Opinion
D071281
01-07-2020
In re the Marriage of C.S. and G.S. C.S., Appellant, v. G.S., Respondent.
C.S., in pro. per., for Appellant. G.S., in pro. per., for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. ED53926) APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Maureen Hallahan, Judge. Affirmed. C.S., in pro. per., for Appellant. G.S., in pro. per., for Respondent.
Appellant C.S. appeals from a September 2016 family court order following a trial de novo in which the family court set and confirmed temporary child support for the parties' adult child, S.S. C.S., a self-represented litigant, contends the family court commissioner abused its discretion in determining and calculating support and the family court judge erred in various other ways, including by not advising the parties that a commissioner would hear their matters, calculating the amount of support, and imputing income to her. She asks us to reverse and remand the matter to the family court for various actions, some of which are beyond the scope of our review of the order at issue on appeal. We affirm.
C.S. asks for an audit, to recalculate "income, time share, and guideline support," to redetermine monies she would have received between December 2013 and July 2014, and to address "missing" funds paid to G.S. as well as attorney fees and costs.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
C.S. has augmented the record with various documents, including superior court records that were before the trial court. She also seeks to add documents to her opening brief, a request that we ordered considered with this appeal. C.S. characterizes these documents as evidence submitted or lodged by G.S. in the family court, including pages of a calendar or calendars as well as a declaration that she states totals 28 pages. C.S.'s request does not make clear whether the items were actually lodged with or before the family court or commissioner whose orders are the subject of C.S.'s appeal. She also states that given her arguments, "[t]hey might not be needed." Even if these items were before the court, C.S. has not demonstrated they are relevant to the issues encompassed by the appealed-from adult child support orders. We deny C.S.'s motion to augment on those grounds. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) ["the reviewing court may order the record augmented to include . . . [¶] [a]ny document filed or lodged in the case in superior court . . . ."]; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 696, fn. 4 [denying motion to augment record because material was not relevant to resolution of issues on appeal].) For the same reasons, we deny C.S.'s November 25, 2019 request to augment the appellate record with items that were apparently submitted to the court in connection with hearings that took place in October 2014 and August 2016. C.S. has not demonstrated the relevance of these items in her written request.
This matter has a lengthy procedural history, recounted in fair detail in the family court commissioner's February 16, 2016 Final Statement of Decision, adopted in large part by the family court in its September 13, 2016 findings and order after hearing. The order for temporary adult support that is the subject of this appeal was preceded by hearings and orders issued in July 2014, September 2014, January 2015, July 2015, August 2015, and November 2015. Another hearing on C.S.'s request for attorney fees took place in December 2015. As explained below, the orders in connection with those hearings—including orders denying C.S.'s motion to set aside a prior child support and arrears order, and either granting or denying C.S. attorney fees—are not at issue on this appeal.
In November 2015, the parties appeared before a family court commissioner for a hearing on C.S.'s request to modify support for S.S., for a trial on adult child support, and for sanctions. The commissioner heard the parties' testimony and considered evidence of S.S.'s behavior, including hospital records and psychological evaluations. It made extensive findings as to S.S.'s medical history and hospitalizations. The commissioner found S.S. was incapacitated from earning a living due to mental disability; was without sufficient means, was disabled and received Supplemental Security Income (SSI) of $648 per month; and C.S. bore the primary financial responsibility for S.S. It ordered G.S. to pay $1,289 in guideline temporary child support effective November 1, 2015, but reserved and suspended the order effective the following month, December 1, 2015, and continued the matter "for a review to determine where [S.S.] is living and whether [S.S.] is actually receiving ongoing consistent treatment whether it is inpatient or outpatient, and whether [S.S.] is taking . . . medication as prescribed." The commissioner ordered the parties to open trust and checking accounts in the event S.S. was in a residential facility, or arrange for the support to be paid directly to the facility. The commissioner issued its findings and order after hearing on February 11, 2016.
