Opinion
CV146049358S
04-21-2016
Nicholas Crismale v. Christopher Walston et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Robin L. Wilson, J.
FACTS
This case arises from an arrest that took place on a commercial fishing boat in Long Island Sound. On August 19, 2014, the plaintiff, Nicholas Crismale, commenced this action by service of process upon the defendants, Christopher Walston, Jeffrey Samorajczyk, and Todd Chenacki. In an eight-count complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following relevant facts. On December 14, 2011, Walston informed Samorajczyk and Chenacki, both officers of the Department of Environmental Protection Police (EnCON), that the plaintiff was trespassing on Walston's clam beds and stealing his clams. The EnCON defendants, while acting under color of law, arrested the plaintiff without a warrant and falsely and maliciously accused him of the crimes of violating the terms of his Connecticut Shellfish License and of the crime of Larceny in the Fourth Degree, which resulted in prosecution against the plaintiff. Moreover, the EnCON defendants, unreasonably and without a warrant, boarded the plaintiff's boat and seized a large quantity of fresh clams belonging to the plaintiff, and dumped them overboard.
The defendants Samorajczyk and Chenacki will be subsequently referred to as " the EnCON defendants."
The plaintiff was tried in criminal court found not guilty of the charges for which he had been arrested. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought the instant action against the defendants, in which he raises claims of malicious prosecution and related constitutional violations against the EnCON defendants. On November 10, 2015, the EnCON defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (#113) as to Counts Three through Eight, along with a supporting memorandum of law, seeking judgment on numerous grounds. The plaintiff filed an objection on January 25, 2016, to which the defendants replied on February 19, 2016. Oral argument was heard on the motion at short calendar on February 22, 2016.
DISCUSSION
" Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vendrella v. Astriab Family Ltd. Partnership, 311 Conn. 301, 313, 87 A.3d 546 (2014). " In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 319-20, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
In support of the motion for summary judgment, the EnCON defendants argue that Counts Three and Four, sounding in malicious prosecution, should be dismissed because the EnCON defendants' decision to arrest the plaintiff was supported by probable cause and not made out of malice. The EnCON defendants additionally argue that Counts Three through Eight should be dismissed because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, the EnCON defendants contend that judgment is appropriate as to Counts Five through Eight because the plaintiff has no standing to assert the constitutional rights of another. In support of their motion, the EnCON defendants submitted the following evidence: the affidavit of Christopher Walston (Exhibit 1); the affidavit of Kristin Derosia-Banick (Exhibit 2); the July 22, 2015 affidavit of Samorajczyk (Exhibit 3); the affidavit of Chemacki (Exhibit 4); excerpts from the deposition of Hector Avila (Exhibit 5); excerpts from the deposition of Santos Bertrand (Exhibit 6); excerpts from the deposition of Sandoval Maynor (Exhibit 7); excerpts from the March 18, 2014 trial testimony of Crismale (Exhibit 8); the September 25, 2015 affidavit of Samorajczyk (Exhibit 9); excerpts from the August 21, 2015 deposition of Crismale (Exhibit 10); excerpts and exhibits from the November 6, 2013 deposition of Crismale (Exhibit 11); the misdemeanor summons and complaint from December 14, 2011 (Exhibit 12); the plaintiff's response to the defendants' interrogatories (Exhibit 13); a certification of existence for Mid Sound Fisheries, LLC (Exhibit 14); and a certified copy of the claim file of Mid Sound Fisheries v. State of Connecticut, No. 23703 (Exhibit 15).
In opposition, the plaintiff argues that there is an issue of material fact over whether the EnCON defendants acted with probable cause or malice, or were otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff further argues that the warrantless search and seizure of the plaintiff's property was unreasonable and unsupported by any recognized constitutional exceptions. In support of his argument, the plaintiff submitted the following evidence: excerpts from the deposition of Crismale (Exhibit A); excerpts from the deposition of Avila (Exhibit B); State of Connecticut maps of fishing lots in Long Island Sound (Exhibit C); excerpts from the March 17, 2014 trial testimony of Walston (Exhibit D); and excerpts from the March 18, 2014 trial testimony of Crismale (Exhibit E).
