Opinion
A152305
06-08-2018
SIDNEY J. CORRIE, JR., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GEOFFREY M. GRIFFIN, as Trustee, etc., Defendant; EAST BAY REGIONAL PARK DISTRICT, Objector and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. P09-01129)
Appellant Sidney J. Corrie, Jr. appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motion for restitution. While the final judgment did not expressly reserve any issues for future determination, Corrie contends he is entitled to now litigate his claim for restitution after judgment was entered and affirmed on appeal. Respondent East Bay Regional Park District (the District) seeks both to dismiss Corrie's appeal as arising from nonappealable orders and to contest the substance of his claims. We deny the District's motion to dismiss, but affirm the trial court's order.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal is the latest of multiple previous appellate court proceedings related to this dispute. We summarized the facts of the protracted litigation in a prior appeal (East Bay Regional Park District v. Griffin (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 734), and see no need to restate that long history for the instant appeal. It is sufficient for present purposes to recall Corrie filed two separate petitions to enforce an option agreement between himself and the trust of Armand Borel (Option Agreement), as well as two subsequent amendments thereto (Amendments Nos. 1 and 2).
Following a bench trial on both petitions regarding the validity of Corrie's option rights, the probate court issued a detailed, 37-page statement of decision. The probate court found the original Option Agreement and Amendment No. 1 had expired. As to Amendment No. 2, the probate court first found the trustee acted without authority by entering into the amendment because it was counter to the trust's purpose to create an agricultural park. After finding Amendment No. 2 void, the court noted: "Generally, when an agreement is determined to be void or voidable, the court seeks to return the parties to the same positions existing before the agreement was entered, because equity and fairness requires [sic] it. [Citation.] . . . In this instance, the Court will decide the appropriateness and the amount of any restitution at a later hearing."
However, the probate court then proceeded to assess whether Corrie breached Amendment No. 2. The court concluded Corrie failed to materially perform and defaulted under Amendment No. 2, including by (1) not paying required option fees, (2) not providing the required notice of intent to exercise the option, and (3) not paying the purchase price. When announcing its decision orally, the court explained the impact of this second ruling—namely, that Corrie's breach of Amendment No. 2 would not give rise to restitution. In light of these various rulings, the court cautioned the parties they "will need to think through these options, figure out how they're going to appeal this, because in sequence, to me, certain remedies follow logically. It depends on what you wish to challenge."
The court's statement of decision concluded as follows: "[T]he Court finds that Amendment #2 is invalid and unenforceable. The Court also finds that [Corrie] materially breached the terms of Amendment #2. The Court, therefore, concludes that Corrie cannot assert any rights pursuant to that invalid and unenforceable agreement, which in any event he materially breached. The Court reserves for later hearing any determination of the appropriate remedy that should follow from these findings."
The District prepared a draft judgment for Corrie's review. In a follow-up e-mail to Corrie's counsel, the District's counsel inquired whether Corrie's counsel had a chance to review the draft and stated, "I don't think there is any controversial [sic]—more just a formality as the Statement of Decision is the guts of the Judge's decision." The e-mail concluded, "Please let me know by the end of the day tomorrow if you have can [sic] approve it as to form or have any comments." While Corrie's counsel provided comments on the draft judgment, no one sought to include a reservation of the restitution issue, and Corrie's counsel eventually approved the form of the judgment now at issue. The final judgment stated: "1. Petitioner's Petitions are denied and the objections by the Trustee and the [District] are sustained. [¶] 2. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the Trustee and the [District], and against Petitioners."
Corrie appealed from the judgment. In the nonpublished portion of our opinion, we affirmed Amendment No. 2 was unenforceable and concluded "the probate court correctly found [the trustee] lacked authority to enter into Amendment No. 2 and breached her fiduciary duty by doing so." (East Bay Regional Park District v. Griffin (Aug. 18, 2016, A141625, A142154, A143688) [nonpub. part of partially pub. opn.], p. 26.)
We take judicial notice of our prior decision. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
Corrie subsequently filed a motion for order requiring restitution of those funds paid to the trust for the Option Agreement. The probate court deferred hearing the motion and instead scheduled a trial on the issue of Corrie's right to restitution for option payments made to the trust. In response, the District petitioned this court for a writ of prohibition, mandamus, or other appropriate relief. The District argued Corrie's motion for restitution was an attempt to revisit an issue encompassed by the final judgment.
On June 8, 2017, this court entered an order issuing an alternative writ of mandate. (East Bay Regional Park District v. Superior Court (A151202).) That order noted judgment had been entered, which "generally terminates the superior court's jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action," and the matter appealed and affirmed by this court. The order further commented, "Respondent [court]'s statement of decision left open the issue of restitution, but the judgment itself did not retain jurisdiction of that question or of any other matter." We therefore commanded the superior court to set aside and vacate its order and to enter a new and different order denying Corrie's motion for an order requiring restitution, or, in the alternative, to appear and show cause why a peremptory writ of mandate and/or prohibition should not be granted. The probate court subsequently vacated its prior order and entered a new order denying Corrie's motion. In light of the probate court's compliance with the alternative writ of mandate, this court discharged the writ and dismissed the petition as moot.
We take judicial notice of our prior order. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
Corrie filed a motion for reconsideration with the probate court, which was denied. Corrie then timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss
On November 20, 2017, the District filed a motion to dismiss alleging the probate court's order denying Corrie's motion for restitution is not appealable. The District further argued Corrie's appeal was frivolous as "he is pursuing the same meritless arguments that were rejected by this Court in June 2017 in the District's Writ proceeding," and sought sanctions. We deny the District's motion in its entirety.
The District's motion also challenged the appealability of the court's order denying Corrie's motion for reconsideration. We need not address this order. While Corrie's notice of appeal includes the order denying his motion for reconsideration, his opening brief does not include any argument or analysis regarding the validity of the probate court's order, and his reply brief concedes he "has elected not to argue the substance of the order denying his reconsideration." Accordingly, Corrie has waived any appeal as to the order denying his motion for reconsideration. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [reviewing court may treat argument as waived where appellate brief fails to provide legal authority for position taken].)
1. Appealability
The District first challenges the appealability of the order denying Corrie's motion for restitution. The District argues an order denying restitution is not appealable because it is not expressly listed in either Probate Code section 1300 or 1304. In response, Corrie contends his appeal is authorized by Probate Code sections 1300, subdivision (k), 850, and 856. We conclude the court's order denying Corrie's motion for restitution is appealable.
"[T]he Probate Code provisions concerning appealability are exclusive. The appealability of probate disputes in general is governed by section 1300. [Citations.] In addition, section 1304 lists appealable orders in trust proceedings." (Kalenian v. Insen (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 569, 575-576.) Probate Code section 1300, subdivision (k), provides an order "[a]djudicating the merits of a claim made under Part 19 (commencing with Section 850) of Division 2" is appealable. (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10) [appeal may be taken from "an order made appealable by the Probate Code"].) Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a)(2)(A) provides an interested person may file a petition requesting the court make an order "[w]here the decedent while living is bound by a contract in writing to convey real property or to transfer personal property and dies before making the conveyance or transfer and the decedent, if living, could have been compelled to make the conveyance or transfer." Section 856 provides "if the court is satisfied that a conveyance, transfer, or other order should be made, the court shall make an order authorizing and directing the personal representative or other fiduciary, or the person having title to or possession of the property, to execute a conveyance or transfer to the person entitled thereto, or granting other appropriate relief."
While appeals in probate matters are limited to those enumerated by statute, " 'the appealability of an order of the probate court is determined not from its form, but from its legal effect.' " (Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 759, 766.) In Estate of Martin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1441, the petitioner challenged the probate court's denial of his request to void a sale of shares. On appeal, the respondent argued the denial was not appealable. The court noted: "Generally, an order that merely declines to vacate a prior order confirming a sale is not appealable. [Citations] . . . [¶] However, as our Supreme Court explained in Estate of West (1912) 162 Cal. 352 , the appealability of an order of the probate court is determined not from its form, but from its legal effect." (Id. at p. 1442.) The court concluded because the order at issue went beyond a mere denial of a request to void a sale but rather had the legal effect of approving the underlying sale itself, it was appealable under Probate Code section 1300. (Estate of Martin, at pp. 1442-1443.)
Here, Corrie's motion for restitution is directly related to the merits of his petition. As the probate court noted, restitution is a remedy that naturally flows from a void contract, such as Amendment No. 2. Likewise, the District argued in its writ petition that Corrie's request for restitution was an attempt to revisit an issue encompassed by the final judgment—an implicit acknowledgement that the issue of restitution was a component of the petitions adjudicated by the probate court. While the District argues Probate Code section 1300 cannot apply because Corrie's prior petitions have been fully adjudicated, we find this position unavailing. Corrie is challenging whether all issues have been fully adjudicated—i.e., whether the question of restitution remains outstanding. While the District clearly believes the answer to that question is no, it does not negate the correlation between the current inquiry and Corrie's petitions. Accordingly, the probate court's denial of Corrie's motion for restitution amounts to an "Adjudicat[ion of] the merits of a claim made under Part 19 (commencing with Section 850) of Division 2." (Prob. Code, § 1300, subd. (k).)
2. Frivolity of Appeal
The District next argues Corrie's appeal is frivolous because he raises the same arguments that were raised in the prior writ proceeding. In essence, the District contends our order issuing the alternative writ of mandate constitutes law of the case such that we must adhere to our prior determination, and it cannot be relitigated. But the law of the case doctrine does not apply. "[A]bsent a written opinion following issuance of the alternative writ, this court's reasoning in issuing the alternative writ is not the law of the case . . . ." (Ross v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1513, fn. 6, citing Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 893-894.) Where, as here, the superior court complies with the writ, the petition " 'becomes moot.' " (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240.) If, however, the superior court does not perform the act specified in an alternative writ, the matter then "becomes a 'cause' that must be decided 'in writing with reasons stated.' " (Id. at p. 1241; Kowis v. Howard, at pp. 893-894.) It is only when the matter is fully briefed, argued, and decided by a written opinion that the writ proceeding becomes law of the case upon a later appeal. (Kowis v. Howard, at p. 894; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 182.)
Here, no opinion followed issuance of the alternative writ. The probate court vacated the hearing on Corrie's motion for restitution, and the District's petition became moot. Accordingly, we must consider the legal issues anew. We do, however, reach the same conclusion. B. Probate Court's Jurisdiction to Hear Motion for Restitution
The District claims the probate court lacked jurisdiction to consider Corrie's motion for restitution. Specifically, the District argues the judgment was the final determination of Corrie's rights and bars future litigation on his claim. In response, Corrie contends the judgment was not "final" because it left for future consideration the issue of restitution. We disagree.
To the extent these jurisdictional questions raise pure issues of law, we apply the de novo standard of review. (See Conservatorship of Kane (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 400, 405 ["appeal presents pure issues of law concerning the jurisdiction and authority of the probate courts, as to which we must exercise de novo review"].)
1. Scope of the Judgment
It is undisputed the judgment does not contain any reservation regarding the issue of restitution. However, Corrie argues the judgment must be interpreted as incorporating the statement of decision.
The rules for interpreting judgments have been long settled. In ascertaining the scope and effect of an order, judgment, or arbitration award, the same rules apply as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. (Estate of Careaga (1964) 61 Cal.2d 471, 475.) Generally, "[t]he language of a [writing] is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit . . . ." (Civ. Code, § 1638.) Where, however, the order, judgment, or arbitration award is ambiguous or uncertain, the entire record may be examined to determine its scope and effect. (Estate of Careaga, at p. 475.)
Here, the language is clear and explicit. The judgment unequivocally states: "Petitioner's Petitions are denied and the objections by the Trustee and the [District] are sustained." The judgment does not reference any reserved issues or imply any issues remain outstanding.
Nor does the judgment incorporate the statement of decision and oral decision, as suggested by Corrie. None of the cases cited by Corrie suggest a document can be incorporated into a judgment by a mere passing reference. While the judgment "need not recite that it 'incorporates' another document," it must " 'guide[] the reader to the incorporated document.' " (Shaw v. Regents of University of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 44, 54 (Shaw).) No such language is included in the judgment. Instead, the judgment only mentions the statement of decision as part of its recitation of the procedural history. It references the statement of decision in the same manner in which it references Corrie's complaint and the District's objections—neither of which Corrie asserts are incorporated into the judgment. Adopting the rule Corrie suggests would result in chaos. No court could recite the procedural history without fear those documents would be incorporated by reference. Instead, the judgment must contain some language suggesting an intent to incorporate. (See, e.g., id., at pp. 54-55 [reference to policy " 'set forth in' " other document sufficient to incorporate].)
Corrie also argues that because "facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true," then "the contents of those Statements of Decisions are conclusively presumed to be true." Such logic is faulty. Assuming facts recited in a written instrument are true, then the only "true" fact is that the court issued a statement of decision. It says nothing about the contents of that statement of decision.
Corrie also contends our interpretation of the judgment should be governed by the parties' intent. While a "prior stipulated or consent judgment is subject to construction as to the parties' intent" (Landeros v. Pankey (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1172), Corrie cites no authority suggesting the parties' intent is relevant to interpreting the judgment at issue. Even if we were to consider such intent, "the relevant intent is 'objective'—that is, the objective intent as evidenced by the words of the instrument, not a party's subjective intent." (Shaw, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 54-55.) Because the express language of the judgment does not evidence an intent to incorporate, we conclude the statement of decision is not incorporated by reference.
2. Ambiguities in the Judgment
Corrie next contends this court must consider the statement of decision as it reflects a latent ambiguity in the judgment. Corrie argues such evidence shows the intent of the probate court to address restitution at a " 'later hearing.' "
"The proper interpretation of a contract is disputable if the contract is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, that is, if the contract is ambiguous. An ambiguity may appear on the face of a contract, or extrinsic evidence may reveal a latent ambiguity. [Citation.] . . . If the court determines that the contract is reasonably susceptible of an interpretation supported by extrinsic evidence, the court must admit that evidence for purposes of interpreting the contract." (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114.) "Ambiguity is defined as 'an unclear, indefinite, or equivocal word, expression, meaning, etc.' [Citation.] A word or expression is said to be ambiguous when it is 'open to having several possible meanings or interpretations.' " (Rancho Pauma Mutual Water Co. v. Yuima Municipal Water Dist. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 109, 117.)
Here, the statement of decision does not reveal a latent ambiguity in the judgment. The judgment states: "Petitioner's Petitions are denied . . . ." The court's statement that it "will decide the appropriateness and the amount of any restitution at a later hearing" does not make the word "denied" indefinite. Nor does it suggest "denied" has an alternative meaning. Rather, Corrie is actually arguing the statement of decision contradicts the judgment. While a court should consider competent extrinsic evidence to determine the existence of any latent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence that contradicts the express terms of a written contract is disregarded. (Wagner v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 586, 592.) Accordingly, we reject Corrie's contention the judgment contains a latent ambiguity.
3. Impact of Entry of Judgment
As discussed in our order issuing alternative writ, "A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., § 577.) Entry of judgment generally terminates the superior court's jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action. (Diamond Heights Village Assn., Inc. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 290, 305.) Corrie does not address this authority. Instead, he raises various theories for why the probate court retained jurisdiction to hear his motion for restitution. We find these arguments unavailing.
To the extent Corrie takes issue with the factual record submitted to this court in connection with the District's writ petition, we note the fault equally lies with Corrie. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(c) [anticipating a party will file "supporting documents" with a preliminary opposition to a petition]; accord, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.487(a)(2) [memorandum "must" contain "a statement of any material fact not included in the petition"].) Regardless, this appeal is not contesting our order issuing an alternative writ of mandate.
a. The Probate Court's Inherent Powers
Corrie first argues, despite entry of judgment, the probate court retained its "inherent power" to correct the judgment and resolve the controversy.
It is well established " 'A court may reconsider its order granting or denying a motion and may even reconsider or alter its judgment so long as judgment has not yet been entered.' " (Ramon v. Aerospace Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1236 (Ramon).) However, "entry of judgment ordinarily terminates a trial court's jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a case . . . ." (Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455, 479.) Once judgment has been entered, the court " 'loses its unrestricted power to change the judgment' " and " 'may correct judicial error only through certain limited procedures such as motions for new trial and motions to vacate the judgment.' " (Ramon, at p. 1236.) The opposing party "must use statutory methods to attack the judgment in the trial court or must file an appeal, and the party must take those steps within specified time periods." (Id. at p. 1238; see Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2017) ¶ 9:332.3, p. 9(I)-151 ["Once a judgment has been entered, the proper challenge is a motion for new trial ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 657), which may be based on various grounds including errors of law."].)
Corrie has not pursued such remedies. While he argues the court has "inherent power" to amend the judgment, he concedes he "is not appealing the 2014 Judgment" and has not sought to amend the judgment. Nor are we inclined to construe his motion as such. In APRI Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 176 (APRI Ins. Co.), the court was asked to construe a motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial or a motion to vacate judgment. (Id. at p. 184.) The court declined to do so, stating: " 'Even if we assume the trial court is free to ignore the label of a motion, it does not necessarily follow that appellate courts should do so as well, particularly when there is no indication that the motion was "construed" to be a different motion in the trial court. For an appellate court to construe a motion merely to "save" the appeal from dismissal may result in further problems and cannot be justified. . . .' " (Ibid., quoting Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1609.) " 'Absent a showing of extremely good cause, we are disinclined to engage in the practice of "construing" motions and will hold counsel to the label they attach to their motions.' [Citation.] [¶] . . . Plaintiff chose to challenge the court's ruling granting the motion . . . by a motion for reconsideration, and the trial court ruled on that motion. Although there was discussion about treating the motion as a motion to vacate, the trial court did not do so. We decline to construe the motion for reconsideration as something that it was not." (APRI Ins. Co., at p. 184.)
Likewise, we are disinclined to address the probate court's power to modify the judgment when Corrie never requested that the probate court do so. (Duran v. Obesity Research Institute, LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 635, 645 ["in general, an appellate court will not review an issue that was not raised by some proper method in the trial court"].) The only case cited by Corrie, Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, involved a probate dispute where the party contesting a prior order filed a motion to modify that prior order. (Id. at pp. 762-763.)
Estate of Beard is also distinguishable because the settlement at issue, unlike the judgment in this dispute, only resolved a portion of the parties' dispute, so "the probate proceedings . . . did not cease . . . and all the parties remained subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the probate court." (Estate of Beard, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.)
Even if we were inclined to address Corrie's argument, he has not demonstrated the probate court abused its discretion by not correcting the judgment. (Wolf Metals Inc. v. Rand Pacific Sales, Inc. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 698, 703 [decision to modify judgment is "consigned to the trial court's discretion"].) A final judgment may be contested to correct for extrinsic fraud or mistake. (Estate of Anderson (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 336, 347.) " 'Fraud or mistake is extrinsic when it deprives the unsuccessful party of an opportunity to present his case to the court. [Citations.] If an unsuccessful party to an action has been kept in ignorance thereof [citations] or has been prevented from fully participating therein [citation], there has been no true adversary proceeding, and the judgment is open to attack at any time. A party who has been given proper notice of an action, however, and who has not been prevented from full participation therein, has had an opportunity to present his case to the court and to protect himself from any fraud attempted by his adversary. [Citations.] Fraud perpetrated under such circumstances is intrinsic . . . .' " (Ibid.) The comments from opposing counsel, while arguably misleading, do not amount to extrinsic fraud or mistake. Corrie was not prevented from presenting his case to the court. To the contrary, he was given an opportunity to review the draft judgment and provide comments or objections thereto. To the extent Corrie argues the judgment was incomplete and counsel's e-mail misrepresented the scope of that judgment, he had an opportunity to " 'protect himself from any fraud attempted by his adversary.' " (Ibid.) Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Corrie's motion for restitution and, by implication, refusing to correct the judgment.
Corrie next argues the court had an inherent power to manage the litigation, which includes setting a hearing on restitution. He contends such equitable authority arises from both the Probate Code and the probate court as a court of general jurisdiction. Neither source provides the probate court with the authority he seeks.
While Probate Code section 856 provides for the transfer of assets or "other appropriate relief," nothing in that provision suggests a court may do so after entry of judgment. Nor does Corrie cite any authority for such a proposition. Instead, Corrie relies on Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103 (Kraus) to support this argument. There, two beneficiaries filed a petition alleging the settlor's brother misappropriated funds that should have been part of the settlor's trust. (Id. at pp. 106-107.) The brother argued the petition should have been denied because the beneficiaries did not prove they were entitled to the funds. (Id. at p. 112.) In rejecting this argument, the court held the probate court could order the transfer of funds to the trust, despite inconclusive evidence regarding the ultimate disposition of those funds. (Id. at pp. 113, 115.) It concluded: "Given these circumstances, the probate court could reasonably, in the exercise of its statutory and equitable powers, place the funds, together with the statutory penalty imposed . . . in [settlor's] estate for a future determination of their proper disposition. Under the language and purpose of the statutory scheme, and given the probate court's broad powers, it was not required to allow the wrongdoer to retain the property misappropriated in bad faith until someone else proved a 'better' right to it." (Id. at p. 115.) While the Kraus court had ongoing jurisdiction over the estate—assets had yet to be distributed—there was no unresolved issue between the beneficiaries and the brother following judgment. And nothing in Kraus suggests the probate court retained unrestricted authority to alter the judgment after it was entered. Barring such authority, we decline to interpret the Probate Code as undermining " ' " 'the important public interest in the finality of judgments.' " ' " (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1222.)
Likewise, the probate court's equitable powers as a court of general jurisdiction cannot provide Corrie with the relief he seeks. Corrie, citing Witkin, acknowledges any such equitable powers are limited to actions to implement an equitable decree. (See 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 81, p. 617.) Here, the judgment contained no equitable decree. The court did not order specific performance or impose an injunction, but rather denied Corrie's petitions. (Compare with Barnes v. Chamberlain (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 762, 769 [subsequent orders appropriate to clarify details of specific performance compelled by judgment].) Accordingly, the probate court lacked inherent authority to enter additional orders impacting the judgment.
Corrie raises a related argument that a probate court has authority to determine the entire controversy before it. But he ignores the fact that the probate court did, in fact, resolve the entire controversy. The judgment explicitly denied his petitions in their entirety, and reserved no issues for future determination. While Corrie argues the failure to reserve the issue of restitution was merely a clerical error, he concedes he is not challenging the judgment. Accordingly, the question of whether the judgment contains an error is not before this court.
b. One Final Judgment Rule
Corrie next argues the one final judgment rule should not apply. Specifically, he asserts it was reasonable for him to allow entry of judgment and pursue his initial appeal before seeking restitution. Because it was efficient to first appeal the judgment, he contends, the "one final judgment" rule should not preclude the court from resolving future issues between the parties. We disagree.
As an initial matter, Corrie had no reason to believe he could pursue an appeal from the judgment while preserving allegedly unresolved issues for future determination. Not only does this run counter to the basic rules governing final judgments, but the probate court never endorsed such an approach. As noted by Corrie, the probate court stated it was making no determination regarding "the amount or the contours or the scope of restitution" and reserving those issues for later determination. But the probate court never said it was reserving those issues until after entry of judgment and appeal. While certain holdings by the probate court may beget a right to restitution, others would not, and the probate court specifically warned the parties to carefully consider these issues: "That is why I mentioned at the outset that counsel will need to think through these options, figure out how they're going to appeal this, because in sequence, to me, certain remedies follow logically. It depends on what you wish to challenge." Rather than instructing the parties to first appeal and then seek restitution, the court actually counseled the parties to carefully consider what next steps should be taken in light of its ruling. Unfortunately, Corrie appears to have overlooked this warning.
Even if the probate court had endorsed such an approach, Corrie could not merely rely on such an endorsement. "As explained in Sommer v. Martin (1921) 55 Cal.App. 603, 610: ' "In the hurry of the trial many things may be, and are, overlooked which would readily have been rectified had attention been called to them. The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge's attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it could be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal." ' " (Nave v. Taggart (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1177; accord, Passavanti v. Williams, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1609 [" 'counsel [is] duty-bound to know the rules of civil procedure' "].)
Moreover, the one final judgment rule is not at issue here. Under that rule, " ' "an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action." ' " (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756.) Neither party disputes the probate court's judgment constituted an appealable final judgment. Indeed, Corrie alleged this court had jurisdiction to review the judgment in his prior appeal's opening brief. Rather, the pending appeal raises a distinct inquiry—whether entry of judgment divests the probate court of its unrestricted authority to alter the judgment.
Corrie again relies on Kraus, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 103, which, as discussed in part II.B.3.a., ante, is distinguishable. In this context, Corrie argues Kraus illustrates an "exception" to the one final judgment rule. But Kraus did not discuss the one final judgment rule, and thus cannot purport to provide an exception to that rule. Nor does Estate of Baglione (1966) 65 Cal.2d 192, the other case relied on by Corrie, address the one final judgment rule. We are unaware of any authority suggesting the one final judgment rule would be applicable and allow Corrie to avoid the effect of entry of judgment. Accordingly, Corrie failed to demonstrate the probate court retained jurisdiction to hear his motion for restitution following entry of judgment denying his petitions, and the probate court properly denied Corrie's motion.
Because we conclude the entry of judgment precluded the probate court from considering Corrie's motion or restitution, we need not address whether res judicata also barred Corrie's motion.
III. DISPOSITION
The District's motion to dismiss is denied. The trial court's order denying the motion for restitution is affirmed. Defendant East Bay Regional Park District may recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Dondero, J.