Opinion
Case No. 3:16-cv-05980-RJB
06-12-2017
MICHAEL G. COOK, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
This matter is before the Court on defendant Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 9. Plaintiff Michael G. Cook has filed a response. Dkt. 12-1. Because plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies nor raised a colorable constitutional claim, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter. For these reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff first applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits in 2009. See Dkt. 10 at Exhibit 7, p. 4. The Commissioner denied plaintiff's application, and plaintiff did not request reconsideration or a hearing. Id.
Plaintiff applied for disability benefits again in 2012. See id. at Exhibits 1, 3. The Commissioner denied this application, and plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). See id. at Exhibit 3, p. 4. However, plaintiff then asked to withdraw his request for a hearing, and the ALJ accordingly dismissed the request for a hearing. See id. Plaintiff then asked the Appeals Council to review the dismissal. See id. at Exhibit 4. The Appeals Council declined. See id.
Plaintiff then filed a third application for disability benefits in 2013. See id. at Exhibit 7, pp. 4-6. After the application was denied, plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ and asked the ALJ to reopen the first two applications. See id. The ALJ declined to reopen the earlier applications and dismissed plaintiff's request for a hearing. See id. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review of this aspect of the ALJ's decision. See id. at Exhibit 8.
Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court seeking judicial review. See Dkt. 3. The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear this matter. See Dkt. 9; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and "possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). When presented with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction. See id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the Court favorably views "the facts alleged to support jurisdiction." McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Boettcher v. Sec. Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 720 (9th Cir. 1985)).
This Court has statutory jurisdiction to review "any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to the relevant federal regulations, a claimant obtains a judicially reviewable final decision only after completing all of the required steps, including asking for reconsideration of an initial determination, requesting a hearing, and requesting review by the Appeals Council. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907, 404.929, 404.967. A claimant seeking judicial review must either receive a decision by the Appeals Council or notice from the Appeals Council that it has denied the claimant's request for review. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 122.210(a).
Although the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to statute to review only the final decision of the Social Security Administration made after a hearing, a discretionary decision by the Administration that is not a final decision may be subject to an exception where the Commissioner's decision "is challenged on constitutional grounds." Evans v. Chater, 110 F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977)); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Ninth Circuit has "held that 'the Sanders exception applies to any colorable constitutional claim of due process violation that implicates a due process right either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits determination.'" Udd v. Massanari, 245 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Evans, 110 F.3d at 1483); see also Sanders, 430 U.S. at 107-09. According to the Ninth Circuit, a "challenge that is not 'wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous' raises a colorable constitutional claim." Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Boettcher, 59 F.2d at 722).
As stated by the Supreme Court, "[c]onstitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such questions." Sanders, 430 U.S. at 109. The Court noted the "well-established principle that when constitutional questions are in issue, the availability of judicial review is presumed." Id. (citations omitted).
Because an individual's interest in social security benefits is a property interest created by statute and protected by the Fifth Amendment, if a claimant has properly raised a due process claim with respect to the denial of such benefits, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. See Sanders, 430 U.S. at 109; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099; Evans, 110 F.3d at 1483.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff concedes that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies and receive a final decision made after a hearing. See Dkt. 12-1 at 5. However, plaintiff alleges that the Commissioner violated plaintiff's constitutional right to due process by denying him a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See id. at 5-8.
Plaintiff also argues that the Commissioner committed several other errors in choosing to deny his requests to reopen prior applications. See Dkt. 12-1 at 5-8. However, those alleged violations of the Commissioner's regulations are not constitutional questions, and this Court does not have jurisdiction to review "alleged abuses of agency discretion in refusing to reopen claims for social security benefits." See Califano, 430 U.S. at 107-08. --------
Plaintiff argues that he was first denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard when he did not receive a hearing following the denial of his first application. See id. at 5. However, plaintiff "decided to request that the ALJ dismiss his case" and withdrew his request for a hearing. See Dkt. 11-1 at 3. Plaintiff argues that he failed to understand the impact of that withdrawal. See Dkt. 12-1 at 5. A claimant may be denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard if, for example, he "lacked the mental capacity to understand the [Commissioner]'s termination notice and the procedures for contesting that termination." Udd, 245 F.3d at 1099. However, the evidence here does not indicate that plaintiff lacked the mental capacity to understand the opportunity to receive a hearing. Instead, plaintiff actively chose not to pursue his right to a hearing but later "changed his mind." See Dkt. 11-1 at 3. While plaintiff may have made a regrettable choice, allegedly due to incorrect legal advice (see Dkt. 12-1 at 5), that fact does not show that he was denied an opportunity or that the opportunity was not meaningful. Therefore, plaintiff has not met his burden of showing a colorable constitutional claim.
Plaintiff also argues that he had no meaningful opportunity to be heard before the Appeals Council. See Dkt. 12-1 at 6. However, the Appeals Council specifically stated that it looked at plaintiff's case, considered the reasons that plaintiff disagreed with the dismissal of his case, and found that the relevant evidence did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ's dismissal. See Dkt. 10 at Exhibit 4. Plaintiff claims that the Appeals Council violated his due process rights because it did not "meaningfully explain its decision," analogizing the case to Dexter v. Colvin, 731 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2013). See Dkt. 12-1 at 6. However, according to the Ninth Circuit, the Appeals Council's denial of review in Dexter violated due process because it "could not have made an informed decision" where the ALJ had failed to discuss all of the claimant's facially legitimate good cause arguments against a dismissal. See Dexter, 732 F.3d at 981. Here, the ALJ explained in her order of dismissal that plaintiff withdrew his request for a hearing after being "fully advised of the effects of [that] action." See Dkt. 10 at Exhibit 3, p. 4. The Appeals Council made a decision after review of the ALJ's dismissal and consideration of the reasons that plaintiff disagreed with that dismissal. See id. at Exhibit 4. Plaintiff does not show that the ALJ's dismissal was insufficient and left the Appeals Council without an opportunity to make an informed decision. Therefore, plaintiff has not raised a colorable constitutional claim.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the relevant federal regulations, plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to statute to hear this matter. In addition, as plaintiff has not raised a colorable constitutional claim, this Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to the Constitution to hear this matter. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner's motion to dismiss this case.
DATED this 12th day of June, 2017.
/s/_________
ROBERT J. BRYAN
United States District Judge