I
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Counts Three and Four of the complaint arise from the plaintiff's claims of malicious prosecution. " An action for malicious prosecution against a private person requires a plaintiff to prove that: (1) the defendant initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff (3) the defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210-11, 9 A.3d 347 (2010). " Probable cause has been defined as the knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable [person] in the belief that he has reasonable grounds for prosecuting an action . . . Mere conjecture or suspicion is insufficient . . . Moreover, belief alone, no matter how sincere it may be, is not enough, since it must be based on circumstances which make it reasonable . . . Although want of probable cause is negative in character, the burden is [on] the plaintiff to prove affirmatively, by circumstances or otherwise, that the defendant had no reasonable ground for instituting the criminal proceeding . . . The existence of probable cause is an absolute protection against an action for malicious prosecution, and what facts, and whether particular facts, constitute probable cause is always a question of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 211.
Likewise, " [t]o establish a claim for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification . . . Because probable cause to arrest constitutes justification, there can be no claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff . . . Even if probable cause to arrest is ultimately found not to have existed, an arresting officer will still be entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages if he can establish that there was 'arguable probable cause' to arrest. Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004).
The material facts underlying this action are not in dispute. On December 14, 2011, the EnCON defendants received a complaint from Walston that two vessels were actively harvesting shellfish on Walston's lot. At 11:40 am the EnCON defendants responded by boat and found the " Mighty Maxx" vessel, owned by Mid-State Shellfish, LLC, operating in Walston's lot. The EnCON defendants observed the vessel's harvesting dredge in the water with clams coming up the belt, and workers onboard sorting the clams. (Exhibit 3.) Although the plaintiff states that he was not actively harvesting at the time, he concedes that an individual who observes the belt moving and people taking clams from the belt may gain the impression that harvesting is underway. (Exhibit 10, p. 39-40.)
Based on their observations, the EnCON defendants conducted an investigative stop of the Mighty Maxx. As Samorajczyk boarded the vessel, he noticed several bags of shellfish sorted out and stacked. The plaintiff, who was required by law to keep a shellfish harvesting license on board the vessel, was unable to produce one at Samorajczyk's request. Upon questioning by Samorajczyk, the plaintiff initially stated that he was on his own lot, Lot #44. He subsequently admitted, however, that the vessel was off of Lot #44 by about 100 feet. (Exhibit 3.) Further investigation revealed that the vessel was actually on Lot Number #562, which was licensed to Walston. (Exhibit 2.) In light of the foregoing, the EnCON defendants concluded that probable cause existed that the plaintiff had engaged in activity in violation of General Statutes § § 26-192c and 53a-125. (Exhibit 3; Exhibit 4.)
The core of the plaintiff's opposition is that the plaintiff's perception of the events of December 14, 2011, is different from the EnCON defendants' perception of those events, thus giving rise to a genuine issue of material fact. In determining probable cause, however, the only perception that matters is that of the arresting officer. In turn, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving affirmatively that the officers had no reasonable ground for the arrest. Thus, if the record demonstrates that EnCON defendants possessed knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable person in the belief that he has reasonable grounds for prosecuting an action, then probable cause is established, and the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims must fail. Based on the circumstances described above, the EnCON defendants had probable cause to determine that the plaintiff engaged in illegal activity. Therefore, because the existence of probable cause is an absolute protection against a claim of malicious prosecution, see Brooks v. Sweeney, supra, 299 Conn. 211, the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims against the EnCON defendants must fail as a matter of law.
II
THE PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
The plaintiff's constitutional claims are made through Title 42 of the United States Code, § § 1983 and 1988. In Counts Five and Six, the plaintiff claims a Fourth Amendment violation based on the EnCON defendants' warrantless search of the boat and disposal of the shellfish onboard. In Counts Seven and Eight, the plaintiff claims a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment based on those same allegations.
With respect to these constitutional claims, the EnCON defendants have asserted qualified immunity. " '[A] claim for qualified immunity from liability for damages under § 1983 raises a question of federal law . . . and not state law. Therefore, in reviewing these claims of qualified immunity we are bound by federal precedent, and may not expand or contract the contours of the immunity available to government officials.' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schnabel v. Tyler, 230 Conn. 735, 742-43, 646 A.2d 152 (1994).
" 'Under federal law, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil damages liability for their discretionary actions as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability and, therefore, protects officials from the burdens of litigation for the choices that they make in the course of their duties . . . Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has recognized qualified immunity for government officials [when] it [is] necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public good or to ensure that talented candidates [are] not deterred by the threat of damages suits from entering public service. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). Whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity presents a question of law that must be resolved de novo on appeal. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994).
