Opinion
A152198
04-16-2018
ALVIN COX, as Trustee, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BARBARA BLUMBERG, as Executor, etc., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG16820169)
Plaintiff Alvin Cox, as trustee of the Westlake Trust, in an unopposed appeal challenges the denial of his application to quiet title to a parcel of improved real property in Oakland. Plaintiff purchased the property from the person who several years before had acquired it from a decedent whose estate had not been probated. Although no objection was raised by any party with a conceivable interest in the property, the trial court refused to quiet title apparently on the grounds that title should have been transferred in probate proceedings and that the county would be unable to enforce an anticipated supplemental assessment against the property if title were quieted in plaintiff. We conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff's action, and that plaintiff is entitled to relief confirming the trust's title to the property subject to payment of the supplemental assessment.
Background
The Oakland property was acquired by Regete Gruhn in April 1996 by a recorded grant deed. Gruhn died in December 2008, unmarried and with no living children or any grandchildren. A diligent search disclosed only one living heir, Jacquelin Taylor, who resided in Texas. In 2005, Gruhn executed a will that named four beneficiaries: her long-time friend Barbara Blumberg, to whom she devised her "residuary estate, including any real property that I own at the time of my death," and Barbara's two children Dorin and Tanin, and the Tony La Russa's Animal Rescue Foundation, Inc., to whom she made specific bequests. The will designated Barbara Blumberg as executor.
The record reflects that Gruhn's estate had considerable debt and few assets other than the Oakland property. Barbara Blumberg therefore did not commence probate proceedings and listed the Oakland property for sale. Because of a downturn in the real estate market she took the property off the market for a period but ultimately entered an agreement to sell the property to plaintiff in March 2016. During the period between Gruhn's death and the sale to plaintiff, delinquencies arose in the payment of property taxes, mortgage payments and homeowner dues. As part of the purchase price, plaintiff brought all of these obligations current.
Prior to entry of the purchase and sale agreement between Barbara Blumberg and plaintiff, Barbara's two children assigned all of their interest in Gruhn's estate to Barbara. Subsequently, the fourth beneficiary under Gruhn's will, the Animal Rescue Foundation, for consideration paid by plaintiff, assigned to plaintiff its rights and interest in the Gruhn estate. Shortly after the filing of the quiet title action, in July 2016, Jacquelin Taylor disclaimed and assigned to Barbara Blumberg all of her actual and potential rights in Gruhn's property, and on December 1, 2016, she executed a quitclaim deed to Barbara Blumberg. On December 8, 2016, Barbara Blumberg executed a quitclaim deed of the property to plaintiff.
Upon filing the quiet title action in July 2016, plaintiff published notice of the action as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 761.010. No party ever appeared to dispute plaintiff's right to title. In January 2017 plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding the allegations that Jacquelin Taylor had quitclaimed her interest in the property to Barbara Blumberg, and that Barbara Blumberg had executed a quitclaim deed to plaintiff. On July 6, 2017, Barbara Blumberg and plaintiff executed a stipulation that judgment be entered providing, among other things, that plaintiff be adjudicated "the sole owner and title holder" of the property.
The complaint and amended complaint also contain allegations that plaintiff asserts establish that Barbara Blumberg also acquired a right to title by adverse possession of the property. In view of the other conclusions we reach with regard to plaintiff's claim, we need not consider the sufficiency of his allegations to establish adverse possession.
