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Conservatorship of Person of Burget

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Apr 15, 2009
No. B211438 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2009)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KP011278, Thomas C. Falls, Judge.

James R. Bostwick, Jr. for Objector and Appellant.

James S. Link for Petitioner and Respondent.


TURNER, P. J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from an order granting $7,354.38 in fees to Ralph Thompson for actions taken as the temporary conservator for the person of Donald E. Burget. Mr. Thompson is not the conservator of Mr. Burget’s estate. Mr. Burget is married to the objector, Shigeko Burget. Ms. Burget is now the conservator of Mr. Burget’s person and estate. The objector, in her role as conservator, contends the order must be reversed because the probate court lacked jurisdiction to award fees to Mr. Thompson. The objector argues: Mr. Thompson’s first fee petition was denied; Mr. Thompson filed a second petition; the second petition was then granted; and the second petition did not satisfy the reconsideration requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. Also, the objector argues the fee award was an abuse of discretion. We disagree with the objector’s arguments and affirm the order.

All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

II. BACKGROUND

The conservatorship petition, which was filed on July 21, 2006, alleged: Keith Walker was Mr. Burget’s attorney; Mr. Burget had been sedated and placed in a psychiatric facility in Glendora by the objector; the staff at the facility would not allow access to Mr. Burget without the permission or presence of the objector; Mr. Burget wanted to return to his home but the objector was “engineering his continued detention”; and Mr. Burget was not held involuntarily pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. The petition sought appointment of Mr. Thompson as the conservator of Mr. Burget’s person. Additionally, the petition requested appointment of PFF Bank & Trust as the conservator of Mr. Burget’s estate.

The objector objected to the petition on the grounds: a conservatorship was unnecessary because Mr. Burget had executed estate planning documents which encompassed his need for a conservator; through the estate planning documents, the objector was meeting his medical needs; and Mr. Burget needed to be in a skilled, locked nursing facility due to his lack of mental capacity. In addition, the objector alleged that Mr. Burget was unable to manage his own affairs, had wandered away from home, and been lost for several days. In support of the objection, the objector attached copies of: a February 23, 2004 Advanced Health Care Directive; a Durable Power of Attorney dated May 27, 2005 naming her as Mr. Burget’s agent and nominating her as his conservator in the event a conservatorship was necessary; a February 23, 2004 revocable living trust placing all of Mr. Burget’s assets including his home into the trust; and a March 7, 2005 First Amendment to the trust naming the objector and Akiko M. Gooden as co-trustees. Ms. Gooden is the objector’s daughter. The objector also attached a letter dated June 8, 2006, from Dr. James P. Larsen. The letter indicated Mr. Burget: was under medical care for Alzheimer’s disease; was unable to understand or manage his own affairs due to severe mental impairment; and required 24-hour supervision.

The objector further stated that Mr. Burget’s only assets were a home and the couple’s joint bank account. The objector had paid his expenses and met his personal needs for about a year. Mr. Burget’s brother, William E. Burget, filed a declaration opposing the conservatorship. The brother asserted the objector was meeting Mr. Burget’s needs through the estate planning documents.

On July 21, 2006, John L. Gordon was appointed as the Probate Volunteer Panel attorney. On July 27, 2006, the probate court issued an order directing that Mr. Gordon have access to Mr. Burget. On August 2, 2006, Mr. Gordon filed a report. The report stated pertinent information could not be provided because of the conduct of the staff at the East Valley Hospital, Gero-Psychiatric Unit. Because of the interference by hospital staff, Mr. Gordon could not meet with Mr. Burget. Further, Mr. Gordon was unable to review Mr. Burget’s medical records. On July 24, 2006, Mr. Burget was moved to Wildwood Canyon Villa. Mr. Gordon visited with Mr. Burget on July 30, 2006. Mr. Burget was confused and disoriented. Mr. Burget did not know: where he was or how long he had been at the Wildwood facility; why he had been brought there; which of his siblings were still alive; and the location of his home. Mr. Burget knew he was married. Mr. Burget also knew Mr. Thompson. When unable to answer questions, Mr. Burget became agitated. Mr. Burget’s medical file listed a diagnosis of dementia and stated he was taking three prescription drugs. According to the file, Mr. Burget could not be located in his room on July 26, 2006, when staff looked for him at about 11 p.m. The local police were alerted and he was found about three hours later. Apparently, Mr. Burget forced a window open thereby escaping. Mr. Burget had escaped from a LaVerne facility in a similar manner several weeks earlier.

