Opinion
Record No. 1181-92-1
August 24, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY G. DUANE HOLLOWAY, JUDGE.
(C. Thomas Turbeville; D. R. Dansby, LTD., on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
(Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General; Donald R. Curry, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Cole and Duff.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Terry Darnel Cowles, appellant, appeals his conviction for distribution of or possession with intent to distribute cocaine on the ground that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. We affirm.
On August 23, 1991, an undercover agent in an operation conducted by the York County Sheriff's Department met with appellant's cousin to buy drugs. The agent and the cousin searched at length for appellant. They drove to appellant's home and then to another location, where they waited for him. The cousin took money that the agent had given him and went to talk to appellant at the edge of a driveway in full view of the agent. The agent testified that he witnessed an exchange between appellant and the cousin, although he could not see what was being exchanged, nor could he hear what was said. The cousin then returned to the agent with the cocaine.
Appellant argued that the evidence did not prove a prima facie case because no evidence of participation by appellant was presented, and the court failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and inferred guilt through circumstantial evidence.
The standard for appellate review of criminal convictions is well established. "When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to review the evidence 'in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'"Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 177, 179, 409 S.E.2d 175, 176 (1991) (quoting Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). "The conviction will not be reversed unless it is 'plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id.
From the evidence presented, the fact-finder could reasonably conclude that appellant, during the course of the witnessed exchange, gave the cocaine to his cousin, who, in turn, gave it to the agent. Furthermore, although appellant offers alternative explanations to suggest how the cousin could have received the cocaine other than from appellant, none reasonably flow from the evidence before the court. See Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 841, 284 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1981).
The trial court's decision, therefore, was not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Accordingly, the decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.