Opinion
No. CV-16-03458-PHX-SPL
10-22-2019
Delia Coronado, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 32).
On August 24, 2017, this Court granted the parties' Stipulated Motion for Remand (Docs. 27, 28). On remand, Plaintiff was awarded $76,504 in back benefits due, and a Notice of Award was issued on April 21, 2019 (Doc. 32-1). Plaintiff now seeks an award of $19,126 in attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 32).
The Social Security Act provides that the Court may award reasonable attorneys' fees for representation before the Court, not to exceed twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart provides district courts with guidance on how to evaluate such Section 406(b) contingent-fee requests for reasonableness.
Most plausibly read, . . . § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield
reasonable results in particular cases.Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). In determining whether such a fee award is reasonable under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), the Court may look to factors including the character of the representation, the results achieved, delay, and proportionality. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).
Defendant does not object to the merits of the request (Doc. 29). Upon review, the Court finds the request for $19,126 is twenty-five percent of Plaintiff's past-due benefits and does not exceed the statutory cap. In addition, the instant record provides no indication of substandard performance, dilatory litigation tactics, or disproportionality. Accordingly, this Court concludes that a consideration of the Gisbrecht factors warrants a finding that the fee requested is reasonable.
Defendant has no objection to the award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Defendant only requests clarification on the calculation of counsel's hourly rate (Doc. 29). Counsel claims that the effective hourly rate is $569.93, taking into account the EAJA offset (Doc. 32 at 11). "However, the effective hourly rate can be calculated only prior to the subtraction of the duplicate prior EAJA award; subtracting the EAJA award from the total fee sought is incorrect, as the EAJA fee is a wash." Ringel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 295 F.Supp.3d 816, 839-40 (S.D. Ohio 2018). Accordingly, the Court finds counsel's effective hourly rate is not $569.93, but $768.11.
The fee request results in an effective hourly rate of $768.11 (Doc 32 at 12). "In cases of this type, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc has approved effective hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902 without finding that they are unreasonable." Young v. Colvin, 2014 WL 590335 at *2 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153). Taking into account the risk inherent in contingent-fee arrangements, the Court concludes the hourly rate is reasonable. --------
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 32) is granted. /// /// /// /// /// ///
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counsel is awarded $19,126 in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Upon receipt of this sum, Counsel shall refund the previously awarded EAJA fees of $4,934.67 to Plaintiff.
Dated this 22nd day of October, 2019.
/s/_________
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge