the complaint stated no claims upon which relief could be granted.
The prior suit against the Werners was filed under cause number 64D02-2109-PL-8355. The dismissal in that prior case set forth reasons similar to those in the order of dismissal in the Steinhilber prior case.
Discussion and Decision
[5] At the outset, we note that it is quite clear that the trial court considers DeCola to be a " ‘prolific, abusive litigant.’ " Dunigan v. State , 191 N.E.3d 851, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper , 17 N.E.3d 259, 262 (Ind. 2014) ), trans. denied ; see Appellees’ App. Vol. II pp. 56–57 (referring to DeCola's "cantankerous and rather obstinate personality" and the trial court's lack of appreciation for "litigants who make cases more difficult than they need to be."). Indeed, this litigation appears to have been byzantine: dozens of defendants, excessive motions practice, and a general lack of clarity as to which parties are where in the proceedings, and, sometimes, as to what the proceedings even are. On numerous occasions, the trial court was required to call upon the parties to clarify what issues and motions were currently pending. Nevertheless, we reiterate, as the trial court patiently and repeatedly has: "a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented." Zavodnik , 17 N.E.3d at 266. "This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so." Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis , 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Basic v. Amouri , 58 N.E.3d 980, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) ).
I. Quiet Title Claims
[6] We briefly address the Steinhilbers’ argument that DeCola has failed to adduce evidence that they have any legal interest in DeCola's property. We consider summary judgment rulings de novo. See, e.g. , Minser v. DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm'n , 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Schoettmer v. Wright , 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013) ). And we limit our review to the evidence designated by the parties at the trial court level. Id. (quoting Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep't of Nat. Res. , 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied ). The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burton v. Benner , 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020). The burden shifts to the non-moving party which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve "[a]ny doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom ... in favor of the non-moving party." Id.
The argument, to the extent that it can be discerned, is more than likely waived under Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Waiver notwithstanding, we address the claim as the trial court did below.
[7] Pursuant to Trial Rule 56 the Steinhilbers designated DeCola's complaint, which makes no allegations that they have any legal interest in, or claims to, DeCola's property. Unless rebutted, this would entitle the Steinhilbers to summary judgment, given that an interest in a property cannot be cleared if it does not exist. We see nothing in the designated evidence, and DeCola fails to direct us towards anything, that would call into question whether the Steinhilbers have any legal interest in DeCola's property. So far as we can tell, DeCola has never articulated which interests in his property he is attempting to clear. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Steinhilbers have any legal interest in DeCola's property.
We further note that, with respect to the easement claims as to the Appellees’ properties, DeCola's complaint fails to comply with statutory requirements. Though DeCola provides legal descriptions of his own properties, he fails to provide legal descriptions of the properties through which he claims he has a right to an easement. This failing contravenes Indiana Code Section 32-30-2-4.
II. Easement Claims
[8] The remaining argument concerns the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata forecloses DeCola's attempts to secure easements against the properties belonging to the Werners and Steinhilbers. "Generally speaking, res judicata operates ‘to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same, by holding a prior final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies.’ " Matter of Eq.W. , 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Becker v. State , 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013) ). "This doctrine applies where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue between the same parties." Id. (quoting Ind. State Ethics Comm'n v. Sanchez , 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) ) (internal quotation omitted). "Similar to double jeopardy in the criminal context, res judicata operates to prevent a party from receiving the proverbial ‘second bite at the apple.’ " Id. at 1209 (citing Garrett v. State , 992 N.E.2d 710, 721 (Ind. 2013) ; Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 17, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) ). [9] "There are two branches of res judicata: claim preclusion—which has been raised in the present dispute—and issue preclusion." Id. (citing First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson , 65 N.E.3d 1045, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) ). The case at bar evinces claim preclusion because DeCola presented the same claims to easements in the prior action.
Before a court can find that claim preclusion applies to bar a subsequent action, four essential elements must be met: (1) the former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was or might have been determined in the former suit; and (4) the controversy adjudicated in the former suit must have been between the parties to the present action or their privies.
Ramey v. Ping , 190 N.E.3d 392, 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Eq.W , 124 N.E.3d at 1209 ) (internal quotations omitted), trans. denied.
[10] DeCola has waived any arguments on this score, given that his only assertions are that "the [t]rial [c]ourt failed to illuminate with absolute certainty the elemental standard of how the doctrine of res judicata is applicable over implied appurtunent [sic] easements ..." and that: "[i]t is simply not equitable for DeCola to be forced to utilize aviation as a means to access his landlocked parcels if his appeal is not granted." Appellant's Br. p. 7 (emphasis in original); see Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) ; Clark Cnty. Drainage Bd. v. Isgrigg , 963 N.E.2d 9, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Watson v. Auto Advisors, Inc. , 822 N.E.2d 1017, 1027–28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied ) (" ‘When parties fail to provide argument and citations, we find their arguments are waived for appellate review.’ "). Waiver notwithstanding, we hold that the trial court properly found that DeCola's claims are res judicata.
