Opinion
24-CV-3652 (LTS)
05-14-2024
JAMAR DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; WARDEN USP FLORENCE HIGH, Defendants.
TRANSFER ORDER
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary (USP) Florence -High, in Fremont County, Colorado. Plaintiff's 94-page application, filed pro se, is disjointed and unclear, but he appears to bring claims primarily about the conditions of his earlier confinement in USP Allenwood in Pennsylvania, and Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Beckley in West Virginia. He also raises the lack of access to hygiene products at USP Florence.Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages, and he may also seek to restore the loss of good-time credits.
Plaintiff brought an earlier petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this district challenging denial of hygiene products at USP Florence, and the action was transferred to the District of Colorado. Davis v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 24-CV-1538 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2024).
There may be questions about whether the claims for injunctive relief are moot because Plaintiff is no longer at the facilities where his claims arose. Moreover, an implied damages remedy, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is only available against an individual who was personally involved in violating the plaintiff's rights. The only individual named in this action is the Warden of USP Florence-High, in Colorado.
Petitioner's application raises questions about whether the appropriate vehicle for this action is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, or a civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In the Second Circuit, a federal prisoner's claims seeking injunctive relief related to conditions of confinement are generally brought in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Other circuits, however, do not allow challenges to conditions of confinement to be brought in a Section 2241 petition. See, e.g., Camacho Lopez v. Lowe, 452 F.Supp.3d 150, 159 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (“[A] split has developed as to whether habeas corpus provides a remedy for a conditions-of-confinement claim that does not implicate the fact, duration, or execution of the petitioner's confinement.”). In the Tenth Circuit, where Plaintiff is incarcerated, “[i]t is well-settled law that prisoners who wish to challenge only the conditions of their confinement . . . must do so through civil rights lawsuits . . . not through federal habeas proceedings.” Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2011).
See Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2008); Acevedo v. Capra, 545 F.Supp.3d 107, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Because Thompson was a federal prisoner, a remedy under § 1983 was categorially unavailable to him. As a result, longstanding Second Circuit precedent indicated that he could challenge those conditions pursuant to § 2241, which our Court of Appeals has interpreted as covering such claims.”).
See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 42 (1980) (“The broad power of federal courts to grant equitable relief for constitutional violations has long been established.”); Simmat v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that sovereign immunity did not bar a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim against the BOP for denial of dental care because the sovereign immunity waiver in 5 U.S.C. § 702 applied).
By contrast, the Supreme Court has settled that challenges to the loss of good-time credits, which do implicate the duration of a petitioner's confinement, are cognizable only in a habeas corpus petition. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (holding that a petitioner's “sole federal remedy,” when challenging the “fact or duration” of imprisonment and seeking immediate or speedier release, is a writ of habeas corpus); Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a federal prisoner's petition to expunge a disciplinary sanction that includes the loss of good-time credits is properly brought via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241).
Here, the Court need not resolve whether this civil action should be recharacterized, in whole or in part, as a Section 2241 petition because venue is not proper in this district in either situation. In order to entertain a habeas corpus petition under Section 2241, a court must have jurisdiction over the custodian, Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973), and the jurisdiction of a habeas petition challenging a petitioner's physical confinement generally lies in the district of his confinement, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004). Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at USP Florence in Fremont County, Colorado, which is located in the District of Colorado, 28 U.S.C. § 85, and he names the Warden of USP Florence. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado would therefore be a proper venue for this action if it were deemed a Section 2241 petition, including for a challenge to the loss of good-time credits.
Alternatively, for a civil action under Section 1331, the general venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 applies.Venue is not proper in this district, under Section 1391(b)(1), based on the residence of the parties because only the Warden of USP Florence in Colorado, and the Bureau of Prisons are named as defendants in this action. Venue also does not lie in this district under Section 1391(b)(2) based on where the events took place because Plaintiff's claims arose in USP Allenwood in Pennsylvania, FCI Beckley in West Virginia, and USP Florence in Colorado, all of which are outside this district. Because venue does not lie in this district but may be proper in the District of Colorado, regardless of how this action is characterized, the Court transfers this action in the interest of justice to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Under the general venue provision, a civil action may be brought in
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . .; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Plaintiff may have submitted this application here because he is incarcerated pursuant to his conviction in the Southern District of New York. See United States v. Davis, No. 16-CR-0339-2 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2017).
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court.This order closes the case in this district.
Plaintiff has not paid the filing fees or submitted paperwork necessary to proceed in forma pauperis.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.