Opinion
3:02-CV-745-M
November 5, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the District Court in implementation thereof; this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint brought by a state inmate pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parties: Plaintiff is currently confined at the Moore Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Bonham, Texas. He was confined as a pre-trial detainee at the Navarro County Jail during the events at issue in this case as well as at the time of filing the complaint. Defendants are Navarro County Sheriff Leshe Cotten, Captain Faith Holt and Chief Don Barron. The court has not issued process in this case. However, on July 17 and October 3, 2002, the magistrate judge issued questionnaires to Plaintiff, who filed his answers on August 5 and October 24, 2002. In answer to Question three of the original questionnaire, Plaintiff adds the following entities and individuals as defendants: the Navarro County Sheriffs Department, the Navarro County Justice Center, the County Commissioners' Office, Dr. Grady Shaw, Sgt. Elmer Tanner, Deputy Hank Bailey, and the Navarro County Courts 13th District.
In the supplemental complaint, filed on May 3, 2002, Plaintiff adds some of the Defendants named in answer to Question three of the original Questionnaire.
Statement of Case: In this action, Plaintiff complains about (1) numerous conditions of confinement at the Navarro County Jail from January 7, 2002, until May 20, 2002, (2) the excessive use of force that he endured during booking, (3) the failure to inventory properly his personal property following his arrest and at booking, (4) the denial of a lawyer during arraignment and at a bond hearing, and (5) the failure to bring him to court for a preliminary hearing. Plaintiff requests declaratory and monetary relief. Findings and Conclusions: The court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed informa pauperis. His complaint is, thus, subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which imposes a screening responsibility on the district court. Section 1915A reads in pertinent part as follows:
Specifically Plaintiff complains about the following conditions of confinement at the Navarro County Jail: (1) failure to provide access to the law library, (2) failure to provide hygiene items, (3) failure to provide an adequate amount of food, (4) refusal to provide adequate access to a doctor or medical personnel, (5) refusal to respond to grievances, (6) refusal to conduct TB tests on new inmates and hepatitis tests on inmates involved in food handling, (7) failure to maintain racially balanced cells, (8) failure to fumigate the jail to kill the brown recluse spider, and (9) failure to limit the overuse of pepper spray in the jail.
Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the Navarro County Jail his claim for prospective injunctive relief is moot. See Cooper v. Sheriff. Lubbock County. Tex., 929 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (inmate's transfer to another prison rendered moot his claims for equitable relief in connection with allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of food at former prison); Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1988) (prisoners who were no longer in Retrieve Unit could not seek injunctive relief against conditions of confinement there). Nor is his request for an investigation of the jail and its officials cognizable in this civil rights action.
The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b) (emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B).
Both sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds that the complaint is "frivolous" or that it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A complaint is frivolous, if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact."Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Plaintiff names as Defendants the Navarro County Sheriffs Department, the Navarro County Justice Center, and the County Commissioners' Office. None of these Defendants is a proper party to this action. A governmental department cannot engage in litigation "unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority." Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991). Governmental offices and departments do not have a separate legal existence. See Ruggiero v. Litchfield, 700 F. Supp. 863, 865 (M.D.La. 1988) (local sheriffs office is not legal entity subject to suit). Accordingly, the claims against the Navarro County Sheriffs Department, the Navarro County Justice Center, and the County Commissioner's Officer should be dismissed as frivolous.
Under the allegations made in the complaint, even if Plaintiff had identified a political entity with jural authority, his claims would not suffice to allege a cognizable claim since he has identified no established policies or customs of a political entity which would give rise to liability under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984).
In addition to the above entities, Plaintiff sues Dr. Shaw for providing inadequate medical care for bites inflicted by the brown recluse spider while incarcerated at the Navarro County Jail. To state a colorable claim for the denial of medical care under the Eighth Amendment, convicted inmates must allege acts or omissions "sufficiently harmful to evidence a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 291 (5th Cir. 1997). "Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind."Norton, 122 F.3d at 291. It occurs when a prison official subjectively knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the imnate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-840 (1994). Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same standard applies to pretrial detainees who complain of episodic acts or omissions resulting in the denial of medical care. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999); Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996).