[11] As we have noted, the easement claims are identical to those raised previously, as are the parties to those previously named. DeCola does not suggest that the Porter Superior Court is not one of competent jurisdiction. The only remaining question is: are the prior dismissals of DeCola's easement claims judgments on the merits? Generally speaking, Rule 12 is designed to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not the merits of the claims asserted. Thus, a Rule 12(B) "dismissal ... does not usually operate as an adjudication on the merits and is not res judicata." Thacker v. Bartlett , 785 N.E.2d 621, 624–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Browning v. Walters , 616 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ; Kokomo Med. Arts Bldg. P'ship v. William Hutchens & Assocs. , 566 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ). In Thacker we noted that a dismissal under Rule 12(B)(6) must be one without prejudice, given that the Rule provides for a ten-day period during which a complainant may amend her complaint to rectify the deficiencies that led to its dismissal. See also Brodnik v. Cottage Rents LLC, 165 N.E.3d 126, 128–29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Here, however, both dismissals were ordered "with prejudice." Appellees’ App. Vol. II pp. 145, 153. The chronological case summaries for the two previous easement actions reveal that DeCola did not challenge that aspect of the orders, and indeed, made no filings after the orders for dismissal were entered.
[12] Thus, we are faced with a set of facts where dismissals which are not supposed to be made with prejudice have nonetheless been issued as such, and "[a] dismissal with prejudice is a dismissal on the merits." Brodnik , 165 N.E.3d at 128–29 (citing Hart v. Webster , 894 N.E.2d 1032, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) ). In Thacker we noted that a plaintiff faced with a Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal may opt to amend her complaint or to appeal the decision. 785 N.E.2d at 624. Since Thacker opted for the former, "the dismissal of Thacker's original complaint under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is not res judicata." Id. In dicta, however, we noted that "[a] Trial Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal becomes an adjudication on the merits only after the complaining party opts to appeal the order instead of filing an amended complaint." Id. at 624–25 (citing Platt v. State , 664 N.E.2d 357, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ; Dixon v. Siwy , 661 N.E.2d 600, 605 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) ; Browning , 616 N.E.2d at 1044 ).
[13] This proposition—that a judgment not normally considered to be on the merits may convert into a judgment on the merits by virtue of being appealed—traces to our decision in England v. Dana Corp. , 147 Ind.App. 279, 259 N.E. 2d 433 (1970) more than fifty years ago. But the England decision did not, as such, stand for that proposition. Rather, the England court was interpreting how a dismissal under the federal Rule 12(B)(6) operated in the context of federal judgments. Since the order in question in that case would be considered to be a judgment on the merits under federal law, we determined that the prior federal order could meet the requirement for res judicata in our state courts. Nevertheless, this court appears to have now adopted the federal principle and incorporated it into our jurisprudence of our own Rule 12(B)(6). For the first time, we explicitly confirm that adoption here.
In a footnote, the England court observed:
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 41(b), so provides:
‘Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule , other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.’
England , 259 N.E.2d at n. 6 (emphasis added). This draws attention to a tension between our case law and the trial rules, as our own Rule 41(B) utilizes similar language. Ind. Trial Rule 41(B) ("a dismissal under this subdivision or subdivision (E) of this rule and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication upon the merits."). Namely, we have held that a Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal is not an adjudication on the merits, while Rule 41 appears to provide the opposite. No party directs us to Rule 41, so we need not address the tension in order to resolve this case. We do note, however, that the provision in our Rule 12 that provides for the filing of an amended complaint as of right after dismissal for failure to state grounds upon which relief may be granted is a provision which the federal Rule 12 does not include. Under the federal system, the plaintiff is afforded the opportunity to repair any defects in her complaint prior to the dismissal ruling. Thus, there is never a need for a plaintiff to re-file.
This is apparent despite some early missteps with respect to the interaction between Rule 12(B)(6) and the species of judgment it generates. See, e.g., Cureton v. Lyman S. Ayres & Co., 153 Ind.App. 495, 287 N.E.2d 904, 907 (1972) ("[W]here a motion to dismiss is directed to the complaint for failure to state a claim and the motion is sustained, unless otherwise specified in the order of dismissal, such order constitutes a final adjudication upon the merits of the claim ...."); Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Wm. P. Jungclaus Co. , 352 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (taking it as generally accepted that all dismissals under Rule 12(B)(6) are decisions on the merits).
[14] We observe that an appealed Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal does not become an adjudication on the merits merely because it has become final for purposes of appeal. See Hutchinson v. City of Madison, 987 N.E.2d 539, 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) ("Not all final judgments, however, are adjudications on the merits."). Rather, when a trial court rules that a complaint ought to be dismissed because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it is essentially ruling that the claims asserted are, as presented, lacking in merit as a matter of law. At that point a plaintiff has two options: (1) determine that the claims only currently lack merit because of the way in which they are pleaded—a matter of form—and correct the pleadings; or (2) reject the trial court's ruling and its implication and challenge the ruling on appeal. The latter is essentially a challenge—as a matter of substance—that contends that the claims do have merit. The plaintiff "elect[s] to stand upon the complaint ..." England , 259 N.E.2d at 436 (citing Asher v. Ruppa , 173 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1949) ). Thus, it is the plaintiff who decides whether to concede that a Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal is a final judgment on the merits of her claims. We hold today that this logic applies even when, as DeCola has done here, the plaintiff declines to make a decision and merely allows the deadlines to file an appeal or amend his complaint to expire. Here, DeCola's failure to make a choice when faced with the orders of dismissal was, itself, a choice. The consequence of that choice is that he is barred from re-raising his easement claims in a later action pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
This is true regardless of whether a trial court erroneously orders a Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal with prejudice.
[15] We, therefore, find that the trial court did not err in granting the two motions for summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.
[16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.