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denying Rule 59(e) motion based on the advancement of legal theories not previously raised before the court
Summary of this case from Citizens Against Casino Gambling in Erie Co. v. HogenOpinion
06 Civ. 13289 (VM).
July 7, 2008
DECISION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND
By Decision and Order dated June 16, 2008 (the "Order"), the Court denied the motion (the "Motion") of plaintiff Edwin Cordero ("Cordero") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), granted the cross-motion (the "Cross Motion") of defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), and directed that this case be closed. The Court determined that the findings of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") were supported by substantial evidence. Cordero now moves for an order granting reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) ("Rule 59(e)") and 60(b)(1) ("Rule 60(b)(1)"), and Local Civil Rule 6.3 ("Rule 6.3"). Because Cordero's submission in support of the instant motion raises legal theories and arguments not previously argued before this Court, his motion for reconsideration is denied.
The Order is reported as Cordero v. Astrue, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 06 Civ. 13289, 2008 WL 2485428 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2008).
A motion for reconsideration "is to be treated as a Rule 59(e) motion if filed within 10 days of entry of the challenged order and as a Rule 60(b) motion if filed thereafter." United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1993). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays do not count toward the ten-day limit, nor does the day the opinion was entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). The opinion was entered on June 17, 2008, a Tuesday, and the Rule 59(e) motion was filed on June 27, 2008, a Friday. Thus, Cordero's motion was filed within 10 days of the Order, and therefore, it will be treated as a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions to alter or amend judgments under Rule 59(e) and for reconsideration under Rule 6.3 are evaluated under the same standard. Cioce v. County of Westchester, No. 03 Civ. 6795, 2006 WL 692022, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2006) (citing Word v. Croce, No. 01 Civ. 9614, 2004 WL 434038, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2004);Williams v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 219 F.R.D. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Griffin Indus. v. Petrojam, Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Under Rule 6.3, which governs motions for reconsideration in this District, the moving party must demonstrate controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the underlying matter that the movant believes the court overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court. See Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995); S.E.C. v. Ashbury Capital Partners, L.P., No. 00 Civ. 7898, 2001 WL 604044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2001) (citing AT T Corp. v. Cmty Network Servs., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 316, 2000 WL 1174992, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2000); Rule 6.3). "The major grounds justifying reconsideration are 'an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice Procedure § 4478, at 790).
Reconsideration of a previous order by the court is an "extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources." In re Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc. Sec. Litg., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). A Rule 59(e) motion is not intended to be a vehicle for a party dissatisfied with a court's ruling to advance new theories that the movant failed to advance in connection with the underlying motion, nor to secure a rehearing on the merits with regard to issues already decided. See Griffin Indus., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d at 368. Furthermore, "[n]either Rule 59(e) or Local Civil Rule 6.3 . . . is an appropriate vehicle . . . to advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously presented to the court." Pasha v. William M. Mercer Consulting, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8362, 2004 WL 1474694, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2004) (citing Williams, 219 F.R.D. at 83). A court must narrowly construe and strictly apply Rule 6.3 so as to avoid duplicative rulings on previously considered issues, and to prevent Rule 6.3 from being used to advance different theories not previously argued, or as a substitute for appealing a final judgment. See Montanile v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 187 F.R.D. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Rule 6.3 is intended to "'ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party . . . plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters.'" S.E.C., 2001 WL 604044, at *1 (quoting Carolco Pictures, Inc. v. Sirota, 700 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)). Against this standard, the Court considers Cordero's arguments for reconsideration.
III. DISCUSSION
Cordero urges reconsideration on the ground that the Court overlooked a controlling decision. However, in doing so, Cordero argues new theories not previously raised before this Court in his original motion.
Cordero also asserts that the Court should grant reconsideration because his failure to respond to the Cross-Motion was due to administrative errors in his attorney's law office. Cordero, however, states that he would have responded to the Cross-Motion with the same arguments raised in his Motion, arguments this Court has already considered in deciding the Motion and Cross-Motion. Accordingly, reconsideration is not warranted. See Schonberger v. Serchuk, 742 F. Supp. 108, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Specifically, Cordero asserts that a conflict existed between the physical and mental limitations that the ALJ found to affect Cordero's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and the vocational expert's ("VE") finding that Cordero could be employed as a housekeeper, cafeteria assistant or dishwasher. The ALJ determined that Cordero would be limited to jobs requiring a low stress work environment, simple instructions and tasks, and no more than occasional contact with co-workers or the public.
Cordero now claims that the VE proposed jobs that Cordero is not capable of performing because they require more than occasional contact with co-workers or the public. Cordero also argues that the ALJ should have resolved this alleged conflict between Cordero's RFC and the jobs proposed by the VE before relying on the VE's testimony. Cordero relies primarily on Aubeuf v. Schwieker, 649 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981), to argue that because this Court did not consider the conflict between the limitations in Cordero's RFC and the actual demands of the jobs proposed by the VE, reconsideration is warranted. However, these arguments were not raised in his original motion to this Court. In contrast, Cordero argued in the Motion that the hypothetical that the ALJ posed to the VE did not incorporate all the physical and mental limitations the ALJ determined applied to Cordero, and that the hypothetical was not based on all the medical evidence in the record. In its Order, the Court, after reviewing the record as a whole, including the ALJ's determination of Cordero's physical and mental limitations, the ALJ's hypothetical posed to the VE, the VE's testimony, and Cordero's testimony and medical records, found that the ALJ's decision to deny Cordero's claim for Supplemental Security Income benefits was based on substantial evidence.
Because Cordero is attempting to advance different theories not previously raised before this Court and has failed to identify any controlling law or factual matters put to the Court on the underlying motion that the Court demonstrably did not consider, Cordero's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
IV. ORDER
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby
ORDERED that motion dated June 27, 2008 of plaintiff Edwin Cordero for reconsideration of the Court's Decision and Order dated June 16, 2008, is DENIED.