Opinion
FBTCV166056909S
08-03-2017
Marianna Davit, Conservator of the Estate of Rubia Rodrigues v. Town of Fairfield et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Richard E. Arnold, Judge.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to Counts Two and Three of the plaintiff's Amended Complaint dated July 5, 2016. Counts Two and Three allege recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8) and indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § § 7-101a and 7-465, respectively. The defendants argue that Count One, which alleges a violation of General Statutes § 13a-149, regarding a highway defect, is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The defendants have filed a memorandum of law dated January 19, 2017. The plaintiff has filed an objection and a memorandum of law, both dated March 13, 2017. The court heard oral argument on the motion for summary judgment on April 3, 2017.
At the relevant times alleged in the complaint, Defendant Tetreau was the Fairfield First Selectman. Defendant Michelangelo was the Director of Public Works for Fairfield. Defendant Monteiro was an employee of the Town of Fairfield.
The court on March 15, 2017 denied a motion to dismiss on similar grounds and arguments advanced by the parties. At oral argument on that motion there was discussion regarding whether or not a motion to dismiss was the proper pleading to address the legal sufficiency of the Amended Complaint as to the argument that § 13a-149 was the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the statutory notice provided by the plaintiff regarding the highway defect.
Plaintiff alleges in her Amended Complaint that on September 7, 2015, Rubia Rodrigues, the conserved person, was riding her bicycle traveling down hill direction along the right side of the road known as Morehouse Highway in Fairfield, Connecticut, between Adley Road and the entrance to Lake Mohegan when the front tire of her bicycle became trapped in a catch basin grate on the right side of the road causing Rodrigues to fall off her bicycle and sustain serious injuries. As noted above, the plaintiff filed a three-count action, which was amended on July 5, 2016.
I
Standard of Law: Summary Judgment
" Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 312-13, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party " must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . [T]he burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact is on the party seeking summary judgment . . . It is not enough for the moving party merely to assert the absence of any disputed factual issue; the moving party is required to bring forward . . . evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings to show the absence of any material dispute . . . The party opposing summary judgment must present a factual predicate for his [or her] argument to raise a genuine issue of fact . . . Once raised, if it is not conclusively refuted by the moving party, a genuine issue of fact exists, and summary judgment is inappropriate." Valente v. Securitas Security Services, USA, Inc., 152 Conn.App. 196, 202-03, 96 A.3d 1275 (2014).
" The court is required to view the facts presented in a motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vollemans v. Wallingford, 103 Conn.App. 188, 193, 928 A.2d 586 (2007), aff'd, 289 Conn. 57, 956 A.2d 579 (2008).
It is also well established that " [s]ummary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where, as here, the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975); see also Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984); DiUlio v. Goulet, 2 Conn.App. 701, 703, 483 A.2d 1099 (1984). A determination of negligence is necessarily one of fact. Cappiello v. Haselman, 154 Conn. 490, 495, 227 A.2d 79 (1967); Balboni v. Stonick, 2 Conn.App. 523, 527, 481 A.2d 82 (1984). As such, " [i]ssues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." Spencer v. Good Earth Restaurant Corp., 164 Conn. 194, 199, 319 A.2d 403 (1972); see also Amendola v. Geremia, 21 Conn.App. 35, 37, 571 A.2d 131, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 803, 574 A.2d 217 (1990).
II
Arguments of the Parties
The plaintiff has brought two claims against the defendants. Count One alleges a violation of General Statutes § 13a-149 against the Town of Fairfield. Count Two alleges recklessness against Tetreau, the First Selectman, Michelangelo, the Director of Public Works and Monteiro, a town employee. Count Three claims indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § § 7-101a and 7-465.