In July 2016, at C.S.'s request, the family court conducted a trial de novo limited to the commissioner's findings and order. The parties agreed that the sole issue before the family court was the question of adult child support for S.S. Thereafter, the family court on its own motion reconsidered its order, held a further hearing on the matter in August 2016, and issued an order on September 13, 2016, modifying its order in part. Specifically, the court (1) made specific findings as to G.S.'s net income and time share with S.S.; (2) imputed $1,169 in gross monthly income to C.S. on a finding she was not working to her capacity; (3) found monthly guideline child support to be $1,486 payable from G.S. to C.S.; (4) found S.S. was receiving $881 in SSI and deducted that amount from the guideline support amount; (5) ordered G.S. to pay C.S. prorated adult child support of $453 for February 2015 (February 9, 2015, to February 28, 2015) and $605 ($1486 minus $881) per month for the period March 1, 2015, to November 30, 2015; and (6) adopted all of the commissioner's other findings and recommendations not in conflict with its previous rulings.
DISCUSSION
I. The Scope of This Appeal and Principles of Appellate Review
C.S. has appealed only from the September 13, 2016 family court order determining the parties' gross monthly income, setting guideline child support, ordering G.S. to pay $605 in monthly adult child support from March 1, 2015, to November 30, 2015, and approving all other consistent findings and recommendations from the family court commissioner's February 11, 2016 order. C.S.'s notice of appeal was timely filed as to that order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(7); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).) C.S. discusses the other earlier hearings and orders throughout her briefing, but those matters are not properly before us. Though we are required to liberally construe notices of appeal in favor of their sufficiency (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2)), we cannot do so where an order is not mentioned at all. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 76; Baker v. Castaldi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 218, 225-226; Filbin v. Fitzgerald (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 154, 173; Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 846 [appellate court's jurisdiction is " 'limited in scope to the notice of appeal' "].) Such appeals would be untimely in any event, requiring us to dismiss them on our own motion. (See Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113.)
C.S.'s notice of appeal states she is appealing from an "adult child support order 3910, trial de novo from a commissioner." As indicated, the family court first entered its order on or about August 30, 2016, but then reconsidered it on its own motion and entered new findings and an order after hearing on September 13, 2016. It is apparent from the papers filed by C.S. that she is appealing the family court's September 2016 order.
For example, C.S. argues the family court or commissioner (1) abused its discretion by determining in January 2015 that adult support was "premature"; (2) erred by denying C.S. advance attorney fees or awarding her insufficient attorney fees in an "augment"; (3) erred in connection with C.S.'s request to set aside the prior child support and arrears order; (4) failed in 2014 and 2015 to alert the parties a commissioner would be hearing their matter and procedurally erred with respect to C.S.'s objection to using a commissioner; and (5) erred by failing to include certain information in an August 2015 minute order or not verifying information in giving G.S. credit against certain arrears.
C.S.'s briefing in this court also compels us to emphasize settled principles of appellate review. "[A]s a party appearing in propria persona, [C.S] 'is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.' [Citations.] Accordingly, we may disregard factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or are based on information that is outside the record." (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.) We disregard conclusory arguments. (Ibid.) C.S. must provide cogent legal argument in support of her claims of error with citation to legal authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); Sims v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1081.) Absent these required matters, the point is forfeited. (Sims, at p. 1081; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
On appeal, a judgment or an order is presumed to be correct, and C.S. as the party challenging the order must affirmatively show error. (E.g., Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We also presume judicial duty is properly performed; that the court below knows and applies the correct statutory and case law, and will ignore material it knows is incompetent, irrelevant, or inadmissible. (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526.)