Mr. Gordon spoke with an attorney, Leon Opolski, who prepared the July 2005 trust amendment which appointed the objector as successor trustee. Mr. Opolski also prepared the power of attorney document. Mr. Opolski stated that the Burgets were his clients. Yet, Mr. Opolski had never met Mr. Burget.

Mr. Gordon wrote that his investigation was incomplete because he had been unable to speak with key medical personnel. Mr. Gordon also had not received all of Mr. Burget’s records. Mr. Gordon was unable to determine whether Mr. Burget had been diagnosed with dementia when the financial planning documents prepared by Mr. Opolski were executed. Mr. Gordon recommended that the probate court not appoint a temporary conservator because of the care Mr. Burget was receiving at Wildwood. On August 3, 2006, the probate court appointed Mr. Thompson as temporary conservator of Mr. Burget’s person. Further, PFF Bank & Trust was appointed as conservator of Mr. Burget’s estate. Letters were issued to the conservators.

On August 30, 2006, the objector filed a petition which requested she be appointed as the conservator of Mr. Burget’s person and estate. The objector’s petition alleged: Mr. Burget has been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease; he does not eat properly if left on his own; he will not take his medication without assistance; Mr. Burget’s treating physicians state that he should not be allowed to drive and reported his condition to the Department of Motor Vehicles; Mr. Burget jumped out of a window into the street while he was being treated for severe paranoia and confusion at East Valley Hospital Medical Center; the police located and returned him to the facility; Mr. Burget had escaped from four facilities; and Mr. Burget had sprinted into moving traffic attempting to flag down cars for a ride. With respect to his estate, the petition alleged: Mr. Burget is easily influenced by others; treating physicians indicate he cannot make day-to-day decisions; all of his assets have been managed by the objector for almost a year; and she had paid for his care and personal needs from their bank account.

On September 26, 2006, Mr. Gordon reported that Mr. Burget suffered from moderate dementia of the Alzheimer’s type. A plan had been made to coordinate with Mr. Burget’s treating physicians to reduce his medications. This would allow Mr. Burget to be medically evaluated at a time when he is not in an altered state caused by the drugs ingestion. Mr. Thompson, the temporary conservator, was concerned that the physicians were not recognizing his conservatorship letters in connection with medication issues. Mr. Gordon was unable to discover much more information about Mr. Opolski’s preparation of certain estate planning documents. The papers prepared by Mr. Opolski amended documents Mr. Thompson had previously executed in February 2004. Paul Shimoff was Mr. Burget’s attorney. Mr. Shimoff testified that when the February 2004 documents were executed, Mr. Burget was capable of communicating. Also, Mr. Burget was capable of expressing his wishes about his estate.

Mr. Gordon reported that Mr. Thompson’s view was that the objector was not acting in Mr. Burget’s best interests. According to Mr. Thompson, the objector wanted control over Mr. Burget’s $10 million in assets. This is because in July 2006, the objector locked him in a facility and made him unavailable to visitors. Mr. Thompson said the objector said Mr. Burget was crazy. Also, the objector had said Mr. Thompson would never see Mr. Burget again. When they would visit, Mr. Burget would ask Mr. Thompson for help.

Mr. Gordon recommended that the probate court continue the conservatorship orders. However, Mr. Gordon believed that Mr. Thompson was “a bit too zealous and headstrong” to remain the conservator of Mr. Burget’s person. Mr. Gordon also noted that the objector may have unnecessarily confined Mr. Burget. Mr. Gordon reported: “It is obvious that Mr. Burget requires assistance with medical and financial matters. However, there needs to be further investigation and discovery into this matter to determine what assistance is appropriate and who should render same.” On September 28, 2006, the probate court continued the matter to January 11, 2007. The probate court noted that a stipulation was entered into regarding medication for and examination of Mr. Burget by a doctor.