The defendants argue that the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Counts Two and Three of the amended complaint because section 13a-149 is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy." [W]e construe § 52-557n to provide that an action under the highway defect statute, § 13a-149, is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy against a municipality or other political subdivision for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge. It also, therefore, precludes a joint action seeking such damages against a municipality and its officer. The proviso in § 52-557n would be stripped of all meaning, for § 7-465(a) would permit a plaintiff to reach the result forbidden by § 52-557n: the imposition of tort liability on a municipality for a highway defect claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 192, 592 A.2d 912 (1991).
General Statutes § 13a-149 reads as follows:
General Statutes § 52-557n reads in relevant part:
The court questions if a motion for summary judgment is the proper procedural vehicle, as the defendants are apparently arguing that the plaintiff's allegations regarding causes of action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8) and indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § § 7-101a and 7-465, are legally insufficient as a matter of law. A motion to strike may be the proper way to proceed. However, the court has reviewed the plaintiff's memorandum of law in which she objects to the motion for summary judgment and finds the plaintiff has not objected to the defendants' use of a motion for summary judgment in determining the issue briefed the parties, which is whether or not an action for highway defect, pursuant to § 13a-149 is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. Therefore, in its analysis, court takes into consideration the standard of law relevant to a motion to strike.
The plaintiff in addition to making arguments regarding the legal sufficiency of his allegations contained in Counts Two and Three, has in her memorandum of law addressed whether genuine issues of material fact are present regarding whether the defendants' conduct constitutes recklessness. The court agrees that whether conduct is reckless is an issue of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. However, as the court is treating the present motion, as a motion to strike, the court need not determine whether genuine issues of material fact are present.
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is " to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). " [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000).
The defendants argue that § 52-557n(b)(8) does not provide a cause of action against a municipality in a highway defect case brought pursuant to § 13a-149. Section 52-557n(b)(8) states:
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from: . . . (8) failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, other than property owned or leased by or leased to such political subdivision, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, unless the political subdivision had notice of such a violation of law or such a hazard or unless such failure to inspect or such inadequate or negligent inspection constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances . . .(Emphasis added.)
" Although the legislature should have been clearer, the only sensible interpretation of the 'notwithstanding' clause that introduces paragraph (b) is to eliminate the cases in paragraph (a)(1) in which a town 'shall be liable' without also eliminating the immunities in paragraph (a)(2). This construction produces a consistent legislative scheme in which paragraph (a) describes cases in which a town " shall be liable" and paragraph (b) describes cases in which, '[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, ' a town 'shall not be liable.' The alternative, upon which plaintiff relies, is to read 'shall not be liable' to mean 'shall be liable.' While our statutes arc not always models of clarity, the court will not indulge in the assumption that the legislature meant the polar opposite of what it said. Nor will it presume that the legislature intended to create liability by negative inference. Accordingly, the court concludes that § 52-557n(b)(8) does not create a cause of action." Curtin v. Town of Brookfield, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Nos. X02CV020178124S, X02CV020178123S (April 14, 2005, Schuman, J.) 39 Conn.L.Rptr. 173,; see also, Niemitz v. Town of Barkhamsted, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, No. LLI-CV-06-5000208-S, (Feb. 21, 2008, Pickard, J.) (" The plaintiff next makes a very brief argument that C.G.S. § 52-557n(b)(8)4 must be interpreted to mean that a municipality cannot claim immunity for failure to inspect its own property. The plaintiff cites no case law for this proposition because there is none. This subsection of the statute provides a municipality and its employees with immunity in certain specific circumstances, regardless of subsection (a).")
