Opinion
# 2015-041-037 Claim No. 124592 Motion No. M-86242
05-18-2015
DONALD L. CURTIS, #86-A-3111 v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
DONALD L. CURTIS Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion for summary judgment in wrongful confinement action based upon administratively annulled disciplinary determination is denied where claimant fails to satisfy his initial burden to show, as a matter of law, that defendant's quasi-judicial hearing immunity is abrogated by defendant's alleged violations of disciplinary hearing rules and regulations and that the alleged violations caused prejudice to claimant.
Case information
| UID: | 2015-041-037 |
| Claimant(s): | DONALD L. CURTIS, #86-A-3111 |
| Claimant short name: | CURTIS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124592 |
| Motion number(s): | M-86242 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | DONALD L. CURTIS Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 18, 2015 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, currently an inmate at Upstate Correctional Facility, moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment as to defendant's liability for wrongfully confining claimant to keeplock at Clinton Correctional Facility (Clinton) as a result of an inmate disciplinary proceeding. Defendant opposes the motion.
The claim, and claimant's affidavit supporting his summary judgment motion, essentially allege that claimant was wrongfully confined to keeplock at Clinton as a consequence of a guilty determination issued after a prison disciplinary hearing completed on March 24, 2014. The disciplinary determination found claimant guilty of the following charges: Creating a disturbance; harassment; refusing a direct order; and threats. Claimant was sentenced to 60 days keeplock, among other penalties.
Claimant alleges that defendant violated disciplinary hearing rules and regulations at the disciplinary hearing by denying claimant the right to call witnesses (7 NYCRR 254.5), failing to provide an impartial hearing officer (7 NYCRR 253.1 [b]), denying claimant the opportunity to offer exculpatory documentary evidence (7 NYCRR 254.6 [a] [3]) and failing to provide an effective inmate assistant (7 NYCRR 251-4.1).
The disciplinary determination was administratively appealed by claimant, based upon the defendant's above-described alleged violations of hearing rules and regulations, and also upon on the grounds that the charges themselves were false and lodged in retaliation by a certain correction officer.
On May 27, 2014, the disciplinary determination was "reviewed and reversed," by the defendant's Director of Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Program, based upon a "FAILURE TO MAINTAIN COMPLETE ELECTRONIC RECORD." By the time the disciplinary determination was reversed, the claimant had already completed his 60 day keeplock confinement.
The claim was served on July 1, 2014 and defendant answered on August 1, 2014.
The standard for review of the motion is well-established. "A motion for summary judgment should be entertained only after the moving party has established, by competent admissible evidence, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . If the movant meets this initial burden, the opposing party is required to submit evidence which raises a material issue of fact to preclude an award of summary judgment" (Ware v Baxter Health Care Corp., 25 AD3d 863, 864 [3d Dept 2006]).
Once the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts and the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue (Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 31 AD3d 877 [3d Dept 2006]).
To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove the following elements "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
The element most often contested in a prison disciplinary wrongful confinement claim is whether claimant can show that the confinement was not "otherwise privileged."
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
In the context of confinement pursuant to a prison disciplinary proceeding, such confinement is "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with [inmate misbehavior] regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).
Both the verified claim, and the claimant's affidavit in support of his summary judgment motion, assert that defendant failed to follow its own rules and regulations in conducting the disciplinary hearing, as described above, and the confinement was therefore not "otherwise privileged."
Defendant argues that claimant has failed to meet his initial burden to show prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on his claim of wrongful confinement. With respect to the crucial element of whether the confinement was privileged, defendant has not contradicted, via affidavit or other admissible evidence, claimant's sworn assertions as to the disciplinary hearing rules and regulations violations of defendant alleged by claimant, but instead simply labels claimant's sworn allegations as "speculative and conclusory."
That circumstance, however, does not end the Court's inquiry into whether claimant has satisfied his initial burden on his summary judgment motion. Defendant also argues that claimant's initial motion papers fail to include competent admissible proof to establish that the alleged violations of the hearing rules and regulations caused claimant prejudice or that the excluded evidence would have changed the hearing outcome.
Defendant reminds that where employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary proceedings, "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations . . . their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Varela v State of New York, 283 AD2d 841 [3d Dept 2001]). This immunity attaches even if the conviction is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 215).
If, however, prison officials fail to comply with a rule or regulation governing such disciplinary hearings, absolute immunity may be lost and liability for money damages may be imposed if it is proven that the regulatory violation caused actual prejudice or injury to the inmate (see Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2004]).
In his initial motion papers, the claimant failed to offer admissible proof as to the specific nature of the purported hearing officer bias and impartiality. Claimant similarly offered no competent proof in his initial papers as to the nature and import of the allegedly exculpatory documentary evidence, nor did he provide the identity and expected testimony of his witnesses.
As a result, claimant failed to show, as a matter of law, that the defendant's alleged violation of the hearing rules and regulations caused him "prejudice" or that the allegedly excluded witnesses and documentary evidence would have "changed the outcome of the hearing" and the claimant's summary judgment motion must be denied (Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2015]).
Claimant's attempt, in his reply papers, to remedy the failure of his initial motion papers is unavailing:
"On a motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting competent evidence that demonstrates the absence of any material issue of fact [citations omitted]. Only when the movant satisfies its obligation does the burden shift to the nonmovant to present evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact" (Lacasse v Sorbello, 121 AD3d 1241, 1241-1242 [3d Dept 2014]).
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that claimant failed to satisfy his initial burden to show, as a matter of law, that defendant violated disciplinary hearing rules and regulations and that such violations caused actual prejudice to claimant or would have otherwise "changed the outcome of the hearing" (Watson, 125 AD3d at 1065).
Accordingly, the Court further finds that claimant has failed to meet his initial burden to present competent evidence establishing his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on his claim of wrongful confinement.
Even assuming that claimant's initial motion papers had satisfied his preliminary summary judgment burden, it is clear that triable issues of fact exist with respect to the salient issue of whether claimant's documentary evidence and witnesses would have changed the outcome of the disciplinary hearing.
Claimant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
May 18, 2015
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 21, 2015;
2. Affidavit of Donald L. Curtis, sworn to January 13, 2015, and attached exhibits;
3. Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich, dated March 9, 2015, and attached exhibits;
4. Unsworn "Traverse to the Defendant's Opposition," of Donald L. Curtis, dated March 16, 2015.