II. Application of Appellate Review Standards Invalidates Many of C.S.'s Arguments
C.S.'s opening brief on appeal is difficult to follow. Both her "Statement of the Case" and her "Statement of Facts" discuss the orders that are not within the scope of this appeal, and they are argumentative and conclusory. Her brief lacks the type of headings and subheadings that ensure litigants " 'present their cause systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.' " (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831, fn. 4.) Throughout, C.S. recounts earlier hearings and reargues the merits of her case, impermissibly making factual assertions that she believes are favorable to her position and presenting them in a rambling, disorganized fashion. She impermissibly challenges G.S.'s credibility or that of Department of Child Support Service representatives, contrary to settled principles of appellate review. (See In re Marriage of Cipriari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 94 [on reviewing a statement of decision following a bench trial, appellate court "may not reweigh the evidence and are bound by the trial court's credibility determinations"]; Shulman v. Shulman (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 120, 122 [in reviewing modification of alimony award for abuse of discretion, "[i]t is not the province of [the appellate court] to judge the credibility of witnesses"].) While C.S. correctly identifies the applicable standard of review for an adult support award she does not apply it; many of her argument headings do not coherently address how and why the court abused its discretion, the normal inquiry on review of an adult support order. (In re Marriage of Drake (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 934, 939 (Drake II).)
Although we exercise our discretion to consider those issues we can discern in C.S.'s disorganized arguments related to the appealed-from order, there are times when it is not possible to understand what precisely she is arguing. "It is not our responsibility to act as counsel for [C.S.] and attempt to arrange [her] arguments coherently. In addition to the failure to provide proper headings, [C.S.'s] failure to provide coherent organization to [her] arguments forfeits consideration of those arguments on appeal." (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 181; see also Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 [appellate court is not required to make an independent search of the record seeking error].) Nor is it our place to construct theories or arguments for C.S. to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799.) Accordingly, arguments that are not discussed in this opinion are deemed forfeited. (Id. at p. 179.)
III. C.S. Has Not Demonstrated the Court Abused Its Discretion in Calculating or
Awarding Adult Child Support for the Period At Issue
A. Legal Principles Pertaining to Calculating and Awarding Adult Child Support
Parents have an equal responsibility to maintain a child of any age "who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means." (Fam. Code, § 3910, subd. (a).) Awarding child support for such adult children protects the public from the burden of supporting people whose parents are able to support them. (Drake II, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 940; In re Marriage of Cecilia & David W. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1286.) "The term 'incapacitated from earning a living' [citation] means 'an inability to be self-supporting because of a mental or physical disability or proof of inability to find work because of factors beyond the child's control.' " (Drake II, supra, at p. 940.) Courts must not focus solely on the adult child's conditions; they must consider the child's ability to find work or become self-supporting in light of such conditions. (In re Marriage of Cecilia & David W., supra, at p. 1286.)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
The statutory Family Code guidelines apply to calculate adult child support. (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1155-1157 (Drake I).) The guideline formula, which is "presumptively correct" (In re Marriage of Macilwaine (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 514, 528), embodies the "Legislature's intent that the benchmark for the amount of child support should be the parents' standard of living." (Drake I, at p. 1157.) Usually, courts "may not depart from those guidelines ' " 'except in the special circumstances enumerated in the statutes.' " ' " (Macilwaine, at p. 528.) However, in Drake I, the court made clear in the adult child support context the guidelines are not "fatally inflexible with respect to the special circumstances of disabled adult children and their parents. Generally speaking, when any assumption operating through the guideline formula produces an 'unjust or inappropriate' result 'due to special circumstances in the particular case,' Family Code section 4057 'effectively vests trial courts with considerable discretion to approach unique cases on an ad hoc basis.' " (Drake I, at p. 1157.) Thus, "the guidelines permit the trial court to adapt or depart from the formula when warranted by the special circumstances of particular disabled adult children or their parents." (Ibid.)