The defendants also cite a recent decision by our Appellate Court in Williams v. Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport, 159 Conn.App. 679, 689-91, 124 A.3d 537, cert. granted, 319 Conn. 947, 125 A.3d 528 (2015) for the proposition that § 52-557n(b)(8) cannot serve as a legal basis for an additional cause of action. Williams addressed the statutory interpretation of General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8) as it relates to the waiver of traditional immunity extended to municipalities for their tortious acts at common law pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(2)(B). The defendants concede that Williams, supra, did not analyze the applicability of General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8) to a highway defect claim, but argue that it is still relevant. The Appellate Court reasoned that " under § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) the defendants are immune from liability for tortious violations of a discretionary duty; but are not extended immunity for tortious violations of a ministerial duty. Under § 52-557n(b)(8), however, with respect to a duty to inspect, the defendants are immune from liability even if the failure to inspect is a ministerial duty, unless that failure to inspect constitutes a reckless disregard for health and safety, in which case they would not be immune from liability. Id., 691. Thus, as a result, § 52-557n(b)(8) has been held to provide additional immunities to municipalities as it relates to the waiver of immunity in § 52-557n(a)(2)(B). Consequently, in the present action § 52-557n(b)(8) cannot serve as a legal basis for an additional cause of action.
The plaintiff argues that none of the case cited by the defendants are applicable to this case as they are not cases discussing the applicability of General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8) to a highway defect claim. The plaintiff argues that the language of General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8) provides that in the case of a conflict between terms, those of § 52-557n(b) take precedence over the terms in General Statutes § 52-557n(a).
The plaintiff cites no case authority in support of her position. She relies only on the language of the statute.
The plaintiff argues that Count Two of the Amended Complaint specifically alleges that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by " reckless disregard for health and safety under all the relevant circumstances of the defendant Town of Fairfield and the defendant employees of the Town of Fairfield." Thus, these allegations clearly fall directly within the statutory framework of permissible allegations under § 52-557n(b). The claims in Count Three are derivative of the claims in Count Two. Therefore, summary judgment as to Counts Two and Three should be denied.
The plaintiff also argues there are issues of fact as to whether the defendants' conduct amounted to recklessness. These issues of fact should be left to the trier of fact. The plaintiff notes that her expert will testify that the catch basin grate at issue had sunk or settled into a depression that was two and one-half inches deep, and the defendant's Superintendent of Public Works, Scott Bartlett, testified at his deposition that he would not be comfortable with a catch basin surface that had sunk two inches below the road surface because of safety concerns. Bartlett also testified that even though he inspected the subject grate, he decided not to have it repaired. The plaintiff argues that this, along with other stated claims, is a reason for the jury to decided whether the defendants failed to " timely inspect and/or adequately inspected the road and/or the catch basin grate" to determine that the grate was " extremely dangerous for bicyclists, " and if so, whether this amounted to a " reckless disregard for health and safety under all the relevant circumstances."
III
Discussion
Section 13a-149, the highway defect statute, provides in relevant part: " Any person injured in person or property . . . by means of a defective road . . . may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair . . . No action for any such injury shall be maintained against any town . . . unless written notice of such injury and a general description of the same, and of the cause thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence, shall, within ninety days thereafter be given to a selectman or the clerk of such town . . ." In addition, General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(1) provides, in relevant part: " Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties; (B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit; and (c) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149 . . ." (Emphasis added.) " Whether a highway is defective may involve issues of fact, but whether the facts alleged would, if true, amount to a highway defect according to the statute is a question of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 341-42, 766 A.2d 400 (2001); see also, Goutier v. Town of Hamden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, CV156059000S (Jan. 6, 2017, Wilson, J.); 63 Conn.L.Rptr. 684, .
" [I]n an action against a municipality for damages resulting from a highway defect, the defective highway statute is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy." Ferreira v. Pringle, supra, 255 Conn. 341. " Under § 52-557n(a)(1), we first must determine whether the plaintiff's claim is a claim for damages against a municipality 'resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road.' . . . If the answer is yes, then the party seeking relief is bound to pursue such relief pursuant to § 13a-149." (Citation omitted.) Escourse v. 100 Taylor Avenue, LLC, 150 Conn.App. 805, 816, 92 A.3d 1016 (2014).