Accepting as true Plaintiffs allegations as to the denial of medical care, he has failed to raise a claim cognizable under § 1983. Plaintiff offers no facts showing deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by Dr. Shaw. He alleges Dr. Shaw "should have lanced the spider bites to enhance healing" and should have tested them for signs of an infection. (Answer to Supplemental Question 18). Insofar as Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Shaw misdiagnosed the severity of the spider bites and should have followed a different course of treatment, his claims do not rise to a constitutional violation. A disagreement of opinion as to the correct medical treatment does not constitute an actionable civil rights claim, but at most, a possible claim of medical malpractice appropriately addressed under state law. E.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-108; Norton, 122 F.3d at 292; Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991);Fielder v. Bosshard 590 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979).
Nor can Plaintiff raise a claim under § 1983 for the alleged assault by Sgt. Tanner and Deputy Bailey during booking. (Handwritten attachment to suppl. complaint at 5). A claim that an officer used excessive force against a pretrial detainee is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Valencia v. Wiggins 981 F.2d 1440, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993) (Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process standard applied to pretrial detainee's excessive force claim against county jail official); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) (constitutional rights of pretrial detainees flow from the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment). The appropriate inquiry is the same regardless whether the claim arises under the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1446 (holding that Hudson v. McMillian's test for use of excessive force under the Eighth Amendment applies to a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim under the Due Process Clause); see also Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); Jackson v. Culbertson, 984 F.2d 699, 700 (5th Cir. 1993) (same).
Under Hudson v. MeMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8(1992), a plaintiff must show that the force was not applied "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline," but rather was administered in a malicious and sadistic manner to cause harm. The above standard includes both an objective and a subjective component. Under the objective component, a court must determine whether "the alleged wrongdoing was objectively `harmful enough' to establish a constitutional violation." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991)). Under the subjective component, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. . . ." Id. at 7. The following objective factors may be suggestive of intent: (1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible official; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. Valencia, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522, 523 (5th Cir. 1992) (opinion on remand)).
Plaintiffs complaint, as supplemented by the answers to the original questionnaire, alleges that Sgt. Tanner and Deputy Bailey slammed Plaintiff to the floor and into the wall injuring his back, hip and shoulder. (See Handwritten attachment to answer to Question 5 at 1). Plaintiff does not present any other facts which this court could liberally construe to allege that the force was administered in a malicious and sadistic manner to cause harm, and not applied "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline." Hudson, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). As noted above, it is now clear that the use of force resulting in injury does not — standing alone — present a cognizable claim under § 1983.
In an effort to ascertain whether Plaintiff had a colorable claim for excessive use of force against Defendants Tanner and Bailey, the court issued a supplemental questionnaire to Plaintiff to obtain the facts surrounding the use of force and his alleged injury. As the record reflects, Plaintiff refused to provide any information with respect to the facts and circumstances leading to and following the alleged use of force. (See Plaintiffs response to Question 1 of the magistrate judge's supplemental questionnaire). As a result, Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Tanner and Bailey should be dismissed.
Since Plaintiff is proceeding informa pauperis under the PLRA, the Court is obligated to screen his complaint to ensure that it alleges a colorable § 1983 claim. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming use of questionnaire as useful and proper means for court to develop factual basis of pro se plaintiffs complaint); Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring further development of insufficient factual allegations before dismissal under § 1915(d) is proper); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (same asBerry).
Insofar as Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the 13th Judicial District Court of Navarro County based upon his claim that he was denied the services of an attorney at his arraignment and at his bond hearing, and for denial of a preliminary hearing, such claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1).
