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Crane v. Runnels

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 24, 2006
No. CIV S-02-2203 MCE KJM P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2006)

Opinion

No. CIV S-02-2203 MCE KJM P.

February 24, 2006


ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Runnels' May 23, 2005 motion for summary judgment is before the court.

I. Preliminary Matters

A. Objections To Transcript Of Deposition

On June 20, 2005, plaintiff filed a document indicating that he objects to certain portions of the transcript of his deposition. Plaintiff believes the court reporter failed to correctly record some portions of his testimony. The court has reviewed the material plaintiff asserts reflects his deposition testimony incorrectly and determined that none of the challenged material is necessary to resolve defendant's pending motion for summary judgment. Therefore this material will be disregarded.

B. Request For An Extension Of Time To File Opposition

Plaintiff has requested an extension of time to file his opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment. Good cause appearing, plaintiff's request for an extension of time will be granted and his June 29, 2005 opposition will be deemed timely.

C. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Reply

On July 20, 2005, and without leave of court, plaintiff filed a response to defendant's reply brief concerning defendant's motion for summary judgment. With respect to briefing a motion for summary judgment, Local Rule 78-230(m) allows for the motion itself, an opposition, and then a reply. In light of the foregoing, the court will not consider plaintiff's response to defendant's reply.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated there exists "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial."T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to `pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On March 2, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. Plaintiff's Allegations

The only claim remaining before the court is that portion of "Count One" in plaintiff's third amended complaint that pertains to defendant Runnels, the Warden of High Desert State Prison (High Desert).

In his opposition, plaintiff suggests that this action also is proceeding on equal protection and Fourteenth Amendment claims against defendant Runnels. Pl.'s Mem. P. A. In Opp'n To Summ. J. (docket no. 112) (Opp'n) at 2:5-11. These claims are not asserted within "Count One" of plaintiff's third amended complaint. All other claims have been dismissed. See Order filed March 24, 2005 (docket no. 97).

Plaintiff claims that when he arrived at High Desert in May of 2001, he had a reputation among some other inmates as being a "snitch." Plaintiff believes there is an agreement among California Department of Corrections inmates who are gang members to stab other inmates identified as "snitches." Despite this, for at least some of his stay at High Desert, plaintiff was housed in general population. Plaintiff alleges this housing arrangement caused him "severe emotional and psychological distress" and caused plaintiff to serve ten months in administrative segregation. Third Am. Compl. at 4, 5-6, 9-10.

The record before the court shows that plaintiff was transferred to High Desert on May 9, 2001. June 29, 2005 Affidavit of Richard Joseph Crane (docket no. 115) at 3:27-28. Plaintiff was transferred from High Desert on June 12, 2003. Def't's Exs. in Supp. Summ. J., Ex. 2 at 1.

Plaintiff claims defendant Runnels knew that inmates such as plaintiff were being attacked constantly at High Desert. Because Runnels had this knowledge, plaintiff alleges Runnels should either have made sure that plaintiff was housed in protective custody at High Desert or transferred plaintiff to another facility. Id. at 12-13.

Based on the allegations summarized above, plaintiff claims Runnels has violated plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

IV. Arguments And Analysis

Defendant argues, among other things, that it is undisputed on the record before the court that he took no action leading to plaintiff's injuries. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment imposes on prison officials, among other things, a duty to "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). An inmate's Eighth Amendment rights are violated by a prison official if that official exposes an inmate to a "substantial risk of serious harm," while displaying "deliberate indifference" to that risk. Id. at 834. It must be noted that supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of their subordinates in a section 1983 action. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor, however, can be held liable for a violation of constitutional rights even if he or she was not personally involved in the actions that led to the violation, if the supervisor implemented a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights and is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Id.

The court has reviewed all relevant portions of the record and finds that there is no evidence before the court suggesting defendant Runnels was personally involved in any housing decision concerning plaintiff or any decision regarding whether plaintiff should have been housed at High Desert. See Def't's Exs. in Supp. Summ J., Ex. 11 (excerpt of plaintiff's deposition in which plaintiff identifies no basis for defendant's liability other than his position as warden). Furthermore, there is no evidence indicating defendant Runnels implemented an inherently flawed policy that resulted in plaintiff being subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff has presented evidence in the form of affidavits from fellow inmates indicating they have been attacked by other inmates at High Desert. See Pl.'s Exs. In Opp'n To Summ. J., Exs. 5, 7 8 (Turner Decl.). But he has presented no evidence suggesting the attacks were a direct result of a policy issued by defendant Runnels. Runnels thus is entitled to summary judgment and the court need not address his other arguments asserted in favor of summary judgment.

V. Miscellaneous

A. November 16, 2005 Request For Judicial Notice

Plaintiff asks that the court take judicial notice of a case he has filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In that case, he names as defendants two correctional officers who were dismissed from this case for lack of venue; the case is still pending. Plaintiff's request will be denied as plaintiff asserts no reason for the taking of judicial notice of the case referenced, in the context of the pending summary judgment motion.

B. Motion For A Preliminary Inunction

On December 15, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction; he supplemented the motion with a filing on January 30, 2006. Plaintiff asks that the court issue an injunction "to prevent defendants from retaliating and subjecting plaintiff to `C' status unjustly and in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights." As noted above, plaintiff no longer resides at the prison where defendant Runnels — the only defendant in this action — is the warden. Def.'s Ex. 2 at 1. Furthermore, plaintiff has not shown that Runnels has retaliated against plaintiff or subjected hin to "C" status. Accordingly, there is no basis for issuing an injunction against defendant Runnels. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975), Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995).

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's June 29, 2005 request for an extension of time is granted;

2. Plaintiff's June 29, 2005 opposition to defendant Runnels's motion for summary judgment is deemed timely; and

3. Plaintiff's November 16, 2005 request for judicial notice is denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff's December 15, 2005 motion for a preliminary injunction, as supplemented on January 30, 2006, be denied;

2. Defendant Runnels's May 23, 2005 motion for summary judgment be granted; and

3. This case be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).


Summaries of

Crane v. Runnels

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 24, 2006
No. CIV S-02-2203 MCE KJM P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2006)
Case details for

Crane v. Runnels

Case Details

Full title:RICHARD JOSEPH CRANE, Plaintiff, v. D.L. RUNNELS, et al., Defendants

Court:United States District Court, E.D. California

Date published: Feb 24, 2006

Citations

No. CIV S-02-2203 MCE KJM P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2006)