" The plain meaning of the word highway is [a] main road or thoroughfare; hence a road or way open to the use of the public . . . [T]he essential feature of a highway is that every traveler has an equal right in it with every other traveler . . . [T]he distinctive feature of a highway for which a claim may arise under § 13a-149 is that it is open to public use." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 147 Conn.App. 148, 158, 82 A.3d 647 (2013), aff'd, 315 Conn. 606, 109 A.3d 903 (2015). In the present case, the conserved person was riding her bicycle on Morehouse Road in Fairfield, Connecticut. It is a road open for use to the public. Section 13a-149 applies to this factual scenario.
Next the court must determine if the catch basin grate can be considered a highway defect for the purposes of a section 13a-149 action. " [A] highway defect is [a]ny object in, upon, or near the traveled path, which would necessarily obstruct or hinder one in the use of the road for the purpose of traveling thereon, or which, from its nature and position, would be likely to produce that result." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Himmelstein v. Windsor, 116 Conn.App. 28, 37, 974 A.2d 820 (2009), aff'd, 304 Conn. 298, 39 A.3d 1065 (2012). The catch basin grate in or near the is sufficiently pleaded as a highway defect for the purposes of an action brought pursuant to § 13a-149.
The court denied a motion to dismiss alleging, among other things, that the statutory notice was defective. See n.2, herein.
The issue before the court is whether, in the present case, section 13a-149 is the exclusive remedy available to the plaintiff. The court has reviewed a recent decision regarding a motion to strike in the matter of Howeson v. Housing Authority of the City of Willimantic, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No.WWM-CV16-6010934 S (Apr. 26, 2017, Calmar, J.) [64 Conn.L.Rptr. 369, ], which discusses whether a claim that a defendant municipal housing authority acted with reckless disregard for the health and safety of its elderly and disabled resident, if proven, would support a cause of action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8). In Howeson, the defendant had moved to strike the claim alleging municipal liability under General Statutes § 52-557n, on the grounds that the statute does not create an independent and direct cause of action. The plaintiff had alleged that she was a resident in an apartment complex controlled, maintained and managed by the defendant Housing Authority, when she fell on ice and snow while walking her dog in a court yard area. The plaintiff alleged negligence, private nuisance and a third count brought pursuant to General Statutes § § 52-557n(a)(1)(C) and 52-557n(b)(8) for failure to carry out adequate inspections.
The Howeson court (Calmar, J.) found that in accordance with holdings in Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 387, 54 A.3d 532 (2012), and Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 29, 818 A.2d 37 (2003), a plaintiff may bring a direct cause of action pursuant to § 52-557n and additionally Ugrin, supra, held that § 52-557n(b)(8) creates a direct cause of action. " In other words, if the town is not shielded from liability in the inspection context when it has notice of a hazardous condition or has engaged in conduct that constitutes reckless disregard of public health and safety, the lack of protection must mean that it is subject to liability in those circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs are not precluded from bringing a cause of action against the town under § 52-557n(b)(8) and that the trial court improperly granted the town's motions to strike count three of the plaintiffs' complaints." Ugrin v. Cheshire, supra, 307 Conn. 387. The Howeson court denied the motion to strike a claim pursuant to § 52-557n(b)(8) finding that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to infer that the defendant housing authority acted with reckless disregard to the health and safety of its elderly and disabled residents by refraining from removing accumulated ice and snow with the knowledge that injuries were likely to result from such a failure. The plaintiff also alleged the failure of the defendant to carry out adequate inspections of the housing complex. The allegations were found to be sufficient to state a claim under the " reckless failure to inspect" exception to § 52-557n. However, the decision in Howeson v. Housing Authority of the City of Willimantic, does not address or discuss the applicability of Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(b)(8) to a highway defect claim brought pursuant to § 13a-149, which is the issue in the present case.