The court refused to accept the stipulation in evidence, considering it to be hearsay. --------
Over the course of two prove-up hearings, at which testimony and documents were introduced substantiating the above facts, the trial court more than once indicated its view that title to the property should have been transferred in probate proceedings. However, the court's principal concern appears to have been that a supplemental assessment would not be enforceable if title were quieted in plaintiff. At one point, the court commented, "My concern is that it appears to me that you are seeking a quiet title judgment that has the effect of cheating somebody." The evidence, however, showed that plaintiff had paid all delinquent property taxes and had attempted to pay the supplemental taxes but had been unable to do so because the supplemental tax bill had not yet been generated. The court rejected his offer to assume personal liability for payment of the supplemental taxes, and also denied his request to continue the hearing "until October when the supplemental tax bill has been generated and Mr. Cox can pay the supplemental taxes on the property." The court denied the request to quiet title, commenting, "How in the world could I issue a judgment saying that the plaintiff in a quiet title case has an obligation to pay money when - he can have the title now, but he's got a personal obligation to pay the money later? There is no authority for me to give that kind of conditional judgment." The court continued, "The claim for quiet title is denied. . . . [W]hy you wanted to do a quiet title case instead of a probate case, I don't know, but you haven't demonstrated to me that quiet title should be issued."
Plaintiff has timely appealed.
Discussion
Based on the uncontroverted facts established in the record, we conclude that plaintiff is entitled to relief in this action. As plaintiff asserts, title to the Oakland property vested in Barbara Blumberg at the time of Gruhn's death. Although the failure to have probated the will gives rise to the uncertainty prompting the need to quiet title, the facts now proven establish that Blumberg owned the property from Gruhn's date of death forward. Probate Code section 7000 provides: "Subject to Section 7001 [providing that a decedent's property is subject to administration], title to a decedent's property passes on the decedent's death to the person to whom it is devised in the decedent's last will or, in the absence of such a devise, to the decedent's heirs as prescribed in the laws governing intestate succession." It has long been established that " '[w]hen a person dies, title to his or her property vests in the heirs or devisees, subject to administration.' " (Estates of Collins & Flowers (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250.) " 'Title to the real estate of the deceased intestate vests immediately in his heirs, of a testate in his devisees. That title they may convey without administration . . . true, the title thus conveyed is not a perfect title, in that the title will always be subject to . . . the payment of claims of legal creditors.' " (Smith v. Barrick (1919) 41 Cal.App. 28, 31.) Thus, Barbara Blumberg acquired ownership of the Oakland property upon Gruhn's death. While Blumberg's title was subject to tax and other liens against the property, those liens have now been satisfied. Unsecured creditors of Gruhn might also have asserted claims, but none have done so and the limitations period for asserting any such claims expired long ago. Moreover, the other beneficiaries under Gruhn's will and her only known heir have all transferred any conceivable interest in the property to her. Therefore, Barbara Blumberg had the right to transfer ownership of the property to plaintiff when she did, despite the absence of a probate decree.
Although Barbara Blumberg, as the named executor of Gruhn's will, might have instituted probate proceedings and obtained a decree confirming title to the property in her name, plaintiff—who purchased the property from her—was in no position to bring the matter before the probate court. "[T]he probate court has no power, on distribution, to pass on the rights and claims of . . . an . . . assignee of the devisee's interest." (Noble v. Beach (1942) 21 Cal.2d 91, 96.)
Finally, although the trial court may have been justifiably concerned about entering an order that might adversely affect the right of the county to enforce a supplemental tax assessment against the property, the county's rights can be fully protected by either an order quieting title subject to a supplemental assessment for the years in question or an order quieting title conditioned on the payment of the supplemental assessment. (Sterling Realty Co. v. Relfe (1942) 21 Cal.2d 164, 171-172; 51 Cal.Jur.3d (2011) Public Improvements, § 68, p. 1067.) The fact that real property taxes had gone into arrears while Barbara Blumberg owned the property can hardly be attributed to plaintiff, who paid all back taxes that were due, nor can plaintiff be faulted for not yet having paid a supplemental assessment that had not yet been made. In all events, the circumstances certainly do not evince an intent to cheat or negate plaintiff's entitlement to an order confirming the trust's ownership of the property.
Disposition
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for entry of an order quieting title to the Oakland property in plaintiff subject to the obligation to pay any supplemental real property tax that may be assessed.
Pollak, Acting P.J. We concur: Siggins, J.
Jenkins, J.