" A court required to rule [on] the qualified immunity issue must consider . . . this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. This inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition; and it too serves to advance understanding of the law and to allow officers to avoid the burden of trial if qualified immunity is applicable. Id. . .
" Under the Saucier test, a court first is required to articulate the elements of a constitutional violation and, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, determine whether there would be a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under those facts. [ Id. ] The principles set forth with regard to the right alleged to have been violated set the groundwork for and inform the second inquiry. Id. Under the second inquiry, the court must determine not merely whether the state official conducted, for example, a reasonable search or seizure because qualified immunity has a further dimension. Id., 205. Rather, a court must also determine for purposes of qualified immunity whether the officer made a reasonable mistake as to the legal constraints on his behavior under those circumstances. Id. As the Supreme Court stated in Saucier, the essence of the second inquiry is that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right . . . Id., 202.
" The Second Circuit has further refined the second inquiry under Saucier . . . A [governmental] defendant will be entitled to qualified immunity if either (1) his actions did not violate clearly established law or (2) it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that his actions did not violate clearly established law. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2007). In determining whether a right was clearly established, the court must assess whether the contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear in the context of the alleged violation such that a reasonable official would understand that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right . . . To that end, the court should consider what a reasonable officer in the defendant's position would have known about the lawfulness of his conduct, not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from researching case law . . . Furthermore, the court need not identify legal precedent addressing an identical factual scenario to conclude that the right is clearly established . . . Id. " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, supra, 299 Conn. 216-18.
The court must first determine whether the EnCON defendants' actions violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff's. " We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials--like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful--should not be held personally liable . . . It follows from what we have said that the determination whether it was objectively legally reasonable to conclude that a given search was supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances will often require examination of the information possessed by the searching officials." (Citation omitted.) Anderson v. Creighton, supra, 483 U.S. 641.
As discussed above, based on the information that the EnCON defendants possessed, it was objectively legally reasonable to conclude that the search and seizure was supported by probable cause. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there was no violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under the first prong of the Saucier test. Therefore, the EnCON defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the claimed constitutional violations.
Even if the court were to conclude that the EnCON defendants wrongfully disposed of the shellfish on the vessel, the EnCON defendants contend that the plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim for injuries caused by the loss of those shellfish. " [A] plaintiff must prove actual injury as a prerequisite to a recovery of compensatory damages in a § 1983 claim. According to the [United States Supreme Court], the abstract value of constitutional rights may not form the basis of substantial § 1983 damages. [ Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 308-10, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986)] . . . In Stachura, the court stated that 'when § 1983 plaintiff's seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts . . .' [ Id. ], 306. The court went on to state that '[s]ection 1983 presupposes that damages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations . . .' Id., 310." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 504-05, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the EnCON defendants' motion for summary judgment (#113) is granted as to Counts Three through Eight because the decision to arrest the plaintiff was supported by probable cause, and the EnCON defendants are otherwise entitled to qualified immunity from liability for their actions.
" [I]f the injuries claimed by the plaintiff are remote, indirect or derivative with respect to the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff is not the proper party to assert them and lacks standing to do so. Where, for example, the harms asserted to have been suffered directly by a plaintiff are in reality derivative of injuries to a third party the injuries are not direct but are indirect, and the plaintiff has no standing to assert them." Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 347-48, 780 A.2d 98 (2001). As such, " [c]laims belonging to the LLC cannot be asserted by a member or manager in his or her individual capacity, but rather must be brought derivatively on behalf of the LLC." Bumbolow v. Foreman, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. AAN-CV-11-6007420, (March 28, 2013, Hiller, J.) (operating agreement gave plaintiff standing to seek dissolution of limited liability company in arbitration), aff'd, 151 Conn.App. 307, 95 A.3d 1153, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 916, 100 A.3d 405 (2014); see also Maile v. Webster Bank, N.A., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. HHB-CV-04-0527763-S, (February 10, 2005, Burke, J.) (individual lacked standing to bring lawsuit on behalf of limited liability corporation due to statutory criteria established by General Statutes § § 34-134, 34-186, and 34-187). The plaintiff brought the instant action as an individual. The evidence submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment indicates that the shellfish seized during the arrest, however, belonged to Mid Sound Fisheries, LLC, not the plaintiff. (Exhibit 14; Exhibit 15.) Thus, the plaintiff's alleged injury for loss of the shellfish is derivative of the injury to Mid Sound Fisheries, and the plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims based on that injury. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that his personal constitutional rights were violated, and the EnCON defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to these claims.