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Conservatorship of Osezuwa O.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 25, 2008
No. F054929 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 25, 2008)

Opinion


Conservatorship of the Person of OSEZUWA O. PAUL ROZELL, as Conservator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. OSEZUWA O., Objector and Appellant. F054929 California Court of Appeal, Fifth District July 25, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Jon E. Stuebbe, Judge. Super. Ct. No. MI004855-04.

Paul Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.

B. C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel, and Judith M. Denny, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.

THE COURT

Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Dawson, J. and Kane, J.

On March 4, 2008, Kern County Counsel filed a petition for postcertification treatment, seeking up to 180 days of involuntary treatment for appellant. The petition was supported by the declaration of Dr. Jeouhsing Lai, a Kern Medical Center psychiatrist.

At the March 5, 2008 hearing, after reviewing the declaration of Dr. Lai and the unsworn statement of appellant, the court found that appellant was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5300 and ordered that he be remanded for postcertification treatment not to exceed 180 days.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

On appeal, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to uphold the court’s findings. We disagree and will affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Appellant was admitted to Kern Medical Center for involuntary mental health treatment on February 19, 2008, pursuant to section 5150. On February 22, he was certified for 14 days of mental health treatment on the grounds he was gravely disabled and a danger to himself and others as a result of a mental disorder. On March 4, Dr. Lai, appellant’s treating psychiatrist, petitioned the Kern County Superior Court for postcertification treatment of appellant pursuant to section 5301.

In his declaration filed in support of the petition, Dr. Lai stated appellant suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type and, as a result, suffers from paranoid ideation, thought disorganization, agitation and violence.

Dr. Lai’s declaration describes three acts of violence by appellant. First, on February 19, 2008, appellant kicked his brother’s door down and threatened to kill him because he heard voices that instructed him to do so. Appellant’s family called the police, who took appellant to Kern Medical Center where he received involuntary mental health treatment pursuant to section 5150. Second, while at Kern Medical Center, appellant became agitated without provocation, approached Dr. Lai and stated, “‘Don’t be playing games with me. I am not sick!’ If I see you on the street I will beat the sh_t out of you.” Third, while a hospital staff member was medicating appellant, appellant hit him in the chest with a closed fist, resulting in appellant being placed in restraints. Dr. Lai reported appellant had continued to threaten him and other staff members. In conclusion, Dr. Lai opined appellant is dangerous as a result of his mental disorder and will cause substantial physical harm to himself or another if not given postcertification treatment.

At the hearing on March 5, 2008, appellant’s attorney agreed the court could consider Dr. Lai’s declaration as evidence in support of the petition. Appellant’s attorney did not cross-examine Dr. Lai and presented no evidence in opposition to the petition other than appellant’s unsworn testimony.

Appellant testified that he kicked his brother’s door down when they got in an argument but that he did not want to fight him. Appellant also admitted to being outraged when Dr. Lai told him he would be held for an additional 14 days, because he did not believe there was justification for doing so.

After reviewing Dr. Lai’s declaration and appellant’s testimony, the court found that appellant attempted or inflicted physical harm upon the person of another and, as a result, was taken into custody. In addition, appellant attempted, inflicted, or made a serious threat of substantial physical harm to other persons after having been taken into custody for treatment, and he made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon the person of another within seven days of being taken into custody. The court concluded that, as a result of his mental disorder, appellant presented a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm upon others. The court remanded appellant for postcertification treatment not to exceed 180 days and ordered that he be treated with antipsychotic medication.

DISCUSSION

An individual may be remanded for postcertification treatment pursuant to section 5300, only when all elements of the section are found true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 541.) Therefore, in considering appellant’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the petitioner to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find all elements of the statute are fulfilled beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630-631.)

Section 5300 requires two types of findings of dangerousness before a person can be remanded for postcertification treatment. “First, there must be a generalized finding of ‘demonstrated danger’ to others. ‘Demonstrated danger may be based on assessment of [the person’s] present mental condition, which is based upon a consideration of past behavior of the person within six years prior to the time the person attempted, inflicted, or threatened physical harm upon another, and other relevant evidence.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5300.5.)” (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 20.)

“In addition to demonstrated danger, one of the following findings establishing recent acts or threats of violence must be made in order to effect a section 5300 commitment: ‘(a) The person has attempted, inflicted, or made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon the person of another after having been taken into custody, and while in custody, for evaluation and treatment ... (b) The person had attempted, or inflicted physical harm upon the person of another, that act having resulted in his or her being taken into custody ... (c) The person had made a serious threat of substantial physical harm upon the person of another within seven days of being taken into custody, that threat having at least in part resulted in his or her being taken into custody.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5300; see also id., § 5304, subd. (a).)” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 20.)

Appellant contends substantial evidence is lacking to satisfy the statutory commitment requirements because Dr. Lai’s opinion that the requirements were met was unsupported by facts and reasoned explanation. Appellant cites People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 141 for the principle that an expert’s opinion constitutes substantial evidence only if he explains the reasoning by which he progressed from the facts to the conclusion. Thus, unexplained labels such as schizophrenia, psychosis or psychopathy are not enough. (Ibid.) We find Dr. Lai’s declaration, which included evidence of appellant’s recent violent acts that supported the doctor’s opinion appellant met the statutory commitment requirements, provided ample evidence to support the court’s findings.

First, appellant asserts there is insufficient evidence to uphold the finding under section 5300, subdivision (a) relating to behavior in custody. He submits there is no evidence he actually inflicted or attempted to inflict harm while in custody because the “allegation” that he struck a staff member in the chest does not state that the injury was substantial and when he said, “If I see you on the street I will beat the sh_t out of you” to Dr. Lai, there was no additional evidence whether he was speaking literally or rhetorically. We are not persuaded. The fact finder could reasonably infer that punching a staff member in the chest constitutes the infliction or attempted infliction of substantial physical harm, even without evidence that the staff member suffered substantial harm. The fact finder could also infer that appellant’s statement to Dr. Lai was a serious threat of substantial physical harm, because appellant was confined to a mental health facility for having kicked down his brother’s door while threatening to kill him, and was suffering from paranoid ideation. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to uphold the finding that the first criterion was met.

Second, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence under section 5300, subdivision (b), relating to the act that resulted in being taken into custody. He argues there is no evidence he harmed or attempted to harm another person. While he concedes he kicked in his brother’s door while threatening to harm him, he argues that is not sufficient because he did not harm him and threats are irrelevant under this criterion. Again, we disagree. Appellant’s act of kicking in his brother’s door, coupled with his threats to kill him constituted “attempted … physical harm upon the person of another.” (§ 5300, subd. (b).)

Third, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the section 5300, subdivision (c) finding, relating to a “serious threat” made within seven days of being taken into custody. He argues that since Dr. Lai did not witness him threaten to kill his brother or provide any facts to support his conclusion that the threat was intended to be taken seriously, his conclusion that the statement was “a serious threat” was unsupported. Appellant’s argument ignores the context in which the threat was made, which amply supports Dr. Lai’s conclusion. Appellant’s family called the police when he kicked his brother’s door in after hearing voices telling him to do so. They told responding officers he had threatened to kill his brother. In light of those facts, the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that appellant’s threat to kill his brother was “a serious threat.”

Finally, appellant contends Dr. Lai’s declaration offers no facts and reasoning to support his conclusion that appellant, as a result of his mental illness, demonstrated a danger of inflicting substantial physical harm upon others. However, as detailed above, Dr. Lai described incidents in which appellant inflicted or attempted to inflict, and threatened to inflict substantial physical harm on others. As People v. Superior Court (Dodson) (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 990, 998 noted, “[P]ast conduct is relevant only as a prognosticator of probable future behavior, a constitutionally valid evidentiary consideration.” Additionally, Dr. Lai, appellant’s treating psychiatrist, declared that appellant “remains unpredictable and agitated” based on appellant’s “repeatedly demonstrate[d] assaultive behavior and continue[d] … threat[s to] staff.” Therefore, based on this evidence, the fact finder could reasonably conclude that appellant presented a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm on others.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.


Summaries of

Conservatorship of Osezuwa O.

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jul 25, 2008
No. F054929 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 25, 2008)
Case details for

Conservatorship of Osezuwa O.

Case Details

Full title:PAUL ROZELL, as Conservator, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. OSEZUWA…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Jul 25, 2008

Citations

No. F054929 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 25, 2008)