Drake I held that while under the guideline formula a child's own estate, as such, is not a factor in computing the amount of child support owed by a parent, in suitable circumstances the trial court may nevertheless adjust parental support obligations in light of a child's independent income. (Drake I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.) "Accordingly, when a disabled adult child has independent income or assets, the trial court has the discretion to reduce the formula-calculated amount of child support." (Ibid.) This includes by reducing the guideline formula by Social Security disability benefits paid to the adult child. (Id. at pp. 1162-1163.)
This court reviews a family court's decision to award or modify adult child support for abuse of discretion. (Drake II, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 939; see In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1038-1039.) "The concept of a reasonable exercise of discretion means that trial courts must follow established legal principles. [Citation.] In the context of child support awards, which are highly regulated by the statewide uniform guideline, the only discretion trial courts possess is the discretion provided by statute or rule." (Morton, at p. 1039.) When reviewing an order under this standard, " 'we will overturn [it] only if, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.' " (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 995.) " 'Where the issue on appeal is whether the trial court has abused its discretion, the showing necessary to reverse . . . is insufficient if it presents facts which merely afford an opportunity for a different opinion . . . . ' " (Drake I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164-1165.) We determine whether substantial evidence supports the family court's findings of fact forming the basis for the order. (In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1479.) In reviewing the evidence, " ' " ' "all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the [prevailing party], and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in [order] to uphold the [finding] if possible." ' " ' " (Ibid.) We exercise independent review of C.S.'s claims that the court incorrectly interpreted or applied the law. (In re Marriage of Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201, 207.) B. Analysis
As we will explain, the above-referenced legal principles and appellate presumptions of correctness require us to affirm the appealed-from order because C.S.'s arguments do not establish the court erred. We summarize C.S.'s contentions as best we can and address them seriatim.
1. Calculating Adult Support
In somewhat repetitive arguments, C.S. contends the family court abused its discretion in calculating adult child support by deducting dollar for dollar S.S.'s SSI from G.S.'s guideline support obligation. C.S. does not challenge the family court's determination that $1,486 was the support amount under the guideline formula, only the absence of an express finding that the adjustment was in S.S.'s best interests. C.S. further contends SSI cannot be included as gross income so as to satisfy a support obligation based on sections 4056, 4057 and 17516, Elsenheimer v. Elsenheimer (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1532, and portions of an unspecified judge's bench guide.
Were we to identify and consider the bench guide, it would only be to establish its contents and not for the truth of the matter asserted. (Accord, Los Angeles County Dept. v. Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1414, fn. 5.)
In ordering the adjustment from the guideline amount, the family court specifically provided in its written order: "Based on the multiple factors regarding the specific child and the parenting placement decisions made exclusively by mother the court finds this [deduction] is appropriate."
The "best interests of the child" standard is a principle applicable to awarding support for minor children. This case involves an adult child. The child's best interests is not one of the two factors relevant to an adult child support award: whether the adult child is incapacitated from earning a living, and whether he or she has sufficient means. (§ 3910, subd. (a); see In re Marriage of Cecelia & David W., supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1285-1286; Drake II, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 940 [section 3910, subdivision (a) governs adult child support, thus the trial court mistakenly considered the need to support the child and the best interests of the child when ordering support].) C.S.'s arguments do not establish the family court was required to expressly find its adjustment of the guideline amount to account for S.S. income was in S.S.'s best interests.
Even assuming arguendo the court was required to provide an express reason for its decision to depart from the guideline support figure (see Y.R. v. A.F. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 974, 984-985 [court cannot exercise its discretion to deviate from the guideline without saying why either in writing or on the record]; S.P. v. F.G. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 921, 935-936), we would conclude its findings constituted a sufficient statement of reasons. The family court articulated in its order why the deviation was proper, and under Drake I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th 1139 the court was well within its discretion to consider S.S.'s income to reduce the formula-calculated amount. (Drake I, at p. 1158, 1162-1163.) Further, we may conclude any omission in making findings harmless when the missing findings are reasonably implicit in other findings. (S.P. v. F.G., at p. 935; In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175, 183 [failure to make finding may be reversible if missing information is not otherwise discernible from the record]; Rojas v. Mitchell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1450.) Here, the family court adopted all other consistent findings of the commissioner, including the commissioner's findings that the child was receiving this additional income and currently living with G.S., who was supporting him. C.S. does not address these findings or demonstrate they are insufficient to support the court's exercise of discretion.
