Opinion
2014-UP-286
07-16-2014
Benjamin L. Cooper, Respondent, v. State of South Carolina, Petitioner. Appellate Case No. 2010-181646
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Respondent. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Heard June 10, 2014.
Appeal From Georgetown County Larry B. Hyman Jr., Circuit Court Judge.
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Respondent.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.
PER CURIAM:
Benjamin Cooper petitioned the post-conviction relief (PCR) court for a new trial, arguing, in relevant part, the plea court's colloquy did not conform to Boykin v. Alabama. The PCR court agreed and granted Cooper a new trial. On appeal, the State argues the PCR court erred in granting a new trial because, based on the entirety of the record, it is evident Cooper's guilty plea was entered into voluntarily and intelligently. We disagree and affirm the PCR court pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 455, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011) ("In reviewing a PCR court's decision, an appellate court is concerned only with whether there is any evidence of probative value that supports the decision."); id. ("The appellate court will reverse the PCR court only where there is either no probative evidence to support the decision or the decision was controlled by an error of law."); Roddy v. State, 339 S.C. 29, 33, 528 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2000) ("To find a guilty plea is voluntarily and knowingly entered into, the record must establish the defendant had a full understanding of the consequences of his plea and the charges against him." (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969))); id. at 33, 528 S.E.2d at 420 (2000) ("[T]he voluntariness of a guilty plea is not determined by an examination of a specific inquiry made by the sentencing [court] alone, but is determined from both the record made at the time of the entry of the guilty plea, and also from the record of the PCR hearing."); Pittman v. State, 337 S.C. 597, 600–01, 524 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1999) (finding the plea court's deficient plea colloquy and incomplete sentencing sheet indicated the petitioner's plea was not voluntary, intelligent, and knowing); id. (finding a deficient plea colloquy between the court and a defendant was not cured by other evidence in the record).
395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969) (finding the trial court, in accepting a guilty plea, must make an affirmative showing on the record that the accused entered into the guilty plea intelligently and voluntarily).
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and SHORT and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.