On November 20, 2006, the objector filed a petition which sought an order suspending Mr. Thompson’s powers and appointing her as temporary conservator. The petition alleged Mr. Burget would likely suffer loss or injury because he was not receiving medications as recommended by his physicians. According to the objector, Mr. Thompson was refusing to authorize medications that Mr. Burget’s physicians were recommending. The objector alleged since the medications were ceased, Mr. Burget: had escaped from Wildwood five times; was attempting to return to his childhood home in Oklahoma and to his parents, who are deceased; does not know the address of his California residence; and is in serious physical and mental pain without medication to calm him down. The petition further alleged: after an escape by Mr. Burget in October 2006, Mr. Thompson failed to appear at a scheduled meeting with Wildwood staff to discuss the incident; in November 2006, after Mr. Burget escaped from Wildwood, he was found wandering in the street by an employee of the facility who was on her way to work; the employee took Mr. Burget to Redlands Community Hospital where he was placed on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold; and Mr. Thompson, against hospital advice, would only authorize Ambien for Mr. Burget. In support of the petition, the objector attached declarations from Dr. Raymundo Morales and Dr. Daniel A. Plotkin, a geriatric psychiatrist. Both doctors agreed the refusal to administer medication to Mr. Burget caused him suffering and made him subject to elopement. Dr. Morales last examined Mr. Burget on November 5, 2006. Mr. Burget was very agitated. Mr. Burget was off of his prescribed medication for about 45 days. Mr. Thompson had made the decision, with probate court approval, to stop providing the medication to Mr. Burget. Dr. Morales and Dr. Plotkin agreed the drugs were necessary to treat agitation, anxiety, fear, and risk of elopement. Because of his dementia, Mr. Burget was incompetent to make decisions or provide for his own needs.

On November 22, 2006, Mr. Gordon reported that Mr. Thompson intended to resign as temporary conservator. Mr. Gordon further concluded Mr. Thompson should resign and the objector should be appointed as Mr. Burget’s temporary conservator. Mr. Gordon concluded that Mr. Thompson was acting out of good intentions but was not making the best decisions for Mr. Burget’s medical and personal care. Mr. Gordon had observed the objector and Mr. Thompson for four months. Mr. Gordon concluded: Mr. Thompson had not characterized the situation correctly; Mr. Thompson was difficult to communicate with and had not provided any evidence to support his theories the objector wanted to simply put Mr. Burget away; the objector was concerned about her husband’s physical and psychological condition; and the objector visited Mr. Burget every day and kept herself informed about his medical and personal needs.

Mr. Thompson resigned in court as temporary conservator on November 22, 2006. The probate court granted the objector’s petition to serve as temporary conservator as to Mr. Burget’s person only. The probate court also found that Mr. Burget would benefit from the administration of dementia drugs.

On January 10, 2007, Mr. Gordon filed a report which related the following. Mr. Gordon had visited Mr. Burget at a new facility, the Claremont House, on January 5, 2007. Mr. Burget had been taking medications since November 22, 2006. The new facility had 24-hour one-on-one monitoring to prevent escape. PFF Bank & Trust requested it be removed as conservator of Mr. Burget’s estate because most of his assets were in a trust that was administered by the objector. Mr. Gordon concluded that the objector had been misunderstood due to the fact she was of Japanese descent and could not express herself fluently in English. Mr. Gordon thought that the objector placed her husband on medications and locked him in facilities to prevent escape. Mr. Gordon recommended the objector be appointed as conservator of Mr. Burget’s person and estate. However, Mr. Gordon also recommended that: he continue to act as counsel; the objector, in her role as conservator, submit a care plan and hire a geriatric care manager; the geriatric care manager would assist the objector in care management; and the objector and Ms. Gooden, as co-trustees, provide monthly or quarterly statements as to the trust account. On January 11, 2007, the probate court granted the objector’s petition and appointed her conservator of Mr. Burget’s person and estate. Pursuant to stipulation, the objector would provide annual accountings to Mr. Gordon who would then file a petition if the accountings were improper.

On March 19, 2007, Mr. Thompson filed a petition for temporary conservator ($7,354.38) and attorney fees ($4,725). In this phase of the conservatorship litigation, Mr. Thompson’s petition, which is the subject of this appeal, alleged: Mr. Burget was Mr. Thompson’s neighbor; when they visited in a mental facility, Mr. Burget begged to get out; Mr. Thompson was concerned the objector was not acting in Mr. Burget’s best interest because they had only been married for a short time; Mr. Burget had a large estate which contributed to Mr. Thompson’s concerns; Mr. Thompson had spent a great deal of time visiting Mr. Burget; and Mr. Thompson spent a considerable amount of time talking to Mr. Burget’s doctors. Mr. Thompson admitted that he ultimately concluded that the objector was acting in good faith. Mr. Thompson attached a list of expenditures dated June 28 through November 21, 2006. Included in the total amount of expenditures was $1,398.88 for a private investigator that Mr. Thompson hired to investigate the objector. At the time, Mr. Thompson suspected the objector of having an affair.

The objector objected to the fees for Mr. Thompson as temporary conservator because they were not just or reasonable. Also, the objector asserted the work undertaken by Mr. Thompson was not in Mr. Burget’s best interests. The objector argued: Mr. Thompson exposed Mr. Burget to psychic and physical danger by withdrawing medications; the withdrawal of medication was contrary to the advice of Mr. Burget’s treating physicians; Mr. Burget escaped twice after he was removed from medication; Mr. Thompson resigned after a petition was filed to forcibly remove him; she did not place Mr. Burget in a mental institution, rather, his doctors did due to his mental condition; Mr. Thompson was not motivated out of concern but out of attempts to obtain money from Mr. Burget; in the past Mr. Thompson had attempted to borrow money from Mr. Burget; Mr. Thompson had exaggerated the number of hours and failed to show up when he was called in emergencies; and neither gasoline costs nor the surveillance fees to investigate her should be reimbursed.

In reply, Mr. Thompson reiterated some of the points raised in his petition. But Mr. Thompson also declared: “I became concerned that [the objector] was not acting in [Mr. Burget’s] best interest when she placed him in East Valley Hospital in June or July of 2006 and began administering drugs to him that left him unable to respond. [Mr. Burget] asked me to help him get back home.” Mr. Thompson had known Mr. Burget for about 26 years. Mr. Thompson had known the objector for 15 years. Mr. Thompson was concerned about Mr. Burget. Mr. Thompson knew Mr. Burget had a substantial estate in excess of $10 million. Further, the objector had Mr. Burget placed him in a locked facility. The objector would not consider home care for her husband, Mr. Burget. At one point, Mr. Burget asked Mr. Thompson for help.

Mr. Thompson denied several of the objector’s assertions filed in her opposition to his fee request. Contrary to the objector’s assertions, Mr. Thompson denied Mr. Burget suffered any injury when various medications were withdrawn. Mr. Thompson declared the withdrawal of medications were not the cause of Mr. Burget’s escapes. Rather, Mr. Burget’s medications were withdrawn in order to make a proper diagnosis of his condition. Mr. Thompson denied he was forced to resign as the conservator. Mr. Thompson denied trying to borrow money from Mr. Burget. Mr. Thompson’s visits with Mr. Burget lasted about two hours. Mr. Thompson only saw the objector on a single occasion during the visits with Mr. Burget. As to the expense incurred retaining an investigator, Mr. Thomson declared: “I was suspicious of [the objector] because she did not want to have [Mr. Burget] at home. She based this on one time [Mr. Burget] grabbing her arm. I believed that she might have a boyfriend and hired an investigator to conduct surveillance.”

On July 27, 2007, Judge Pro Tem Regina Esteras, denied Mr. Thompson’s fee request without prejudice. Judge Esteras found: “[T]he petition was filed in the best interests of the Conservatee, however, [Mr. Thompson’s] requested fees and costs are not just and reasonable.” As noted, the fee request was denied without prejudice.

On February 20, 2008, Mr. Thompson filed a second petition for temporary conservator fees. The second petition contained much of the same information that was in the first petition. But Mr. Thompson elaborated on some of the disputed contentions from the prior fee request petition. For example, among the questions that cause Mr. Thompson problems was the objector’s refusal to consider having an “In-House nurse’s aide” to provide 24-hour care. Mr. Burget sustained several injuries prior to the change of medication authorized by Judge Thomas C. Falls. The purpose of weaning Mr. Burget from his drugs was to secure an independent medical evaluation. Mr. Thompson declared, “I knew how [Mr. Burget] was in late May and how things changed with him when the Haldol prescribed by Dr. Jacob really started to affect him.” Mr. Thompson explained in some detail the circumstances of the medication recommend by Dr. Jacob, the geriatric psychiatrist, and the efforts to wean Mr. Burget from the prescribed drugs. Mr. Thompson declared that the visits with Mr. Burget lasted more than the 15 minutes as asserted by the objector’s attorney. According to Mr. Thompson: “I needed to spend several hours there to see if the weaning was working. And took him to dinner or lunch, you cannot do that in 15 minutes. The only time I did not stay for two or three hours was one Saturday when [the objector] was there. I felt she was very uncomfortable and she told me she would leave and come back so I could be alone with [Mr. Burget]. That day only I stayed for 45 minutes or so. That does not mean all stays were of short duration. They were all two hours plus visits except that one Saturday.” One of the reasons he resigned as conservator was the stress occasioned by his responsibilities. The objector did not argue that the February 2008 petition improperly requested reconsideration in violation of section 1008.

On August 21, 2008, Judge Falls heard argument on the February 20, 2008 fee request petition. After taking the matter under submission, Judge Falls granted the petition. This timely appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The February 20, 2008 Petition Did Not Violate Section 1008

The objector argues the February 20, 2008 fee petition violates the reconsideration requirements set forth in section 1008 which are jurisdictional. Mr. Thompson counters the February 2008 petition was not a reconsideration motion within the meaning of section 1008 because the first petition was denied without prejudice. And Mr. Thompson argues even if the second petition was a reconsideration motion, the objector is precluded from raising the section 1008 issue for the first time on appeal.

Section 1008 provides in part: “(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. [¶] (b) A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. For a failure to comply with this subdivision, any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or set aside on ex parte motion.... [¶] (e) This section specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.”

As noted, the initial fee request was denied without prejudice. Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1014-1016, held section 1008 was inapplicable to a second fee request which was filed after the trial court denied without prejudice the first application. Farber held: “Denial of a motion without prejudice impliedly invites the moving party to renew the motion at a later date, when he can correct the deficiency that led to the denial. [¶] In this case, the first motion was denied for want of sufficient evidence. The trial court might have continued the motion to allow the Association to submit a detailed fee bill, but instead it chose to deny the motion with, in effect, leave to renew it upon further evidence. Which route to choose is an administrative matter of calendar management-some might want to streamline a docket and continue a pending motion to allow supplemental filings, while others might prefer to decide the motion on the existing papers and reconsider that decision in a new motion.” (Farber v. Bay View Terrace Homeowners Assn., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1015; see also Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107-1108; Sanai v. Saltz (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 746, 782-783.) Because the initial petition was denied without prejudice, which was implicitly a determination by Judge Pro Tempore Estevas to allow relitigation of the fee issue, section 1008 was not applicable.

B. The Fees Award Was Not An Abuse of Discretion

The objector contends the decision to order payment of conservator fees to Mr. Thompson was an abuse of discretion. The objector further argues the content of the February 2008 petition does not comply with California Rules of Court, rules 7.702 and 7.751(b). Mr. Thompson argues the objector: waived her substantial evidence argument; there is substantial evidence to support the exercise of discretion; and the objector has waived her argument that the fee request did not comply with rules 7.751(b) and 7.702.

Further references to a rule are to the California Rules of Court.

We initially agree with Mr. Thompson that the objector forfeited the issue of whether his petition complied with rules 7.702 and 7.751(b) as to content. Her failure to raise the lack of compliance with the procedural aspects of the court rules forfeits the issue on appeal. (Martinez v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1249; In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846; Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1685.)

The probate court’s ruling approving a conservator’s action is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Probate Code, § 2403, subd. (a); Estate of Kay (1947) 30 Cal.2d 215, 218-219; Estate of Jacobson (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 255, 261.) Abuse of discretion is not demonstrated simply by arguing that another result would have been preferable, but by demonstration that the lower court’s ruling exceeds the bounds of reason. (Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) In determining whether there has been such an abuse of discretion, we do not reweigh evidence or pass upon witness credibility but interpret the facts and makes all reasonable inferences in support of the order issued. (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1450; Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Ins. Services v. Robb (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1812, 1820.) Where multiple inferences can be drawn from the evidence, we do not redetermine the matter but defer to the probate court’s findings. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479; Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925.) A conservator may be compensated for his or her time when it results in a benefit of service to the conservatee or the conservatee’s estate. (Probate Code, § 2640, subd. (d); Conservatorship of Lefkowitz (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314-1316.) The probate court, at its discretion, may make an order allowing any compensation that is just and reasonable for services provided including those rendered before the date of the appointment. (Probate Code, § 2640, subd. (c); see Conservatorship of Lefkowitz, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314; Estate of Baird (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 343, 347, disapproved on a different point in Estate of Schloss (1961) 56 Cal.2d 248, 256.)

Here, Judge Falls implicitly ruled that Mr. Burget received a benefit from Mr. Thompson’s services. The fees were incurred for the most part to obtain a conservatorship over Mr. Burget’s person and estate. Mr. Thompson was trying to assist a neighbor and friend. Mr. Thompson was highly suspicious of the objector’s actions regarding her husband’s interests. Mr. Thompson’s suspicions were based upon: the size of Mr. Burget’s personal estate ($10 million); the inability to see Mr. Burget; Mr. Burget was institutionalized and medicated; and the short duration of the couple’s marriage. Upon further investigation, Mr. Burget was determined to be suffering from dementia and prone to escape. Mr. Burget’s estate plan was prepared by Mr. Opolski. Yet, Mr. Opolski had never even met Mr. Burget. Shortly, after the amendments were made to Mr. Burget’s estate plan, he was hospitalized. Mr. Gordon, the court appointed probate volunteer panel attorney, concluded that Mr. Thompson was attempting to act in Mr. Burget’s best interests. Moreover, because of Mr. Thompson’s actions, a conservatorship was established for Mr. Burget. The probate court also ordered periodic accountings and ordered that Mr. Gordon continue to act as probate volunteer panel counsel. Thus, there is substantial evidence Mr. Thompson’s actions resulted in a benefit to Mr. Burget. In sum, there was sufficient evidence that Mr. Thompson’s appointment and actions as a temporary conservator were prompted by good-faith beliefs: that a conservatorship was necessary; concerning the extent of Mr. Burget’s will; and that Mr. Burget’s substantial assets should be protected. No abuse of discretion occurred. The probate court order determining the expenses were just and reasonable and should be paid out of the estate must be affirmed.

IV. DISPOSITION

The order under review is affirmed. The former temporary conservator, Ralph Thompson, is awarded his costs on appeal from the objector, Shigeko Burget.

We concur: ARMSTRONG, J. MOSK, J.


Summaries of

Conservatorship of Person of Burget

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Apr 15, 2009
No. B211438 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2009)
Case details for

Conservatorship of Person of Burget

Case Details

Full title:Conservatorship of the Person of DONALD E. BURGET. RALPH THOMPSON…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division

Date published: Apr 15, 2009

Citations

No. B211438 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2009)