Opinion
2012-UP-333
05-30-2012
Leonard Daigle, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Respondent.
Leonard Daigle, pro se. Tommy Evans, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Submitted May 1, 2012
Appeal from the Administrative Law Court Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Court Judge
Leonard Daigle, pro se.
Tommy Evans, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Leonard Daigle appeals the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order dismissing his appeal of the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services's (the Department) decision denying him parole. He argues the ALC erred in (1) dismissing his appeal and (2) denying his motion to compel additional evidence for the record. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
1. As to whether the ALC erred in dismissing Daigle's appeal: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2011) (providing that the ALC shall not hear an appeal involving the denial of parole to a potentially eligible inmate by the Department); Compton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479, 685 S.E.2d 175, 177 (2009) (holding that an order denying parole and stating consideration of all statutory and Department criteria is sufficient to avoid deeming an inmate effectively ineligible for parole).
2. As to whether the ALC erred in denying Daigle's motion to compel additional evidence for the record: S.C. Code Ann § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2011) (explaining that an appellate court may only reverse a decision of the ALC if the substantive rights of the appellant have been prejudiced).
AFFIRMED.
PIEPER, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.