A claim sounding in negligence against a municipality or its subdivisions may fall under either § 52-557n or § 13a-149, but not both. See Cuozzo v. Orange, 315 Conn. 606, 617-18, 109 A.3d 903 (2015); Helfand v. City of Norwalk, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, No. FBTCV136039789, (July 1, 2015, Kamp, J.). Our courts have strictly construed § 52-557n " to provide that, in an action against a municipality for damages resulting from a highway defect, the defective highway statute [§ 13a-149] is the plaintiff's exclusive remedy." Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 341, 766 A.2d 400 (2001). " [W]hether a highway is defective may involve issues of fact, but whether the facts alleged would, if true, amount to a highway defect according to the statute [§ 13a-149] is a question of law." Kumah v. Brown, 307 Conn. 620, 626, 58 A.3d 247 (2013). The Supreme Court has stated that " the manner in which a defect is created in and of itself has no bearing on . . . liability under the statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Himmelstein v. Windsor, supra, 304 Conn. at 314.
Since there is no issue that the complained of condition is a defect within the meaning of the highway defect statute, allowing the plaintiff to plead § 52-557n(b)(8) in the alternative is unwarranted under the circumstances. Helfand v. City of Norwalk, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, No. FBTCV136039789, (July 1, 2015, Kamp, J.). The Supreme Court has deemed § 13a-149 the exclusive remedy in highway defect cases. See Ferreira v. Pringle, supra, 255 Conn. at 341, 766 A.2d 400; Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra, 219 Conn. at 192, 592 A.2d 912. The plaintiff, therefore, cannot bring a claim pursuant to both § 52-557n(b)(8) and § 13a-149. The proviso in § 52-557n(a)(1)(C) regarding § 13a-149 would be stripped of all meaning, as a separate claim pursuant to § 52-557n(b)(8) would permit a plaintiff to reach the result forbidden by § 52-557n(a)(1)(C), being the imposition of tort liability on a municipality for a highway defect claim. See. Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 192 (1991). To determine otherwise, would allow claimants to plead a cause of action pursuant to § 52-557n(b)(8) in every highway defect case filed by alleging a reckless failure to inspect resulting in a danger to public health and safety.
IV
Conclusion and Orders
The court grants summary judgment as to Count Two alleging recklessness pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n(b)(8) and Count Three, a count derivative of Count Two. Count Three alleges indemnification pursuant to General Statutes § § 7-101a and 7-465, respectively. The court emphasizes that for the reasons stated earlier herein, it has analyzed the issues taking into consideration the standard of law applicable to a motion to strike. The court makes no findings regarding issues of fact as to any recklessness by the defendants, as alleged by the plaintiff in her Count Three, which has now, for practical purposes, been stricken by the granting of the motion for summary judgment. The court has proceeded to determine this matter for the purposes of judicial economy despite the possible mislabeling of the present motion as a motion for summary judgment as because no objection to the use of a motion for summary judgment to determine the issues was made by the plaintiff.
Any person injured in person or property by means of a defective road or bridge may recover damages from the party bound to keep it in repair. No action for any such injury sustained on or after October 1, 1982, shall be brought except within two years from the date of such injury. No action for any such injury shall be maintained against any town, city, corporation or borough, unless written notice of such injury and a general description of the same, and of the cause thereof and of the time and place of its occurrence, shall, within ninety days thereafter be given to a selectman or the clerk of such town, or to the clerk of such city or borough, or to the secretary or treasurer of such corporation. If the injury has been caused by a structure legally placed on such road by a railroad company, it, and not the party bound to keep the road in repair, shall be liable therefor. No notice given under the provisions of this section shall be held invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in describing the injury or in stating the time, place or cause of its occurrence, if it appears that there was no intention to mislead or that such town, city, corporation or borough was not in fact misled thereby.
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties; . . . and (c) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149 . (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from: . . . (8) failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, other than property owned or leased by or leased to such political subdivision, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, unless the political subdivision had notice of such a violation of law or such a hazard or unless such failure to inspect or such inadequate or negligent inspection constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances . . .(Emphasis added.) Gen. Stat. 52-557n.