The principle that SSI may not be considered gross income for purposes of support obligations pertains to SSI of the parent. (Eisenheimer v. Eisenheimer, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1536 [interpreting section 4058 and holding Supplemental Security Income—a federally funded welfare program distinguishable from Social Security benefits and Social Security disability insurance benefits—falls within the exception for gross income of a parent].) C.S. concedes this is the case, but says the principle should apply "in keeping with the law, and intent of child support laws . . . when an adult child is on SSI" as "SSI is need based."
"The annual gross income of each parent means income from whatever source derived, except as specified in subdivision (c) and includes, but is not limited to, . . . [¶] disability insurance benefits [and] social security benefits . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Annual gross income does not include . . . income derived from any public assistance program, eligibility for which is based on a determination of need." (§ 4058, subds. (a), (c).)
This assertion, made without reasoned legal analysis or authority, does not convince us. Even in the case of minor children, "[a] child's Social Security insurance benefit are primarily intended for the support of a child" (Y.H v. M.H. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 300, 305, italics added) and "[s]tate law requires such benefits to be applied as a credit to a noncustodial parent's child support obligation" (ibid) unless the benefits were taken into consideration by the court in determining the support to be paid. (Id. at pp. 305-306; Drake I, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) In this adult support context where courts have broad discretion to adjust the guideline with the adult child's income, we see no reason to treat SSI income differently, and C.S. has given us none. In determining how to account for social security benefits, a court has the discretion either to consider the payments in fixing the guideline amount or to allow a direct credit for the payments against the guideline formula support amount. (See Drake I, at pp. 1162-1163.) Here, the court did the latter. Under the principles expressed in Drake I, such a credit was well within the court's "sound discretion." (Id. at p. 1162.)
C.S.'s remaining assertions in support of her argument seek to reargue the underlying facts (including S.S.'s medical conditions), and accuse G.S. of fabricating arguments, "obstructing justice" or presenting conflicting evidence. C.S.'s unsupported assertions are not evidence, and we are entitled to disregard such assertions. (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.)
2. G.S.'s Time Share
C.S. contends the court erred by assigning G.S. a 38 percent time share with S.S. based on the parties' past agreement, admitting a hearsay calendar into evidence, and disregarding her own evidence. She asserts the court "should have used [her] evidence, as [G.S.] also testified [she] had [S.S.] mostly 100 [percent] of the time and there was substantial evidence supporting [her] calendar and claims." C.S. misunderstands that in deciding whether the family court abused its discretion we look for substantial evidence supporting the court's order; the existence of evidence favoring C.S.'s position is not relevant to that standard. (See Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.) We are not at liberty to reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. (In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531.) Otherwise, C.S. does not provide cogent legal analysis to support her contentions. To the extent she cites authority, her citations are incomplete or inscrutable, and the cases purport to stand for the propositions that a witness's demeanor is part of the evidence and affidavits are not admissible in a contested trial leading to judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 2009. C.S. does not explain how or why these principles apply to the family court's determination of G.S.'s physical responsibility for S.S. (See Edwards v. Edwards (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 136, 144 [time sharing adjustment for adult children is based on the parents' respective periods of primary physical responsibility rather than physical custody].) We disregard the assertions made without reasoned legal argument, and her citations to cases absent discussion of their application to the present case. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
3. Date of Commencing Adult Support
C.S. contends the trial court abused its discretion by not commencing adult child support payments as of the filing of her first motion in September 2014. As we have explained, the commissioner's decisions or orders from September 2014 are not before us in this appeal. None of C.S.'s assertions in support of her argument are accompanied by reasoned legal argument or authority, and they merely seek to have us decide the issue anew. They do not establish any abuse of discretion in the family court's order commencing adult child support in February 2015.
