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Crawford v. Matthew Woodward

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Oct 1, 2007
140 Wn. App. 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)

Opinion

No. 59119-3-I.

October 1, 2007.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 03-2-36103-8, Helen Halpert, J., entered October 13, 2006.


Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


Timothy D. Crawford appeals from the King County Superior Court's order dismissing his action against Matthew Woodward for want of prosecution pursuant to CR 41(b) and King County Local Rule (KCLR) 4. Crawford contends that the trial court erred by granting Woodward's motion to dismiss, asserting that his noncompliance with court rules and orders was neither willful and deliberate nor substantially prejudicial to Woodward, and that the trial court failed to consider less harsh sanctions before dismissing the action. Being unpersuaded by his contentions, we affirm.

FACTS

On September 19, 2003, Crawford filed suit against Woodward claiming that Woodward had assaulted him. Upon Crawford's motions, the trial court issued three separate orders of continuance: on July 23, 2004, on August 22, 2005, and again on November 22, 2005. In issuing the third continuance, the trial court stated that no additional continuances would be granted and conditioned the continuance upon Crawford's compliance with several deadlines set forth in an order amending the case schedule, including a May 3, 2006, deadline to engage in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) with Woodward. Crawford failed to comply with these conditions.

On June 12, 2006, Crawford moved for a fourth continuance. On June 15, 2006, the trial court granted Crawford's motion but ordered Crawford to pay $3,122.07 to Woodward's attorney as both compensation for the additional expenses incurred as a result of Crawford's motion to continue and a penalty for Crawford's failure to comply with the trial court's previously imposed deadlines. Crawford did not meet any of the deadlines imposed by the order granting the continuance and failed to engage in ADR. Crawford also failed to provide Woodward with lists of witness or exhibits as KCLR 16(a)(4) requires.

"Exchange of Witness and Exhibit Lists. In cases governed by a Case Schedule pursuant to KCLR 4, the parties shall exchange, not later than 21 days before the scheduled trial date: (A) lists of the witnesses whom each party expects to call at trial; (B) lists of the exhibits that each party expects to offer at trial, except for exhibits to be used only for impeachment." KCLR 16(a)(4).

Woodward then moved to dismiss Crawford's case for want of prosecution pursuant to CR 41(b) and for violation of court orders pursuant to KCLR 4. Crawford submitted an incomplete and late response to Woodward's motion. The trial court nonetheless reviewed Crawford's response before granting Woodward's motion and dismissing the action with prejudice. In so ruling, the trial court cited Crawford's ongoing and unexcused noncompliance with court rules and orders, the ineffectuality of previous sanctions to correct such noncompliance, and the adverse impact of the noncompliance on Woodward's pretrial preparations.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The involuntary dismissal provision of CR 41 empowers a defendant to move for dismissal of an action where the plaintiff has failed "to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court." CR 41(b). KCLR 4(g)(1) provides that a plaintiff's failure to comply with the case schedule may result in the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal.

We review a trial court's decision to dismiss an action pursuant to CR 41 or KCLR 4 for an abuse of discretion. Woodhead v. Discount Waterbeds, Inc., 78 Wn. App. 125, 130-131, 133, 896 P.2d 66 (1995). A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is "'manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494, 933 P.2d 1036 (1997) (quoting Associated Mortgage Investors v. G.P. Kent Constr. Co., 15 Wn. App. 223, 229, 548 P.2d 558 (1976)).

Dismissal is justified pursuant to CR 41(b) and KCLR 4 when (1) refusal to obey the trial court's orders was willful or deliberate, (2) substantially prejudiced the opponent's ability to prepare for trial, and (3) the trial court explicitly considered imposing less harsh sanctions. Woodhead, 78 Wn. App. at 130. See also Rivers v. Wash. State Conference of Mason Contractors, 145 Wn.2d 674, 686, 41 P.3d 1175 (2002). A finding as to each of these elements must be made on the record. Woodhead, 78 Wn. App. at 132. Crawford asserts that none of the elements were satisfied in this case.

Willfulness of Violations

Crawford first contends that his repeated violations of court rules and orders were not willful, asserting that unspecified technological difficulties, a failure to enter the deadlines set in the trial continuance order into a calendar, and his own inadvertence prevented compliance with the deadlines. We disagree.

