Opinion
EP-10-CV-266-KC
09-30-2011
MICHAEL CUEVAS, TDCJ No. 579522, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Michael Cuevas ("Cuevas") challenges the denials of his multiple motions to reopen his mandatory supervision revocation hearing by the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles ("the Board") through a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No. 1]. In his answer [ECF No. 7], Respondent Rick Thaler ("Thaler") asserts that Cuevas's claims not only remain unexhausted, but also lack merit. In his reply [ECF No. 11], Cuevas argues his claims "should be judged in the light of reason drawn from the consideration of fairness . . . when appeal is made to 'due process.'" For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Cuevas is not entitled to § 2254 relief. The Court will accordingly dismiss his petition. The Court will additionally deny Cuevas a certificate of appealability.
"ECF No." in this context refers to the Electronic Case Filing number for documents docketed in EP-10-CV-266-KC.
Pet'r's Reply 4.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 4, 1991, Cuevas pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation in two separate cases in the 120th District Court of El Paso County, Texas. The trial judge accepted his pleas and sentenced him to twenty-one years' imprisonment in each case, to run concurrently. On multiple occasions thereafter, the Board released Cuevas to mandatory supervision only to later revoke his supervision and return him to prison.
See State v. Cuevas, Cause Nos. 59984 and 59985 (120th Dist. Ct., El Paso County, Tex. Mar. 4, 1991).
Relevant to this petition, on March 8, 2007, the Board released Cuevas to mandatory supervision. Over two years later, on May 7, 2009, Cuevas admitted to a parole officer that he had violated the terms of his release by failing to wear a required electronic monitoring ankle transmitter. Cuevas also waived his right to a revocation hearing. Then, on May 21, 2009, the Board voted to revoke his mandatory supervision for failing to participate in an electronic monitoring program and failing to wear the required ankle transmitter. Cuevas subsequently submitted multiple motions to reopen the revocation hearing, which the Board denied.
Cuevas previously filed a petition in this Court attacking the Board's denials of his motions to reopen the revocation hearing. The Court dismissed the petition without prejudice after noting that Cuevas had failed to exhaust his state remedies. Cuevas then filed two state applications for a writ of habeas corpus on May 10, 2010, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") dismissed on June 30, 2010, as noncompliant with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 73.1. This proceeding followed on July 21, 2010.
See Cuevas v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, EP-10-CA-121-FM (W.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2010).
Id.
Ex parte Cuevas, WR-65,262-04, WR 65,262-05 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30, 2010).
Mindful of Cuevas's pro se status, the Court construes his instant petition liberally. The Court understands him to assert that the Board abused its discretion, violated his due process rights, acted in bad faith, and denied him the right to appeal when it rejected his requests to reopen his parole revocation hearing after he waived his right to such a hearing. Cuevas seeks a seventeen-month reduction to his maximum discharge date.
See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holdingpro se pleadings to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers); see also Franklin v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (explaining liberal construction allows active interpretation of a pro se pleading to encompass any allegation which may raise a claim for federal relief).
Pet'r's Pet. 7-8.
Pet'r's Mem. in Supp. 9 [ECF No. 1-2].
APPLICABLE LAW
"[C]ollateral review is different from direct review," and the writ of habeas corpus is "an extraordinary remedy" reserved for those petitioners whom "society has grievously wronged." It "is designed to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system." Accordingly, the federal habeas courts' role in reviewing state prisoner petitions is exceedingly narrow. "Indeed, federal courts do not sit as courts of appeal and error for state court convictions." They must generally defer to state court decisions on the merits and on procedural grounds. They may not grant relief to correct errors of state constitutional, statutory, or procedural law, unless a federal issue is also present. Thus, a federal court should deny a claim decided by a state court on the merits unless the adjudication:
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 634.
Id. (citing Justice Stevens's concurrence in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979)).
Dillard v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1986).
Moore v. Cockrell, 313 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 2002).
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991); Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 1998).
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1404 (5th Cir. 1996).
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2011).
As a prerequisite to obtaining § 2254 relief, a prisoner must exhaust all remedies available in the state system. This exhaustion requirement reflects a policy of federal-state comity "designed to give the State an initial 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'" It also prevents "unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution."
Id. § 2254(b)(1), (c); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1999).
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971)).
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
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A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement when he presents the substance of his habeas claims to the state's highest court in a procedurally proper manner before filing a petition