Opinion
No. 56746-2-I.
October 2, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-2-17865-7, Richard A. Jones, J., entered July 28, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Kevin Blair Hansen, Livengood Fitzgerald Alskog, 121 Third Ave, Po Box 908, Kirkland, WA, 98083-0908.
Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Magnus Rune Andersson, Hanson Baker Ludlow Drumheller PS, 2229 112th Ave Ne Ste 200, Bellevue, WA, 98004-2936.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Grosse, J., concurred in by Cox and Dwyer, JJ.
Once a claim is filed against an estate, a creditor has 30 days after notice of rejection of that claim to bring an action against the estate. A dismissal of that action for failure to perfect the claim does not give the creditor another opportunity to submit a second, now perfected, claim against the estate thus restarting the statutory time frame within which to bring an action. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of Leslie Coyle's second claim for past due spousal support against the estate of her former husband, Christopher Coyle.
FACTS
Leslie and Chris Coyle's marriage was dissolved in August 1977 by the Contra Costa Superior Court of California. The court ordered child support of $150 per month for each of their two children. The court also ordered Chris to pay Leslie $200 a month for spousal support until she died, remarried or until further order of the court. Chris stopped paying spousal support in 1978. The orders were never modified by order of the court, nor has Leslie ever remarried.
Lael Stroh-Coyle married Chris in 1982. Chris died in June 2002 and Lael was appointed notice agent for his estate. No probate was opened.
Leslie Coyle obtained a judgment from a California court for $145,986 for past due spousal support. Robert Smith notified Lael that he was Leslie's attorney representative of claimant in Washington and that he intended to pursue a claim for the past due spousal support. After receiving notice of this potential claim on the estate, Lael sent the notice of non-probate to Smith. Leslie then filed a creditor's claim on September 22, 2003, which Lael rejected in November 2003. Leslie filed suit in Washington against the estate. Prior to filing suit, however, Leslie had not registered a certified copy of that judgment in King County Superior Court. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lael in May 2004, dismissing Leslie's first claim with prejudice. The trial court held that it had no subject matter jurisdiction, but made additional findings on the merits regarding waiver, estoppel, laches, and the statute of limitations. In an unpublished opinion, this court upheld the summary judgment of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but reversed the trial court's substantive findings on the merits because there was no jurisdiction to hear the matter.
In re Marriage of Erickson, 98 Wn. App. 892, 896, 991 P.2d 123 (2000) (holding that Washington courts lack subject matter jurisdiction where a California-issued support order was never registered in Washington).
Coyle v. Stroh-Coyle, No. 54448-9-I, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 987 (May 9, 2005).
Leslie registered the judgment in King County Superior Court in May 2004 and on June 18, 2004, refiled the exact same claim against the estate of Christopher Coyle. The second claim was rejected by the estate on June 23, 2004. Subsequent to that rejection, Leslie filed this present action on July 21, 2004, within 30 days of the rejection of her second claim. Lael again moved for dismissal alleging, inter alia, that the suit was time barred.
ANALYSIS
RCW 11.42.100(1) provides that an action must be brought within 30 days after notice of rejection of a claim by a notice agent. Lael rejected Leslie's claim in December 2003. Leslie had 30 days from the date of that rejection to bring suit. Although Leslie's first suit was filed within the 30 days required under RCW 11.42.100(1), that suit was dismissed for valid reasons. Leslie's belated filing with King County Superior Court of the California judgment to correct the fatal error in her first claim does not overcome the prior dismissal and cannot support a new claim and new 30-day period within which to file a new law suit.
Leslie argues that the first notice to the creditor was sent to her attorney instead of being mailed directly to her as required by RCW 11.42.020(c), which provides:
The notice agent may at any time give actual notice to creditors who become known to the notice agent by serving the notice on the creditor or mailing the notice to the creditor at the creditor's last known address, by regular first class mail, postage prepaid.
Leslie argues that the statute requires that the notice be mailed to the creditor. Therefore, the notice given to her attorney Robert Smith was insufficient under the statute and thus Leslie should be able to pursue this claim under the longer time frames imposed for creditors who were only notified by publication. However, Leslie did receive the notice of rejection of the first claim. In fact, she commenced her suit within 30 days of that rejection.
As the trial court correctly decided, the 30 days to file ran from the date the original claim was rejected. A properly and timely filed claim against an estate is a condition precedent to maintaining a lawsuit against the estate. Because our ruling on this issue is dispositive of the case, we need not address the trial court's additional reasons for summary judgment dismissal.
Cloud v. Summers, 98 Wn. App. 724, 738, 991 P.2d 1169 (1999).
Lael Coyle cross-appeals alleging that the trial court erred in awarding only $6,650 in attorney fees rather than the $12,951.98 actual fees that were submitted by her attorney. The trial court awarded Lael fees under RCW 11.96A.150(1), which provides in pertinent part that "[e]ither the superior court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees. . . ." Actual fees do not necessarily mean reasonable fees. We will not reverse a trial court's decision to deny statutorily authorized attorney fees in a probate matter absent a manifest abuse of discretion. The court had affidavits from both Lael's attorney and Leslie's attorney regarding the award of attorney fees. When granting the summary judgment, the trial court noted that it considered the motion for attorney fees and the declaration of James Hunt opposing the award of attorney fees. The court was familiar with the principles involved in this case. There is no showing that the court abused its discretion in awarding the attorney fees in the amount it did. RCW 11.96A.150(1) provides for "reasonable" attorney fees, not actual.
In re Estate of Black, 116 Wn. App. 476, 489, 66 P.3d 670 (2003).
Because neither party on appeal prevailed with respect to their principal claim, we do not award fees on appeal.
Affirmed.
COX, and DWYER, JJ., concur.