An unexcused or unjustified disregard for court orders is considered willful and deliberate. Rivers, 145 Wn.2d at 686-87; Woodhead, 78 Wn. App. at 130. As the trial court noted in ruling on Crawford's motion for a fourth continuance, Crawford had provided "no explanation for [the] failure to comply with the court scheduling orders (other than the busy schedule of plaintiff's counsel)." Such an explanation is not sufficient to justify a party's continued noncompliance with court rules and orders. Crawford's other excuses, including technical difficulties and a failure to calendar deadlines, also failed to justify his continuing noncompliance. There was no abuse of discretion.

Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Continue on Condition of Payment of Terms and Sanctions.

Resulting Prejudice

Crawford next contends that his noncompliance with court rules did not prejudice Woodward. We disagree.

Dismissal requires a finding that Crawford's noncompliance substantially prejudiced Woodward's ability to prepare for trial. Rivers, 145 Wn.2d at 686; Woodhead, 78 Wn. App. at 130. The trial court correctly observed that Crawford made no disclosure of witnesses or evidence pursuant to KCLR 16 or the trial court's orders. Thus, Woodward did not have the benefit of these disclosures in preparing his trial brief and preparing for trial, Crawford, on the other hand, was benefited by Woodward's timely disclosures, and was unfairly advantaged thereby. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Crawford's violations prejudiced Woodward.

Crawford contends that both Woodward's litigation experience and the availability of documents through informal discovery prevent Woodward from being prejudiced. As Crawford argues these points without support, "the court may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none. We therefore do not consider points unsupported by argument or law." Grant County v. Bohne, 89 Wn.2d 953, 958, 577 P.2d 138 (1978).

Consideration of Lesser Sanctions

Finally, Crawford contends that the trial court did not consider alternative, lesser sanctions. The record indicates to the contrary.

Where a trial court grants a motion to dismiss, it must first explicitly consider "whether a lesser sanction would probably have sufficed." Rivers, 145 Wn.2d at 686. As the order granting dismissal indicates, the trial court not only considered alternative sanctions, but had also previously applied them unsuccessfully:

A trial court "must consider a sanction that will advance the purposes of discovery and yet compensate the defendant for the effects of the plaintiff's discovery failings," and may consider sanctions "to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases, and to assure compliance with the court's rulings and observance of hearing and trial settings." Peluso v. Barton Auto Dealerships, Inc., 138 Wn. App. 65, 70-71, 155 P.3d 978 (2007) (monetary sanctions may be appropriate to compensate one party for costs incurred as a result of another party's noncompliance with a discovery order); Woodhead, 78 Wn. App. at 132 (dismissal upheld on appeal where the party opposing dismissal "failed to provide any evidence in the record . . . that the trial court failed to make the required findings with respect to lesser sanctions" and the record clearly indicated that the trial court had addressed the question of whether lesser sanctions should be imposed).

The Court has already imposed other sanctions as part of the Court's Order Granting [Crawford's] Motion to Continue on Condition of Payment of Terms and Sanctions. These lesser sanctions, and the extra time provided by granting [Crawford's] Motion to Continue, have not brought [Crawford] into compliance with the Orders of this Court, the case scheduling order, or the Local Rules. . . .

. . .

As such, the only sanction left for the Court to enter against [Crawford] is to dismiss [the] case with prejudice. Such a dismissal is not entered into lightly, but [Crawford's] actions and failure to comply with the rules and orders of this Court leave no option. Dismissal is the sanction that justice requires.

The trial court further explained its previous consideration and imposition of lesser sanctions in ruling on Crawford's motion for reconsideration:

[T]he court has accommodated [Crawford] in many regards, including (1) continuing the case after earlier ruling that no further continuances would be granted, (2) considering the late-filed and incomplete response to defendant's motion to dismiss and (3) requiring [Woodward] to respond to the motion for reconsideration so that [Crawford] could have a full opportunity to explain why dismissal was not appropriate. However, at some point, the court cannot continue to sanction [Crawford's] failure to abide by court rules and court orders. Under these circumstances, the court is satisfied that no remedy short of dismissal is sufficient.

The trial court had not only proposed but had also imposed lesser sanctions before determining that no remedy short of dismissal was sufficient. There was no error.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

Crawford v. Matthew Woodward

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Oct 1, 2007
140 Wn. App. 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
Case details for

Crawford v. Matthew Woodward

Case Details

Full title:TIMOTHY D. CRAWFORD ET AL., Appellants, v. MATTHEW WOODWARD ET AL.…

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One

Date published: Oct 1, 2007

Citations

140 Wn. App. 1041 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
140 Wash. App. 1041