Any claim for damages against the court itself is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and any claim against the judge in the judge's individual capacity is barred by judicial immunity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196, 200-201(5th Cir. 1995).
In addition, neither the laws nor the Constitution of the United States requires state courts to provide counsel at arraignments or bond hearings. Nor is there any federal requirement that States afford preliminary hearings to persons accused of state criminal offenses.
Alternatively if the omissions alleged against the state court were found to violate Plaintiffs federal rights, such would impugn on the validity of his state conviction. Under the Supreme Court's decision inHeck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), these claims are not cognizable under § 1983 unless Plaintiffs state conviction is reversed, expunged, invalidated or called into question.
Next Plaintiff seeks to sue Sheriff Cotten, Chief Barron and Captain Holt for the conditions of confinement at the Navarro County Jail. Neither the complaint nor the answers to the questionnaires allege any facts that this court could liberally construe to assert that Defendants Cotten and Barron were personally involved in the acts causing the alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs constitutional rights while at the Navarro County Jail. Plaintiff states Defendants Cotten and Barron were involved because they oversaw "all operations of the jail"and controlled all employees including the medical staff (Answer to Supplemental Questions 8 and 11). Regarding Defendant Holt, the complaint and answer to the questionnaires allege that she failed to respond to written grievances and oral requests which Plaintiff submitted during the course of his confinement at the Navarro County Jail.
To be liable under § 1983, an individual must be personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of a person's constitutional rights. See Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1983). It is well settled that supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable for their subordinates' actions under § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95 (1978); Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1220 (5th Cir. 1988); Thibodeaux v. Arceneaux, 768 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Supervisory officials may be held liable only if they (i) affirmatively participate in acts that cause a constitutional deprivation, or (ii) implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in plaintiffs injury. See Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
Plaintiffs allegations doe not meet either of the above standards. The mere fact that Cotten, Barron and Holt were supervisory officials in charge of prison operations during the events at issue in this case does not render them liable. As such Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Cotten, Barron and Holt lack an arguable basis in law and should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.
Insofar as Plaintiff complains about the seizure of his personal property from his vehicle following his arrest and the loss of personal property inventoried at booking, his claims are equally frivolous. The Supreme Court has held that the unintentional loss of life, liberty or property does not state a cause of action under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). Where mere negligence is involved in causing a deprivation or damage to property, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required. 14. Therefore, insofar as Plaintiffs claim for loss of his property is grounded on negligence, it lacks an arguable basis in law and should be dismissed as frivolous.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks redress for the intentional loss of his personal property, the United States Supreme Court has held that the intentional deprivation of property by state employees does not constitute a civil rights violation as long as the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); accord Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183, 184-85 (5th Cir. 1994);Holloway v. Walker, 790 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir.) (finding no breach of federally guaranteed constitutional rights, even where a high level state employee intentionally engages in tortuous conduct, as long as the state system as a whole provides due process of law). "In essence, the doctrine protects the state from liability for failing to provide a pre-deprivation process in situations where it cannot anticipate the random and unauthorized actions of its officers." Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff bears the burden to establish that the state's post-deprivation remedy is inadequate. Id. at 94-95.
Under Texas state common-law, Plaintiff may sue for conversion to remedy his alleged property loss. Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994); Myers v. Adams, 728 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1987). Conversion occurs when there is an unauthorized and unlawful exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another which is inconsistent with the rights of the owner. Beam v. Voss, 568 S.W.2d 413, 420-21 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ). If a Navarro County officer exercised unauthorized and unlawful control over Plaintiffs personal property, Plaintiff has a cause of action in conversion. Such a common-law action in state court would be sufficient to meet constitutional due process requirements. Murphy, 26 F.3d at 543-44. In light of this adequate state common-law remedy, Plaintiffs claim based on the loss of his personal property lacks an arguable basis in law.
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiffs complaint be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
A copy of this recommendation will be mailed to Plaintiff.