4. Imputing Income to C.S.
During the August 2016 trial de novo, the following exchange took place:
"The Court: . . . Ma'am, are you working now?
"[C.S.]: I'm just working for my brother, mostly.
"The Court: So is that a 'yes' or 'no'?
"[C.S]: Well—I don't know. He just pays me, like, when I take care of his animals and house.
"The Court: Ma'am, answer my question. Are you working?
"[C.S]: Well, I'm going to say no, I'm not working.
"The Court: Are you attempting to work?
"[C.S.]: Yeah. I've been applying—well, I've been applying for jobs. But I haven't got them. I'm trying to go to school so I can be more—to get a job. Because I was taken off of disability. And then they canceled that—my physician canceled it, apparently. But I have a lawyer fighting it. But I've been applying for jobs. But because of different computer skills that were required for the positions that I had before, so I was taking some classes online, taking care of [S.S.].
"The Court: Thank you, ma'am. You're not answering my question, so I'm going to move on."
The family court found that G.S. was "not working to her capacity" or potential, and did not appear to want to get a job. It imputed $1,169 to her in gross monthly income, finding this amount "is the same amount which [C.S.] previously agreed to."
C.S. contends the court abused its discretion by imputing income to her without making findings that such imputation was in S.S.'s best interests, and otherwise by not deciding the issue "fairly." She contends the court "added imputation to already claimed income, giving [her] double incomes [and] prejudicing [her] for support orders." She further contends G.S. did not meet his burden to show she was purposely not working or had the capacity to work. C.S. makes unsupported assertions about her income and unemployment, her claimed participation in a CalWORKs program, and the amount of time S.S. was with her. We disregard the unsupported assertions. (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.)
C.S. also asserts she did not quit work but was removed by a doctor. She points to a document lodged in this court entitled "Verification of Disability" on which S.S.'s name and birthdate were typewritten in but crossed out with C.S.'s name and birthdate inserted in handwriting. The document appears to be signed by a doctor in October 2014 stating the patient's attention deficit disorder was a disability limiting employment, and that the patient was "unlikely to be able to work in the future." We presume in favor of the order at issue that the family court rejected the credibility of this document in making its findings.
All of C.S.'s arguments seek to have this court decide the question anew; C.S. does not discuss relevant legal principles for imputing or not imputing income to a parent for the purpose of child support or apply the relevant abuse of discretion standard of review. (In re Marriage of Berger (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1079-1080 [under abuse of discretion standard, "we consider only 'whether the court's factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and whether the court acted reasonably in exercising its discretion' "].) " '[W]e do not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court, but determine only if any judge reasonably could have made such an order.' " (Ibid.) It is not enough for C.S. to simply make factual assertions and claim the family court got it wrong.
5. G.S.'s Income
Finally, C.S. contends the court erred in determining G.S.'s income. She suggests it should have used submitted tax returns in making its finding. She asserts the court "ignored [G.S.'s] financial wealth" including his "yearly bonus," dividend interest, deferred employee income, "discretionary income factors," stock ownership, stock options, common stock and his employee stock purchase plan. She argues the court's order is not "in line" with section 4507, which she does not otherwise discuss or analyze.
Section 4507 provides: "When a court orders a person to make payment for child support or family support, the court may order that individual to make that payment as provided in Section 1151.5 of the Government Code." Government Code section 1151.5 pertains to salary and wage deductions. C.S. provides no reasoned legal argument or authority explaining the relevance of Family Code section 4507 to the court's determination of G.S.'s net income, and we see nothing in these laws that warrants disturbing the family court's order on that point.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. G.S. shall recover his costs on appeal.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J. IRION, J.