Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV511-041
08-23-2011
GLEN ALVIN DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Warden BARRY GOODRICH; O. DUNNAM; Unit Manager CARTER; and PEGGY COOPER, Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an inmate currently confined at Coffee Correctional Facility in Nicholls, Georgia, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement. A prisoner proceeding in a civil action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner. 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).
In Mitchell v. Farcass. 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only where it appears beyond a doubt that a pro se litigant can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in Mitchell interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this Court in applying the identical language of § 1915A.
Plaintiff contends that he wrote a grievance to Defendant Goodrich, the Warden, in which he stated he was given a medical lay-in by the doctor and was told to stay off his feet, but his medical profile was ignored.
It appears Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Goodrich liable based solely on his position as warden. In section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec, 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations, Id. at 802. As Plaintiff has failed to make this basic showing, his claims against Defendant Goodrich should be dismissed. An allegation that a grievance was filed with supervisory personnel is an insufficient basis for liability in a section 1983 cause of action. Clayton v. Alston, No. CV309-042, 2009 WL 3483805, at *5 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 28, 2009).
In addition to Defendant Goodrich, Plaintiff names as Defendants Officer Dunnam, Unit Manager Carter, and Assistant Warden Peggy Cooper. Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in his Complaint against Defendants Dunnam, Carter, or Cooper. A plaintiff must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As Plaintiff has failed to make any factual allegations against Defendants Dunnam, Carter, and Cooper, his claims against Defendants Dunnam, Carter, and Cooper should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is my RECOMMENDATION that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED, this 23th of August, 2011.
JAMES E. GRAHAM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE