Opinion
D073815
05-20-2020
In re the Marriage of C.S. and G.S.. C.S., Appellant, v. G.S., Respondent.
C.S., in pro. per, for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. ED53926) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Patricia Guerrero, Judge. Affirmed. C.S., in pro. per, for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
Appellant C.S., a self-represented litigant, appeals from a September 26, 2017 family court order following a trial de novo on the issues of support for the parties' adult child S.S., as well as C.S.'s request for sanctions and attorney fees. In its findings and order after hearing, the family court, based on its determination of the parties' incomes and respective timeshare, ordered respondent G.S. to pay an adult child support balance of $23,623.84 to C.S. in monthly installments. It also denied C.S.'s requests for an additional contribution towards her attorney fees and for sanctions against respondent, ordered C.S. to take specified steps to become employed, and directed C.S. to report receipts from sources of income. C.S. contends the family court erred in its calculations, findings, and determinations. We affirm the order.
G.S. has not filed a respondent's brief. We do not consider that an admission of error; we " ' "will decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, and any oral argument by [C.S.]." ' " (Gou v. Xiao (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 812, 817, fn. 3.) C.S. still bears an affirmative burden on appeal, and thus we will reverse the challenged order only on a showing of prejudicial error. (City of Desert Hot Springs v. Valenti (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 788, 792, fn. 5.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We previously summarized some of the lengthy procedural history of this matter in our unpublished opinion (C.S. v. G.S. (Jan. 7, 2020, D071281)), addressing C.S.'s appeal from a September 2016 order for temporary adult child support. We need not repeat that background here, but observe that in her opening brief on this appeal, like her prior appellate brief, C.S. engages in a lengthy discussion of the parties' history and prior orders that are not at issue in this appeal. Our jurisdiction is limited by the scope of C.S.'s notice of appeal, which is from the family court's September 26, 2017 order. (Ellis v. Ellis (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 837, 846.) Additionally, many of C.S.'s purported facts are not supported by record citations. We disregard such facts. (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520; Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.) C.S.'s factual recitation seems designed to relitigate matters already determined in prior orders, a misuse of the appeal process. It reflects a misunderstanding of this court's role, which is to review the trial court's appealed-from decision for prejudicial error: an error that has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (County of Los Angeles v. Nobel Ins. Co. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 939, 945.) C.S. " 'bears the duty of spelling out in [her] brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice.' " (Ibid.) We have no duty to guess or speculate how C.S.'s assignments of error were prejudicial. (Accord, Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)
As of February 2017, C.S. had been declared a vexatious litigant.
We repeat some of the principles discussed in our prior opinion: "[A]s a party appearing in propria persona, [C.S] 'is entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.' [Citations.] Accordingly, we may disregard factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or are based on information that is outside the record [citation]." (Tanguilig v. Valdez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) We disregard conclusory arguments. (Ibid.) C.S. must provide cogent legal argument in support of her claims of error with citation to legal authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); Sims v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1081.) Absent these required matters, the point is forfeited. (Sims, at p. 1081; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) On appeal, we presume a judgment or an order is correct, and C.S. as the party challenging the order must affirmatively show error. (E.g., Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
The September 27, 2017 order that is the subject of this appeal was preceded by October 2016, December 2016 and January 2017 hearings in which a family court commissioner considered C.S.'s requests for advance attorney fees and sanctions against G.S., outstanding discovery regarding income, C.S.'s claim that G.S. was in arrears on support, the parties' income and timeshare of S.S., adult child support, and an audit for support arrears. In January 2017, the commissioner made findings as to the parties' 2016 and 2017 income, imputed $3,089 in income to C.S. from rents and her ability to earn, found S.S. was in C.S.'s custody from January 2016 through October 2016 and in G.S.'s custody since October 2016, denied C.S.'s request for sanctions, ordered $1,532 advance attorney fees to be paid to C.S., and ordered the County of San Diego (the County) to perform a new audit to determine any support arrears.
In April 2017, the parties appeared before the family court on C.S.'s request for a trial de novo of the family court commissioner's rulings. At that hearing, C.S. acknowledged the commissioner had previously ordered G.S. to pay $4,532 towards C.S.'s attorney fees, which G.S. paid. The court continued the issue of attorney fees and set the matter for hearing in June 2017.
In June 2017, the parties appeared with C.S. represented by counsel. The court heard extensive argument concerning G.S.'s income and C.S.'s counsel's position on C.S.'s need for additional attorney fees going forward. It expressed its concern that C.S. was expending much effort and complicating matters in seeking to obtain an attorney fee contribution. During the hearing, G.S. pointed out that the issue for the trial de novo was calculating adult child support based on his income, which he had provided via an earlier deposition and presented to the commissioner. G.S. also pointed out that S.S. had been in his custody since October of 2016 and was not incapacitated. The court observed C.S. sought an additional attorney fee contribution of $24,000, consisting of $8,339 in previously incurred fees and $15,000 in anticipated fees. Stating it had considered the relevant factors under Family Code section 2030 as well as section 4320, and making findings concerning the parties' disparity in income and the nature of the outstanding disputes, the court ordered G.S. to pay C.S.'s counsel $3,000 by June 30, 2017. The court continued the trial de novo hearing to August 2017.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
In early August 2017, C.S. filed an ex parte request for another $7,500 in attorney fees under sections 2030 and 2032. In an accompanying declaration, she asserted G.S. was being evasive with the court's order to produce documents but her attorney fees had been depleted and she needed to replenish her attorney's retainer. C.S. desired full representation for the upcoming trial de novo hearing. She argued she was living off student loans and had the need for an attorney and an attorney fee award. According to C.S., G.S. could afford to pay for his own attorney and hers.
On August 9, 2017, the parties appeared for a lengthy trial de novo hearing on the family court commissioner's January 27, 2017 rulings. Both G.S. and C.S. were present, as was counsel for the County. C.S. and G.S. represented themselves without counsel. The family court addressed and obtained the parties' agreement on the record on many underlying factual matters necessary for its determinations. Specifically, G.S., C.S. and County counsel agreed: G.S.'s 2015 monthly income was $18,512; G.S.'s pretax insurance deduction was $592 per month; G.S.'s spouse's income was $53,256 for 2015; G.S.'s property tax payments were $583 per month; G.S.'s employer made a $593 monthly contribution toward an investment account; G.S. had a monthly depreciation loss of $298; G.S.'s monthly mortgage interest deduction was $2,592; the parties' timeshare for December 2015 was nine days for C.S. (29 percent) and the rest for GS (71 percent); G.S.'s 2016 income was $20,934 per month; G.S. had a $587 monthly pretax health insurance benefit; G.S.'s spouse's 2016 monthly income was $4,178; G.S.'s 2016 property taxes were $593 per month; G.S.'s mortgage interest for 2016 was $1,863 per month; G.S. had no rental income for 2016; G.S.'s 2017 base monthly income was $16,122 and he had $11,667 in monthly bonus income; G.S.'s employer contributed $833 to his 401K; G.S.'s monthly mortgage interest deduction was $1,863; G.S. paid $593 in monthly property taxes; and G.S.'s wife retired as of July 1, 2017.
The family court considered other disputed matters such as the parties' timeshare of S.S. for November and December 2016 and whether the court would use G.S.'s $1,357 monthly employer-paid insurance as income. It heard the parties' arguments on whether to deduct S.S.'s Supplemental Security Income (SSI) from any support, and the amount and extent of C.S.'s income. The court set the matter for a further hearing on September 15, 2017.
On September 15, 2017, the matter proceeded but C.S. did not appear. The family court noted that C.S. had submitted a declaration as well as new income and expense information, which it considered only for matters that had been continued from the prior hearing. County counsel and G.S. each presented their positions on C.S.'s income, with the County proposing that the court use C.S.'s recurring and routine income based on her bank statements. G.S. argued that C.S. actually earned money, which she deposited in her bank each month. The family court submitted the matter on the evidence from the August 9, 2017 hearing, the parties' additional income and expense declarations, portions of C.S.'s declaration and pleadings, and the transcripts from the January 27, 2017, December 7, 2016, and October 7, 2016 hearings.
On appeal, C.S. states she does not recall why she missed that hearing, suggesting she thought the matter was under submission.
The court limited its consideration to paragraphs 20 through 25 of C.S.'s declaration, which addressed C.S.'s ability to work. It eventually struck the remaining parts of the declaration.
On September 26, 2017, the family court issued its findings and order after hearing on the issues of adult support for S.S. and attorney fees. It made findings as to G.S.'s income from December 2015 to the time of the hearing and forward, as well as the parties' timeshare with S.S. As for C.S.'s income, the court observed that a prior August 2016 order imputed $1,169 in monthly income to C.S. The court kept that order in place for December 2015, finding C.S. had a burden to make a showing of changed circumstances but had not done so. For 2016 the court continued to impute income to C.S. until April 18, 2016, finding C.S. presented evidence indicating an inability to continue working. It additionally found C.S. had acknowledged receiving $1,305 per month in gross income in 2016. The court found C.S.'s income in 2017 to be $489.50 per month through June 30, 2017, and $27 per month thereafter. It ordered C.S. to make ten job contacts per week after completing her education, and to notify G.S. within 48 hours of her obtaining employment. The court declined to include rental income for C.S. The court ordered that G.S. pay C.S. $23,633.84 in adult child support for the period of December 2015 to December 2016 in $1,000-per-month installments. Based on G.S.'s 100 percent timeshare with S.S. from January 2017 forward, it ordered that G.S.'s support obligation going forward was zero.
As for S.S.'s SSI benefits, the court declined to exercise its discretion to consider that income in adjusting the parental support obligations, stating: "The court finds that the benefits received by [S.S.] under the SSI program are need-based, and more appropriately considered as a supplement to the non-custodial parent's child support obligation for the period December 2015 forward, rather than an independent source of 'income' or 'assets' of the child."
The court declined C.S.'s request for an additional contribution toward her attorney fees and costs, ruling the amounts previously awarded to C.S. were sufficient under section 2030 and no additional amounts were just and reasonable under the circumstances. It denied C.S.'s request for sanctions, declining to find G.S.'s conduct during the proceedings had unnecessarily increased costs or otherwise rose to the level of sanctionable conduct under section 271.
C.S.'s notice of appeal states she is appealing from an October 26, 2017 order after judgment. The family court's order is actually dated September 26, 2017. It is apparent from other papers filed by C.S. in this court that she is appealing the family court's September 26, 2017 order.
DISCUSSION
I. Challenge to Attorney Fee Order
C.S. contends the family court abused its discretion in determining whether an award of attorney fees was just and reasonable. She maintains the court erred by failing to make required findings on the parties' needs and ability and refusing to order she be reimbursed under sections 2030 through 2032 for attorney fees she incurred in seeking the modification orders. Her arguments improperly attack portions of the underlying commissioner's order, which is not at issue in this appeal and they contain factual and legal assertions either without record citations entirely, or whose accompanying record citations do not support the assertions.
Section 2030, subdivision (a)(1) provides in part that "the court shall ensure that each party has access to legal representation . . . to preserve each party's rights by ordering, if necessary based on the income and needs assessments, one party . . . to pay to the other party . . . whatever amount is reasonably necessary for attorney's fees and for the cost of maintaining or defending the proceeding . . . ." The court may make such an award where the making and amount of the award are "just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties." (§ 2032, subd. (a).) Section 2032, subdivision (b) provides that in determining whether to make an award pursuant to section 2030, "the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case adequately, taking into consideration . . . the circumstances of the respective parties . . . ."
"In deciding whether to award attorney fees, the trial court considers the parties' respective needs and incomes, including their assets and liabilities. [Citation.] A [section 2030] motion for attorney fees is left to the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse. [Citation.] ' "[T]he trial court's order will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made.' " (In re Marriage of Bendetti (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 863, 868-869, italics added; In re Marriage of Winternitz (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 644, 657.) A. Claim of Failure to Make Required Findings
C.S. makes a cursory challenge to the adequacy of the family court's findings. Section 2030 does include an express findings requirement: "When a request for attorney's fees and costs is made, the court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney's fees and costs under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney's fees and costs." (Id., subd. (a)(2).) Failure to make these findings, which must be stated in writing or orally on the record, is "legal error." (In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050.) However, an error in making findings does not warrant automatic reversal; the constitutional doctrine of reversible error applies and requires the appellant to establish prejudice, that is, " 'a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached.' " (Id. at p. 1051.)
Here, the family court made detailed express findings on the parties' respective incomes and relative circumstances. It nevertheless found an attorney fee award was not appropriate, stating: "This Court previously granted [C.S.'s] request for a contribution toward her attorney's fees and costs (which were in addition to prior orders requiring [G.S.] to pay a portion of [C.S.'s] attorney's fees). The Court denies [C.S.'s] request for an additional contribution. The amounts previously awarded were sufficient under . . . section 2030, and no additional amounts are just and reasonable under the circumstances of this case." The order reflects the family court's consideration of section 2030's factors—including the absence of C.S.'s need and reasonable necessity for such an award—in denying C.S.'s request for a contribution to her attorney fees, and met section 2030's express findings requirements.
C.S. does not explain how these findings as to income or need were insufficient, particularly once the family court determined an award of attorney fees was not appropriate. It is not our role to construct theories or arguments for C.S. to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799.) C.S. has not affirmatively shown error in the family court's findings or that the absence of any required finding resulted in prejudice. B. C.S. Does Not Establish the Order Denying Section 2030 Fees Was an Abuse of Discretion
Nor has C.S. presented arguments establishing the family court's order was an abuse of discretion. Throughout her brief, C.S. makes assertions without supporting record citations about proceedings she was forced to bring and attorney fees she supposedly incurred, claiming she was effectively enforcing an existing support order so as to warrant a fee award under section 3557. She similarly makes unsupported factual assertions about G.S.'s business experience and her own disability. We are entitled to disregard such assertions. (Tanguilig v. Valdez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) C.S. also persistently points out that G.S. has a much higher income than her. But C.S. did not present any of these arguments pertaining to disparity or a need for an attorney fee order during the August 9, 2017 hearing, nor did she raise them at the last September 2017 hearing on the trial de novo, which she did not attend.
In any event, in assessing the family court's order denying fees, the relevant inquiry includes need, and the circumstances support the court's finding that C.S. did not establish the need for an attorney fee contribution toward the trial de novo. In June 2017 the family court awarded C.S. a $3,000 contribution toward her attorney fees, which was in addition to a prior $4,532 contribution. Thereafter, C.S. represented herself at the August 9, 2017 hearing without addressing any need for a fee award, and she did not appear at all at the September 15, 2017 hearing. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the family court's order was a clear abuse of discretion.
We disregard C.S.'s arguments concerning section 3557, which permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to a "custodial parent or other person to whom payments should be made in any action to enforce . . . [¶] [a]n existing order for child support." (§ 3557, subd. (a)(1)(A).) The order at issue here is not one for child support and is governed by a different statute (§ 3910). More fatally, C.S. has not shown, and we do not see, that she invoked or sought fees under that statute in the family court. Parties cannot argue theories on appeal that they did not present in the trial court. (In re Marriage of Brewster and Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481, 510.) Such new arguments are deemed waived based on common notions of fairness. (Ibid., quoting Brandwein v. Butler (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1519.)
II. Order Denying Sanctions
C.S. contends the family court abused its discretion by declining to sanction G.S. She invokes both sections 271 and 3667, the latter of which permits the family court to award "sanctions . . . in the form of payment of all costs of [a] motion" for modification or termination of a support order where the responding party provides incomplete income and expense information. (§ 3667.) Pointing to transcripts of the January 27, 2017 and August 9, 2017 hearings, C.S. repeatedly argues G.S. misrepresented or sought to conceal his bonus and other income and either refused to produce paystubs or other tax information or delayed producing them. She makes assertions about G.S.'s sophisticated business background and lodges complaints about the family court's "preferential treatment" of G.S. She randomly argues G.S. did not follow court orders to get their child treatment during his timeshare.
Section 271, subdivision (a) authorizes the trial court to "base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction." Whether to award sanctions under section 271 is committed to the trial court's discretion. (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524.) --------
C.S.'s assertions in large part are either unsupported by the record, or the record does not permit C.S. to establish prejudice, as she must. For example, C.S. asserts that G.S. did not comply with an October 2016 order to produce his last three paystubs, but supports the assertion only by referencing the court's minute order that he produce the documents. She provides no support for the proposition that he failed to comply. C.S. argues the family court did not know whether to treat G.S.'s "medical insurance tax deductible costs" as income, but C.S.'s sole record citation is not to the family court's reasoning or order on this point, but to G.S.'s declaration in which he asserts his and his employer's contributions for health insurance are not to be considered income. C.S. asks this court to "review" the matter. But our role is not to decide issues anew, and we are unable to evaluate family court error absent reference to its reasoning, the record, or meaningful argument and authority. Other assertions by C.S. are incomprehensible.
As for the issue of prejudice, the record shows that at the January 27, 2017 hearing, after the court inquired why G.S. had attached old pay stubs to a December 2016 income and expense declaration, G.S. produced his 2015 and 2016 W-2 forms for the commissioner's review, and the commissioner stated on the record based on those documents that G.S.'s total wages for 2015 and 2016 were $215,043.43 and $244,163.83 respectively. C.S. did not challenge those ultimate figures at the time. Moreover, at the August 9, 2017 hearing C.S. agreed on the record to the family court's calculations for G.S.'s 2016 and 2017 income, the last year of which included substantial monthly bonuses. Having agreed and failed to object to those figures below, C.S. cannot challenge them for the first time on appeal.
III. Adult Child Support Calculations
C.S. contends the trial court erred in calculating G.S.'s income for purposes of awarding support for S.S. She begins these arguments by recounting some background, including the court's August 9, 2017 request that G.S. produce additional 401k statements. She then asserts the family court (1) failed to add the "401k amount" or "401k income" as income of G.S. for 2015, 2016 or 2017; (2) reduced capital gains for 2016 from $1,357 per month to $202 per month; and (3) failed to add "tax free deductible medical tax [and] insurance payments" as income to G.S. For these assertions, C.S. points to her own August 2, 2017 declaration in which she made assertions about G.S.'s income based on his W-2 forms or tax returns. C.S. asks this court to "review, reversal [sic], and re-calculate" G.S.'s income with the additional 401k income plus other "missed income" and appears to ask this court to make decisions on the treatment of capital gains or losses claimed on G.S.'s tax returns.
C.S.'s claim of error neglects to include pertinent or cognizable legal analysis or citations to relevant authority. She does not disturb the presumption that the family court's order is correct. (See Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564; Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457 [" 'To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error' "]; Paterno v. State of California, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 ["An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties"].) We also deem her claim forfeited. (Blech v. Blech (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 941, 955; Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600; Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1007.)
IV. Timeshare Allocation
During the August 9, 2017 hearing, the court addressed the parties' timeshare with S.S. The parties agreed that S.S. spent part of the time with each parent in January and October 2016. G.S. represented that S.S. was with him 100 percent of the time in November through December 2016, but C.S. disputed the assertion, claiming she had visits with S.S. during that time, and that G.S. had told S.S. not to speak with or see her and would not let S.S. see her. G.S. argued C.S.'s statements were false; he maintained S.S. was emancipated and asked to come live with G.S., and claimed to have video proof of C.S.'s visits with S.S. The court advised the parties it would consider both of their testimony in running the support calculations.
The family court's order after hearing contains a chart of the parties' timeshare with S.S., reflecting the parties' agreement as to partial months, and showing S.S. was with G.S. 100 percent of the time from November 2016 forward, resulting in an order for zero adult support during that period.
C.S. challenges the timeshare allocation as "unjust," suggesting she had additional visitations with S.S. and accusing G.S. of threatening to "punish" S.S. for seeing her. Pointing to earlier proceedings that are not at issue in this appeal, C.S. proceeds in a stream-of-thought fashion to make factual assertions about G.S.'s statements and conduct, as well as S.S.'s behavior and emotional well-being. C.S. asserts she tried to argue for a 29 percent time allocation to her but the court did not consider the argument. For that assertion, C.S. points to portions of the record reflecting the family court's consideration of her and G.S.'s respective positions. The cited pages of the record do not reflect C.S.'s request for a 29 percent timeshare. C.S. does not identify or apply a relevant standard of appellate review, and none of C.S.'s assertions are accompanied by meaningful legal argument or authority.
The deficiencies outlined above permit us to conclude C.S. has forfeited any challenge to the family court's timeshare determinations. (Multani v. Witkin & Neal, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1457.) Further, C.S. does not overcome the presumption of correctness. (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564; accord, Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 181.) We reject C.S.'s claims on the required presumption that the family court considered the parties' respective positions about timeshare as it stated on the record it would, and the fact that it made a credibility determination to accept G.S.'s position and reject C.S.'s representations about G.S.'s conduct. The family court's role is to determine that a witness is to be believed or not believed, and it is the sole judge of credibility and weight of the evidence. (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 319.) Such determinations of credibility are not within an appellate court's purview. (Ibid.) C.S. has provided no basis for us to conclude the family court erred in determining the timeshare allocation.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. IRION, J.