Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BP094102, Aviva K. Bobb, Judge.
Linda Paquette for Petitioner and Appellant.
Reyes Valenzuela for Objector and Respondent.
CROSKEY, Acting P. J.
Florentino Pulido, by and through his court-appointed conservator, seeks to recover title to real property from his son-in-law, Jose Varela. Pulido and his late wife executed a quitclaim deed in May 2003 creating their own life estates in the property and conveying the remainder to Varela. After his wife’s death, Pulido executed a grant deed in October 2004 conveying the property to Varela. The conservator filed a petition under Probate Code section 850 for an order directing Varela to convey title to Pulido, alleging fraud, coercion, and mistake. The trial court found that upon the execution of the grant deed, Pulido and Varela both expected that each would have a life estate in the property. The court therefore entered a judgment ordering Varela to convey a “one-half life estate” in the property to Pulido.
Pulido contends (1) he signed the quitclaim deed believing that it was a will, so a resulting trust arose in favor of Pulido and his late wife as a matter of law; and (2) the evidence does not support the court’s finding that the parties intended Varela to have a life estate in the real property. We conclude that Pulido has shown no prejudicial error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Factual Background
Pulido and his wife, Amelia Pulido, owned as joint tenants real property located at 7040 Lanto Street in the City of Commerce. They resided there together with Varela, Amelia Pulido’s sister, and two or more tenants. Amelia Pulido was stricken with cancer and received home hospice care for approximately three months before she died in July 2003.
Varela consulted an attorney for assistance in preparing a deed of conveyance. The attorney, J. Michael Hibler, understood that the purpose of the conveyance was so that Amelia Pulido would qualify for Medi-Cal and so the property would not be subject to a Medi-Cal lien. Hibler visited the house, asked Amelia Pulido her wishes with respect to the disposition of the property, and explained to her the effect of the quitclaim deed that he had prepared. Varela and Pulido also were present, as was Hibler’s wife, a notary public. Hibler spoke in English only. Amelia Pulido was able to speak and read English, but her husband was not. As Hibler spoke to Amelia Pulido in English, she spoke to Pulido in Spanish.
Pulido and his wife executed a quitclaim deed during the visit. The quitclaim deed, dated May 17, 2003, stated that for no consideration, Pulido and his wife created their own life estates in the property and conveyed the remainder to Varela.
After his wife’s death, Pulido moved from a bedroom inside the house to the garage. Pulido owned and drove an old truck at the time, but he had no driver’s license. He transferred title to the truck to Varela, but continued to drive the truck.
Varela suggested refinancing the property in March 2004 to reduce the monthly deed of trust payments. His cousin, who worked in the real estate refinancing business, advised Varela to put the property in Pulido’s name for purposes of refinancing. Pulido and Varela executed a grant deed in March 2004, conveying the property to Pulido. Pulido executed a deed of trust in April 2004 and then conveyed the property to Varela by executing a grant deed on October 31, 2004.
Varela became concerned about Pulido’s continuing to drive without a license. An attorney advised Varela that he could be held liable if Pulido caused any injury or damage. Varela related this to Pulido in August 2005 and told him not to drive. Pulido became angry and insisted that he would continue to drive. Varela then disabled the truck. A few weeks later, Pulido hired a lawyer and served an eviction notice on Varela and Varela’s aunt. Varela also served notices seeking to evict the tenants from the house and Pulido from the garage, purportedly for the purpose of moving Pulido from the garage back into the house. Pulido and Varela both filed unlawful detainer complaints.
2. Trial Court Proceedings
Jorge Barrientos filed a petition in September 2005 for an order appointing him as temporary conservator of Pulido’s person and estate. The court granted the petition. Barrientos filed a petition in October 2005 for an order directing Varela to convey to the conservatorship estate title to and possession of both the real property and the truck. The petition alleges that Pulido did not understand the meaning of the quitclaim deed executed in May 2003 and that Varela obtained Pulido’s signature on the October 2004 grant deed through coercion and fraud. It also alleges that Varela forced Pulido to transfer to Varela title to the truck.
Barrientos was a tenant who resided on the property.
The court later appointed Vida F. Negrete as conservator, succeeding Barrientos, and terminated the conservatorship of the person, leaving only a conservatorship of the estate. A nonjury trial on the petition began on February 1, 2006, and continued on July 21, August 18, and September 1, 2006. After closing arguments, the court stated:
“When one considers the evidence in this matter, it is clear to the court that both parties believed at all times that Mr. Pulido would be living in the house for life, i.e. would have a life estate in the property. When he did tell three witnesses that he had given the house to Mr. Varela, he did understand for refinancing purposes he was giving it to Mr. Varela. But he did not believe that in doing so, he was giving him the right to remove himself from the premises. Indeed, he shows that by continuing to stay in the garage and using his Social Security payments to pay the mortgage.
“So really, the status quo and the expectations of the parties are that the grant deed of October 4 be in place with a life estate to Mr. Pulido. And to that extent, the court finds under [Evidence Code section] 662 that the presumption really has been rebutted by clear and convincing proof that the parties expected Mr. Pulido to have a life estate in the property. The expectation was that the aunt wasn’t going to be moved out, that Mr. Varela wasn’t going to be moved out, and Mr. Pulido wasn’t going to move out. So the question to the court is how to effectuate that result.”
Evidence Code section 662 states: “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.”
After further discussion and comments by counsel, the court stated:
“I am recognizing Mr. Pulido is Spanish speaking, illiterate, perhaps not sophisticated. He signed a deed when he thought he was signing a will. That Mr. Varela was really controlling the transactions. He was just following what the lawyer told him to do, but he was still facilitating making all this happen. So the court can only be Solomonic to a certain extent, in a sense. The only thing the court can do is to roll the matter back to the status quo at the time of the October ’04 deed....”
The court stated further:
“So the court then does find by clear and convincing evidence that the expectation of the parties at the time of the signing of the October ’04 deed was that both Mr. Pulido and Mr. Varela would have a life estate in this property. And on that basis, the [Probate Code section] 850 petition is only granted to the extent that Mr. Varela is ordered to convey a one-half life estate to Mr. Pulido....”
The court stated in response to a question from counsel:
“What I’m doing is reforming the October ’04 deed, which gave title to Mr. Varela, but I’m adding to it the two life estates that I have mentioned.”
The court entered a judgment on June 19, 2007, stating that it found by clear and convincing evidence that upon the execution of the grant deed on October 31, 2004, the parties’ expectation was that Pulido and Varela each would have a life estate in the real property. The judgment orders Varela to convey to Pulido “a one-half life estate” in the real property as well as ownership and possession of the truck. Negrete timely appealed the judgment.
CONTENTIONS
Negrete contends (1) the trial court found that Pulido signed the quitclaim deed on May 17, 2003, believing that it was a will, and that finding gives rise to a resulting trust in favor of Pulido and his late wife as a matter of law; and (2) the evidence does not support the court’s finding that the parties intended Varela to have a life estate in the real property.
DISCUSSION
The Probate Code establishes procedures for the adjudication of certain claims by or against a conservatee relating to the conveyance or transfer of real or personal property. (Prob. Code, § 850 et seq.) Among the claims subject to those procedures is a conservatee’s “claim to real or personal property title to or possession of which is held by another.” (§ 850, subd. (a)(1)(D).) A court-appointed conservator may petition the court to decide such a claim. (§ 850, subd. (a).) “[I]f the court is satisfied that a conveyance, transfer, or other order should be made, the court shall make an order authorizing and directing the personal representative or other fiduciary, or the person having title to or possession of the property, to execute a conveyance or transfer to the person entitled thereto, or granting other appropriate relief.” (§ 856.)
An appellant must show not only that the trial court erred but also that the error was prejudicial in that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800-802; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 105-106.) “ ‘A “miscarriage of justice” should be declared only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of error.’ [Citation.] ‘We have made clear that a “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ [Citation.]” (Cassim, supra, at p. 800.)
Pulido cites the court’s oral statement at the conclusion of trial that Pulido “signed a deed when he thought he was signing a will.” Pulido argues that this statement by the court is a factual finding, that the finding relates to the May 2003 quitclaim deed, and that the finding gives rise to a resulting trust in favor of Pulido and his late wife as a matter of law. Pulido, however, does not discuss the legal significance of the grant deed that he subsequently executed in October 2004. Regardless of the parties’ understanding and intention upon the execution of the quitclaim deed in May 2003, Pulido later signed a grant deed conveying the property to Varela. Pulido’s contention concerning the quitclaim deed provides no basis to challenge the court’s finding as to the legal effect of the later grant deed. Accordingly, we conclude that Pulido has shown no prejudicial error with respect to his first contention.
Pulido also contends the evidence does not support the court’s finding that, upon his execution of the grant deed in October 2004, he and Varela both expected that each would have a life estate in the property. The only evidence that Pulido cites in support of this contention is Hibler’s testimony concerning the execution of the quitclaim deed in May 2003. That testimony does not show the absence of substantial evidence to support the court’s finding as to the parties’ intentions in October 2004. Pulido also quotes portions of his own testimony and Varela’s testimony concerning the execution of the October 2004 grant deed, in the “statement of facts” section of his opening brief, but he does not explain why the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment.
We must presume that the evidence supports the judgment unless the appellant affirmatively demonstrates to the contrary. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) An appellant can overcome this presumption and demonstrate prejudicial error only by citing and discussing the relevant evidence. Pulido fails to discuss the relevant evidence and explain why it is insufficient to support the judgment, and therefore has shown no prejudicial error. Moreover by failing to meaningfully discuss the evidence on point, he waives his claim of error as to the sufficiency of the evidence. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881; County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Varela is entitled to recover his costs on appeal.
We Concur: KITCHING, J. ALDRICH, J.