Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:22-cv-00092-O
2023-03-31
Chastity CONGIOUS, BY AND THROUGH her Guardian, Kimberly HAMMOND, on behalf of Herself and as Mother and Next Friend of Z.C.H., Deceased, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FORT WORTH, et al., Defendants.
Arielle Sade Comer, Comer Law Group, Dallas, TX, Pei Yu, Dallas, TX, Jarrett Adams, Pro Hac Vice, Law Office of Jarrett Adams PLLC, New York, NY, Jeanette Samuels, Pro Hac Vice, Samuels & Associates Ltd., Chicago, IL, Marwa Elsaid Elbially, Elbially Law Office PLLC, Plano, TX, for Plaintiffs. Melvin Keith Ogle, Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's Office, Civil Division, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant Tarrant County.
Arielle Sade Comer, Comer Law Group, Dallas, TX, Pei Yu, Dallas, TX, Jarrett Adams, Pro Hac Vice, Law Office of Jarrett Adams PLLC, New York, NY, Jeanette Samuels, Pro Hac Vice, Samuels & Associates Ltd., Chicago, IL, Marwa Elsaid Elbially, Elbially Law Office PLLC, Plano, TX, for Plaintiffs. Melvin Keith Ogle, Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney's Office, Civil Division, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant Tarrant County. MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Reed O'Connor, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
There are currently five motions to dismiss before the Court. Defendant David Nguyen filed his Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36) on May 18, 2022; Plaintiff Chastity Congious filed her Response (ECF No. 50) on June 27, 2022; and Defendant Nguyen filed his Reply (ECF No. 56) on June 28, 2022. Defendant City of Fort Worth filed its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42) on May 24, 2022; Plaintiff filed her Response (ECF No. 53) on June 27, 2022; and Defendant City of Fort Worth filed its Reply (ECF No. 57) on July 6, 2022. Defendants Nicole Cervantez and Leslie Martinez filed their Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 43) on May 25, 2022; Plaintiff filed her Response (ECF No. 54) on June 28, 2022; and Defendants Cervantez and Martinez filed their Reply (ECF No. 60) on July 11, 2022. Defendant Tarrant County filed its Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 44) on May 25, 2022; Plaintiff filed her Response (ECF No. 52) on June 27, 2022; and Defendant Tarrant County filed its Reply (ECF No. 59) on July 11, 2022. Defendant Dr. Aaron Ivy Shaw filed his Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46) on June 6, 2022; Plaintiff filed her Response (ECF No. 51) on June 27, 2022; Defendant Shaw filed his Reply (ECF No. 58) on July 11, 2022.
Having reviewed all the briefing and applicable law, the Court resolves each of these motions as follows:
1. Defendant David Nguyen's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36) should be GRANTED because Plaintiff's claims against him are time-barred.
2. Defendant City of Fort Worth's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42) should be GRANTED because Plaintiff's claims against it are time-barred.
3. Defendants Nicole Cervantez and Leslie Martinez's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 43) should be GRANTED because they are entitled to qualified immunity.
4. Defendant Dr. Aaron Ivy Shaw's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46) should be GRANTED because he is entitled to qualified immunity.
5. Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 44) should be GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and DEFERRED in part.
a. Plaintiff's denial of due process claim against Tarrant County should be DISMISSED because Plaintiff fails to plead the requisite Monell factors for that claim.
b. Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim against Tarrant County should be DISMISSED because Plaintiff has failed to allege a denial of medical care claim against any of Tarrant County's employees. Plaintiff's unsafe conditions of confinement claim should PROCEED.
c. Plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims against Tarrant County should PROCEED.
d. Plaintiff's state law claims and exemplary damages claims against Tarrant County should be DISMISSED since Plaintiff has abandoned them.
e. Tarrant County's prudential standing objections to Plaintiff's surviving claims should be DEFERRED pending further briefing because the underlying issues may have been resolved since Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss was filed.
The Court's recitation of the facts is taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 32. At the 12(b)(6) stage, these facts are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).
This case arises from the arrest and incarceration of a mentally ill pregnant woman which culminated in the tragic death of her baby daughter, who was born in her mother's prison cell. Plaintiff Chastity Congious is a black woman with a history and diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, psychosis, schizophrenia, mood disorder, hallucinations, delusions, suicidal ideations, prior suicide attempts and self-harm, anxiety disorder, adjustment disorder, intellectual disability, and a family history of mental health and behavioral disorders. She was twenty-one years old during all the events at issue in this case.
On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff was experiencing a mental health crisis involving behaviors likely to lead to self-harm. Her family called the Fort Worth Police Department in order to have Plaintiff involuntarily committed at JPS Hospital. Instead, when Officer David Nguyen ("Defendant Nguyen") arrived on scene, he placed Plaintiff under arrest for simple assault and took her into custody. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Nguyen's actions were influenced by his deficient training on racial bias and appropriate responses to mental health crises. Plaintiff was approximately four months pregnant at the time.
The next day, on January 16, 2020, a magistrate judge issued a probable cause determination for Plaintiff's continued detention. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Nguyen intentionally misled the magistrate judge by omitting material facts about Plaintiff's mental health issues in his Probable Cause Affidavit. Ultimately, the magistrate judge found probable cause, and because Plaintiff was already on probation for a prior unrelated offense, Plaintiff was placed in the custody of Tarrant County Jail on a probation hold and denied bond.
Although this case is at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the Court takes judicial notice of the magistrate judge's Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order as well as Defendant Nguyen's Probable Cause Affidavit since they are in the public record and referenced in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order, Nguyen App. 2, ECF No. 37 at 3; Probable Cause Affidavit, Nguyen App. 3, ECF No. 37 at 4. Defendant Nguyen requested for the Court to take judicial notice of these documents, and Plaintiff did not oppose this request. See Def. Nguyen's Mot. to Dismiss 3-4, ECF No. 36; Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Nguyen's Mot. to Dismiss 6-11, ECF No. 50 (referencing the Probable Cause Determination and Commitment Order as well as the Probable Cause Affidavit). The Court's decision to take judicial notice of these documents at this stage is supported by the case law. See Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n. 9 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record."); Crawford v. Pitts, No. 4:20-CV-1119-O, 2022 WL 479959, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2022) (O'Connor, J.).
Over the next several months, as she was detained in solitary confinement and segregated from staff and other inmates, Plaintiff's condition deteriorated. During this time, Plaintiff received treatment from multiple health professionals who reported that she was suicidal and often unable to understand that she was pregnant. By mid-May, Plaintiff was nonverbal, incommunicative, and had not made a sound in weeks. Despite Plaintiff's worsening condition, routine prenatal checkups consistently revealed that her baby was in good health.
As the end of Plaintiff's pregnancy approached, a nurse reported that Plaintiff may not understand what a contraction was. Shortly afterwards, when Plaintiff was 37-weeks pregnant, Dr. Melanie Carter conducted a routine obstetrics exam of Plaintiff and her baby. Dr. Carter reported that Plaintiff did not respond to questions, would not be able to express her symptoms, and may not recognize when she went into labor. Because of these conditions, Dr. Carter recommended that Plaintiff should have an induced labor. Dr. Aaron Shaw ("Defendant Shaw"), then-medical director of Tarrant County Jail, did not immediately act on Dr. Carter's recommendation to induce labor. Dr. Shaw also oversaw all of Plaintiff's care, and he was responsible for deciding to keep Plaintiff in her solitary cell under standard conditions rather than transfer her to a medical facility or afford her constant around-the-clock care, monitoring, and supervision.
Four days after her last check-up with Dr. Carter, Plaintiff went into labor on the morning of May 17, 2020. A short time after eating breakfast, Plaintiff's stomach began to bother her and she thought that she needed to use the bathroom. When using the bathroom did not relieve her abdominal pain, Plaintiff banged on the window of her cell to try to get help. At that time, blood from Plaintiff's labor was visible on the toilet seat. Correctional Officers Nicole Cervantez and Leslie Martinez ("Defendants Cervantez and Martinez") were responsible for monitoring Plaintiff that day, and they knew she was 37-weeks pregnant. However, they did not respond to Plaintiff's banging. Because she received no assistance, Plaintiff returned to her bed and gave birth to her baby girl Z.C.H. by herself.
Sometime later, at or around 9:07 a.m., Defendant Cervantez entered Plaintiff's cell and noticed the blood on her bedding from the delivery. Paramedics rushed to the scene. At that point, Plaintiff had lost excessive amounts of blood, and the umbilical cord was wrapped around Z.C.H.'s tiny neck. Z.C.H. was not breathing and had a faint heartbeat. Medical personnel separated the mother and her new daughter, taking them to different hospitals. Plaintiff never saw her daughter again.
At JPS Hospital, Plaintiff received treatment for her blood loss and for a grade 3 perineal tear. Meanwhile, at Cook Children's Hospital, doctors attempted to administer life-saving aid to the newborn Z.C.H. However, Z.C.H.'s brain had been severely damaged due to a lack of oxygen after being strangled by the umbilical cord for an unknown length of time. Although alive, Z.C.H. could not breath on her own, remained comatose, and had no brain activity.
Over the next ten days, doctors kept Z.C.H. alive with intensive support. Z.C.H. was baptized, and her doctors requested an opportunity for Plaintiff to see her ailing daughter. That request was denied. One day later, on May 27, 2022, doctors removed life support and Z.C.H. died.
The same day as her daughter's death, Plaintiff was put on suicide watch. Plaintiff's mental health symptoms worsened, and she stopped eating. Plaintiff's family requested compassionate release so that Plaintiff could attend her daughter's funeral. Like the previous request for Plaintiff to see her daughter, this request was also denied. Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff was not allowed to attend her daughter's funeral, the state dropped the charges against Plaintiff six days after that funeral. Plaintiff never had a legal hearing during her five-month period of incarceration.
Plaintiff was then transferred to JPS Hospital where she received months of intensive, inpatient care. Following her treatment, Plaintiff was released into the care of her mother. Unable to fully appreciate all these events, Plaintiff still asks about her daughter Z.C.H. and asks when she will come back.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff originally filed this lawsuit on January 13, 2022 in the Fort Worth Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. That lawsuit was assigned to the Honorable Mark T. Pittman. Just over two weeks later, Judge Pittman dismissed that case without prejudice, on February 1, 2022, due to Plaintiff's failure to obtain local counsel. The next day, February 2, 2022, Plaintiff asked Judge Pittman to reconsider, arguing that Plaintiff had since come into compliance with the requirement for local counsel. Judge Pittman denied the request for reconsideration on February 3, 2022. Plaintiff did not appeal Judge Pittman's dismissal of her case. Instead, Plaintiff refiled her case that same day, on February 3, 2022. That refiled case is the case currently before the Court.
See, e.g., Chasity Congious v. City of Fort Worth, et al., No. 4:22-cv-00027-P (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2022), reconsideration denied Feb. 3, 2022.
Final Judgment, Chasity Congious v. City of Fort Worth, et al., No. 4:22-cv-00027-P (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2022), reconsideration denied Feb. 3, 2022.
Pl.'s Motion for Reconsideration, Chasity Congious v. City of Fort Worth, et al., No. 4:22-cv-00027-P (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2022), reconsideration denied Feb. 3, 2022.
Order Denying Reconsideration, Chasity Congious v. City of Fort Worth, et al., No. 4:22-cv-00027-P (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2022), reconsideration denied Feb. 3, 2022.
After filing her Original Complaint in this case on February 3, 2022, Plaintiff later filed her Amended Complaint on May 11, 2022. Her Amended Complaint advances eight counts against Defendants. Specifically, those counts are:
See Compl., ECF No. 1; Am. Compl., ECF No. 32.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 198-247, ECF No. 32.
• Count I: Unlawful Pretrial Detention (Against Defendant Nguyen)Because of the multiple assertions of qualified immunity in this case, the Court stayed discovery on April 4, 2022.
• Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Failure to Train (Against Defendant City of Fort Worth)
• Count III: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Denial of Due Process (Against Defendant Tarrant County)
• Count IV: Denial of Medical Care (Against Defendants Shaw, Cervantez, and Martinez)
• Count V: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Denial of Medical Care and Unsafe Conditions of Confinement (Against Defendant Tarrant County)
• Count VI: Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act (Against Defendant Tarrant County)
• Count VII: Wrongful Death (Against all Defendants)
• Count VIII: Survival Action (Against all Defendants)
April 4, 2022 Order, ECF No. 25.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The Rule "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). If a plaintiff fails to satisfy this standard, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). A court may not accept legal conclusions as true, but when well-pleaded factual allegations are present, a court assumes their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
B. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). "Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Id. This doctrine protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).
Deciding whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity requires a court to apply the two-pronged analysis established in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs should be addressed first in light of the circumstances of each particular case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 242, 129 S.Ct. 808 ("[T]he judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position to determine the order of decision-making that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.").
The first prong of the Saucier analysis asks whether the facts alleged or shown are sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If the plaintiff's allegations, viewed favorably, do not set out a legitimate claim for relief for violation of a right, no further inquiry is necessary. Id. On the other hand, if the plaintiff sufficiently pleads or establishes the violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, the Court must decide whether that right was clearly established at the time of the government official's alleged misconduct. Id. This requires a determination of whether a defendant's actions were objectively reasonable "in light of clearly established law at the time of the conduct in question." Hampton Co. Nat'l Sur., L.L.C. v. Tunica County, 543 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If public officials or officers of "reasonable competence could disagree [on whether the conduct is legal], immunity should be recognized." Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092; see also Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). Conversely, an officer's conduct is not protected by qualified immunity if, in light of clearly established pre-existing law, it was apparent the officer's conduct, when undertaken, would be a violation of the right at issue. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 2000). "The critical consideration is fair warning." Taylor v. LeBlanc, 60 F.4th 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2023).
Therefore, "[t]o surmount [the qualified immunity] barrier at the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff[ ] must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense with equal specificity." Torns v. City of Jackson, 622 Fed. App'x 414, 416 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). While a district court considers an immunity-asserting defendant's motion to dismiss, it must stay all proceedings and discovery requirements in the interim because "the point of qualified immunity [is] to protect public officials from expansive, intrusive discovery until and unless the requisite showing overcoming immunity is made." See Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 647-49 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)).
C. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
The Fourteenth Amendment vests pretrial detainees with the constitutional right to have the essentials of their well-being tended to while in state custody, including their basic rights to be provided medical care and protection. Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Detainees often seek vindication of these rights through claims of deliberate indifference. However these claims are framed, i.e., as a claim for medical care or for protection, "both medical care and failure-to-protect cases [are] treated the same for purposes of measuring constitutional liability." Id. at 643. A defendant acts with "deliberate indifference" when he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; [meaning] the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). "Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet." Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Domino v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001)). This requires the defendant's subjective knowledge of the facts giving rise to a serious risk of harm to the detainee. "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation," does not meet the standard for deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (emphasis added) (discussing the standard for deliberate indifference in the Eighth Amendment context); see also Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Subjective deliberate indifference means 'the official had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to a pretrial detainee but responded with deliberate indifference to that risk.' ") (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at 650).
IV. ANALYSIS
Throughout the copious briefing in this case, the parties raise similar—and at times identical—arguments. Because courts must consider the conduct of individual defendants separately in qualified immunity cases, the Court addresses each in turn. Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 174 (5th Cir. 2015). The Court begins with Defendant Nguyen's Motion to Dismiss.
A. Defendant Nguyen's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brings three claims against Defendant Nguyen: (1) unlawful pretrial detention, (2) wrongful death, and (3) a survival action. In her Response to Defendant Nguyen's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that the Texas Tort Claims Act bars her recovery against Defendant Nguyen on the wrongful death and survival action claims. Defendant Nguyen argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's lone remaining claim against him for unlawful pretrial detention because that claim is time-barred and because Defendant Nguyen is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff's unlawful pretrial detention claim against Defendant Nguyen is time-barred, the Court finds that is must be dismissed. In the alternative, the Court also finds that Defendant Nguyen is entitled to qualified immunity.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 198-204, 240-47, ECF No. 32.
Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Nguyen's Mot. to Dismiss 12, ECF No. 50.
In Texas, claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are generally governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Flores v. Cameron Cnty., 92 F.3d 258, 271 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff claims that she was unlawfully arrested without a warrant on January 15, 2020, and she further claims that her detention was wrongly prolonged due to the magistrate judge's probable cause determination on January 16, 2020, which was based on Defendant Nguyen's allegedly flawed Probable Cause Affidavit. This means that Plaintiff's cause of action for unlawful pretrial detention accrued on January 15, 2020, or January 16, 2020 at the latest. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391-92, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). As such, Plaintiff needed to bring her claims against Defendant Nguyen before January 15, 2022, or perhaps before January 16, 2022. Since Plaintiff waited to bring her claims against Defendant Nguyen until February 3, 2022, those claims are time-barred.
Ultimately, it does not matter whether Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Nguyen accrued on January 15, 2020 or January 16, 2020, since either date would yield the same result that her claims are now time-barred. Therefore, the Court does not resolve the mixed question of law and fact about precisely which date her claims accrued.
In response, Plaintiff argues that her claims against Defendant Nguyen did not accrue until the state dismissed the charges against her on June 18, 2020. But the case Plaintiff cites in her favor actually stands for the proposition that the nature of the detention determines when the claim accrues. Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 493 (5th Cir. 2018). As the Fifth Circuit explained,
The accrual date depends on whether [Plaintiff's] claim more closely resembles one for false imprisonment or one for malicious prosecution. A false-imprisonment claim is based upon detention without legal process. It begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process. A malicious-prosecution claim is based upon detention accompanied . . . by wrongful institution of legal process. It does not accrue until the prosecution ends in the plaintiff's favor.Id. at 492 (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff's claim involves her detention without a warrant—i.e., without legal process. Because of this fact, Wallace controls, and Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Nguyen accrued on either January 15, 2020 or January 16, 2020. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091 ("There can be no dispute that petitioner could have filed suit as soon as the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, subjecting him to harm of involuntary detention, so the statute of limitations would normally commence to run from that date.")
Finally, as is now clear, Judge Pittman's earlier dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiff's then-timely filed case effectively operated as a dismissal with prejudice due to the time-barring issue Defendant Nguyen identified. But Plaintiff failed to appeal Judge Pittman's decision at that time. Moreover, Plaintiff has not advanced any arguments for statutory or equitable tolling at present. Therefore, the Court is bound to enforce the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's unlawful pretrial detention claim and find that Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Nguyen is time-barred.
In the alternative, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed her burden under the second prong of Saucier to demonstrate that Defendant Nguyen's conduct violated clearly established law. While Plaintiff cites to general prohibitions against false arrests and false statements by police officers, Plaintiff fails to cite a case for the proposition that a police officer cannot arrest an individual based on probable cause for a crime if that officer also perceives, or otherwise believes, that the suspect may be experiencing a mental health crisis. Likewise, Plaintiff fails to cite a case for the proposition that omitting mental health observations in a probable cause affidavit renders that affidavit constitutionally deficient, when it otherwise accurately reflects the situation encountered by the reporting officer. Because Plaintiff has failed to point to clearly established law that prohibits Defendant Nguyen's conduct, Defendant Nguyen is entitled to qualified immunity and Plaintiff's unlawful pretrial detention claim against him must be dismissed.
For these reasons, Defendant Nguyen's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against him should be DISMISSED.
B. Defendant City of Fort Worth's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brings three claims against Defendant City of Fort Worth: (1) failure to train, (2) wrongful death, and (3) a survival action. In her Response to Defendant City of Fort Worth's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that the Texas Tort Claims Act bars her recovery against Defendant Nguyen on the wrongful death and survival action claims. Defendant City of Fort Worth argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's lone remaining claim against it for failure to train because that claim is time-barred and because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a violation of her constitutional rights perpetrated by the City. Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff's failure to train claim against Defendant City of Fort Worth is time-barred, the Court finds that is must be dismissed. The Court does not reach any of Defendant City of Fort Worth's other arguments.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 205-211, 240-47, ECF No. 32.
Pl.'s Resp. to Def. City of Fort Worth's Mot. to Dismiss 11, ECF No. 53.
Plaintiff's only interaction with the City of Fort Worth came at the hands of Officer Nguyen when he arrested her. Once the magistrate judge issued his probable cause determination, Plaintiff entered the custody of Tarrant County and all further experiences that she endured were perpetrated by Tarrant County actors. Therefore, any claims that Plaintiff possesses against the City of Fort Worth ripened at the same time as her claims against Officer Nguyen.
This logic is further supported by the fact that Plaintiff brings a failure to train claim against the City of Fort Worth. This begs the question of who the City of Fort Worth failed to train. And since Officer Nguyen is the only named individual in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint who was trained by the City of Fort Worth, he is necessarily central to her failure to train claim. As such, the Court once again arrives at the conclusion that any claims Plaintiff possesses against the City of Fort Worth ripened at the same time as her claims against Officer Nguyen.
As discussed in the previous section, Plaintiff's claims against Officer Nguyen accrued on either January 15, 2020 or January 16, 2020. For that reason, the Court determines that Plaintiff's claims against the City of Fort Worth accrued on either January 15, 2020 or January 16, 2020. Moreover, Plaintiff's claim for failure to train against the City of Fort Worth under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subject to the same statute of limitations—and also the same time bars—as Plaintiff's unlawful pretrial detention claim against Defendant Nguyen. Accordingly, the Court incorporates its earlier analysis of time bars by reference and finds that Plaintiff's failure to train claim against the City of Fort Worth is also time-barred. Because of this finding, the Court need not address any of the other arguments raised by the City of Fort Worth.
For this reason, the Court finds that Defendant City of Fort Worth's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims against it should be DISMISSED.
C. Defendants Martinez and Cervantez's Motion to Dismiss
Courts must consider the conduct of individual defendants separately in qualified immunity cases. Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 174 (5th Cir. 2015). But here, Plaintiff collectively pleads against both Defendants Cervantez and Martinez. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 216-223, ECF No. 32. Similarly, Defendants Martinez and Cervantez filed a joint motion to dismiss. See Defs. Martinez and Cervantez's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 43. Since these two Defendants have been grouped throughout this case, the Court groups them in this section as a matter of judicial efficiency. But as a matter of legal analysis, the Court has considered Plaintiff's individual claims against Defendant Martinez and found them lacking. Likewise, the Court has considered Plaintiff's individual claims against Defendant Cervantez and also found them lacking.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brings three claims against Defendants Martinez and Cervantez: (1) denial of medical care, (2) wrongful death, and (3) a survival action. Defendants Martinez and Cervantez argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim against them because they are entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants Martinez and Cervantez further argue that Plaintiff's state law claims against them should be dismissed because of Plaintiff's irrevocable election under the Texas Tort Claims Act to pursue those claims exclusively against Tarrant County. Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim is defeated by qualified immunity, the Court finds that it must be dismissed. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendants Martinez and Cervantez should be dismissed because of her irrevocable election under the Texas Tort Claims Act to pursue those claims exclusively against Tarrant County.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 216-223, 240-47, ECF No. 32.
To overcome the presumption of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must satisfy both prongs of Saucier; namely, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez violated her rights and that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez had notice they were violating her rights due to clearly established law. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Plaintiff fails both prongs.
As to the first prong, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Martinez and Cervantez arise from their conduct on the morning of May 17, 2020, when she went into labor and delivered Z.C.H. Particularly, Plaintiff complains that they did not respond to her banging on the window of her cell and that they did not timely notice her distress. Since these claims involve specific events which allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights on a single morning, they are claims of an episodic act or omission which must be analyzed under the deliberate indifference standard. See, e.g., Boyd v. Anderson, No. 4:13-CV-874-O, 2013 WL 6222881, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2013) (O'Connor, J.); Witherspoon v. Waybourn, No. 4:20-CV-313-O, 2021 WL 1056514, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2021) (O'Connor, J.), aff'd, No. 21-10407, 2022 WL 2188530 (5th Cir. June 17, 2022).
A pretrial detainee alleging a violation of rights due to deliberate indifference must show that "(1) the official was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and (2) the official actually drew that inference." Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 755). However, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Martinez and Cervantez fail the first hurdle of awareness.
Specifically, Plaintiff never alleges that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez perceived her distress and chose to ignore her. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez ever heard Plaintiff banging. She also does not allege that they observed the blood in her cell prior to 9:07 a.m. Plaintiff only alleges that they did not respond, which is not sufficient to support a finding of actual awareness. In fact, when Defendant Cervantez discovered Plaintiff at 9:07 a.m. on the morning of Z.C.H.'s birth, Plaintiff reports that paramedics rushed to the scene shortly thereafter. While Defendants Martinez and Cervantez could have been aware of Plaintiff's distress earlier in the morning had they passed her cell, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint only supports the inference that they became aware of her distress at 9:07 a.m. Moreover, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint reveals that they promptly secured aid for Plaintiff after making that discovery. Based on these facts, Defendants Martinez and Cervantez were not deliberately indifferent in their care of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff makes the further argument that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez were culpably deliberately indifferent even before they discovered her in acute distress on the morning of May 17, 2020. As Plaintiff argues, Defendants Martinez and Cervantez were aware that Plaintiff was 37-weeks pregnant and they knew that her pregnancy, coupled with her mental health issues, gave rise to a substantial risk of serious harm. See, e.g., Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380 ("The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees pretrial detainees a right not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials." (internal quotations omitted)). Because Defendants Martinez and Cervantez had this knowledge, Plaintiff contends that they were deliberately indifferent by leaving her alone for a prolonged period of time on the morning of May 17, 2022. But again, this argument falls short.
The Fifth Circuit has held that non-medical personnel are entitled to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Dretke, 226 F. App'x 338, 340 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding warden and director of clinical services "were not deliberately indifferent" where they merely "deferred to the judgment of medical professionals by denying . . . dentures"). While it is true that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez were aware of Plaintiff's medical conditions, they also knew that she was under the care of Tarrant County medical personnel. Since those medical personnel—specifically Dr. Shaw—concluded that Plaintiff should stay in her solitary cell without any special accommodations, Defendants Martinez and Cervantez were entitled to rely on Dr. Shaw's assessment that they could continue their standard correctional duties without placing Plaintiff at a substantial risk of serious harm. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez failed their duties by missing a scheduled face-to-face check in. The fact that Plaintiff went into labor after breakfast and was discovered at 9:07 a.m. means that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez were out of contact with her for a relatively short period of time.
Of course, given their continuous proximity to Plaintiff, it is possible that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez perceived troubling details about Plaintiff's condition in the days or hours leading up to her delivery that were unknown to her medical team. But Plaintiff does not allege that either Martinez or Cervantez possessed unique observational knowledge of that nature. And even if that were somehow true, the guards are not obligated to correctly respond to their own medical observations. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit very recently held that correctional officers were not deliberately indifferent when they misdiagnosed an inmate's traumatic brain injury. Kevion Rogers v. Jeffrey Jarrett, et al., 63 F.4th 971, 978-79 (5th Cir. 2023).
The result of this precedent is that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez were not deliberately indifferent. And having failed to establish that Defendants Martinez and Cervantez violated Plaintiff's rights, Plaintiff necessarily fails to prove that their (non-existent) violation of her rights was clearly established.
Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff irrevocably elected to pursue her state law claims for wrongful death and a survival action against Tarrant County in her Original Complaint. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, she is therefore bound to pursue those claims exclusively against Tarrant County, regardless of subsequent amendments to her claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(e). For that reason, her state law claims against Defendants Martinez and Cervantez must be dismissed.
Compl. ¶¶ 154-67, ECF No. 1.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Martinez and Cervantez's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims against them should be DISMISSED.
D. Defendant Shaw's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brings three claims against Defendant Shaw: (1) denial of medical care, (2) wrongful death, and (3) a survival action. Defendant Shaw argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim against him because he is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim is defeated by qualified immunity, the Court finds that it must be dismissed. Additionally, the Court considers the substance of Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendant Shaw sua sponte and finds that they should be dismissed because of her irrevocable election under the Texas Tort Claims Act to pursue those claims exclusively against Tarrant County.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 216-223, 240-47, ECF No. 32.
Although Plaintiff possibly could have brought a policy-type claim against Dr. Shaw given his months-long supervision of Plaintiff's treatment, she instead advances an episodic act or omission claim against him and argues that he was deliberately indifferent by depriving her of medical care on the morning of May 17, 2020. Indeed, Plaintiff frames her claim narrowly and specifically, stating, "Chasity's claim is that Dr. Shaw acted with deliberate indifference by denying medical care to Chasity while she was in labor which resulted in the tragic death of her baby Z.C.H."
Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Shaw's Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 51.
This narrow tailoring brings with it a distinct advantage because it defangs one of Dr. Shaw's strongest defenses. Had Plaintiff framed her denial of medical care claim against Dr. Shaw more broadly, he could have easily derailed her argument by pointing to the many medical professionals who provided treatment to Plaintiff at his direction. And to be fair, Dr. Shaw still does make this argument, even though it is not directly responsive to Plaintiff's claim.
Regardless, the core issue before the Court is how to interpret Plaintiff's situation on the morning of May 17, 2020. As Plaintiff frames it, Dr. Shaw made a calculated decision to categorically deny her medical treatment that morning. In support of her position, Plaintiff points to Easter v. Powell where a nurse was found to be deliberately indifferent after denying treatment to an inmate with chest pain who had a history of cardiac problems. 467 F.3d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 2006). Conversely, Dr. Shaw argues that he exercised his medical judgment to not offer Plaintiff additional treatment that morning. Bolstering his argument, Dr. Shaw cites to numerous cases which all stand for the exact proposition that "the decision whether to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment." Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (cleaned up); Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up); Dyer, 964 F.3d at 381 (cleaned up).
The precedent weighs in favor of Dr. Shaw. As the Fifth Circuit has held:
Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. It is indisputable that an incorrect diagnosis by prison medical personnel does not suffice to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs . . . . And, the failure to alleviate a significant risk that the official should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (cleaned up). The facts of prior of Fifth Circuit cases, including cases with similarly egregious fact patterns, also support the Court's conclusion that Dr. Shaw was not deliberately indifferent.
For example, in Domino a prison psychologist evaluated an inmate for five minutes, the inmate told her that he was suicidal, and the psychologist nevertheless sent that inmate back to his cell where he killed himself less than three hours later. Id. at 753. The psychologist was not found to be deliberately indifferent. Id. at 756. Similarly, in Dyer, paramedics examined a manic patient with a head injury and decided that he was fit to return to police custody rather than being taken for further treatment. 964 F.3d at 378. That patient subsequently killed himself by "bashing his head over 40 times against the interior of a patrol car while being transported to jail." Id. The paramedics were not found to be deliberately indifferent. Id. at 381.
Returning to the facts at hand, the Court finds that Dr. Shaw knew Plaintiff was at risk and decided to maintain her standard baseline of care. But "[a]n official with subjective knowledge of a risk may still be free from liability if he or she 'responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.' " Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241, 257 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). For that reason, and in light of the precedent cited by the parties and reviewed by the Court, the Court finds that Dr. Shaw was not, as a legal matter, deliberately indifferent in his care of Plaintiff.
Although these parties did not raise it, the Court notes that Dr. Shaw's delay in scheduling Plaintiff's induced labor was not deliberately indifferent. While some cases have found a delay of a needed surgery to be deliberately indifferent, those cases usually involve years-long delays. See, e.g., Delaughter v. Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 140 (5th Cir. 2018) (multi-year delay for hip replacement). In this case, the delay between the recommendation for an induced labor and Plaintiff's early delivery was only four days. The Court cannot make a finding of deliberate indifference based on this four-day delay because the Fifth Circuit has held that a weeklong delay in treatment may be negligent, but it is not deliberately indifferent. See, e.g., Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 352 (5th Cir. 2006) (one week delay in administering antibiotics).
Even if the Court is wrong in its conclusion that Dr. Shaw was not deliberately indifferent, the Court makes the further finding that Plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proving Dr. Shaw's deliberate indifference was clearly established. Indeed, Easter is the only case Plaintiff affirmatively cites in support of the argument that Dr. Shaw's violations of Plaintiff's rights were clearly established. But that case involved a nurse who sent away a cardiac patient experiencing chest pain without treating him in any way and without offering him his prescribed medicine. Easter, 467 F.3d at 461. Here, there is no evidence that Dr. Shaw ever knew Plaintiff was experiencing untreated pain, nor is there evidence that he sent her away when she personally approached him seeking relief. In the Court's view, this case does not present circumstances which are substantially similar enough to clearly establish Dr. Shaw's violation of Plaintiff's rights.
Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Shaw's Mot. to Dismiss 8-10, ECF No. 51.
Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff's state law claims against Dr. Shaw. While Dr. Shaw tangentially levies several standing and capacity defenses against Plaintiff's state claims, neither side addresses the merits of those state claims. This perplexes the Court since all four other motions to dismiss address the implications of the Texas Tort Claims Act on these claims. Nevertheless, since the relevant issues have already been thoroughly briefed elsewhere, the Court raises them here sua sponte in the context of Defendant Shaw's Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, the Court once again finds that Plaintiff irrevocably elected to pursue her state law claims for wrongful death and a survival action against Tarrant County in her Original Complaint. Under the Texas Tort Claims Act, she is therefore bound to pursue those claims exclusively against Tarrant County. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106(e). Thus, her state law claims against Defendant Shaw must be dismissed.
Compl. ¶¶ 154-67, ECF No. 1.
For these reasons, Defendant Shaw's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against him should be DISMISSED.
E. Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff brings five claims against Defendant Tarrant County: (1) denial of due process, (2) denial of medical care and unsafe conditions of confinement, (3) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), (4) wrongful death, and (5) a survival action. The Court finds that the denial of due process claim, the denial of medical care claim, and the state law claims should all be dismissed. The Court further finds that the unsafe conditions of confinement claim as well as the ADA and RA claims should be allowed to proceed. And finally, the Court defers ruling on Defendant Tarrant County's prudential standing objections to the surviving claims. The Court addresses each portion of its disposition in turn.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 216-223, 240-47, ECF No. 32.
1. Plaintiff's Denial of Due Process Claim Against Defendant Tarrant County
Plaintiff brings a denial of due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Tarrant County. Plaintiff alleges that she was denied any legal hearing during her five months of imprisonment. This may indeed be a violation of her constitutional right to due process, but Plaintiff fails to adequately plead her claim against Tarrant County.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 129 L.Ed.2d 93 (1994). Thus, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that show that she has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2005). However, "[i]t is rare that a municipality will be found liable for an isolated unconstitutional act committed by one of its employees." Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 478 F. Supp. 3d 561, 573 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (O'Connor, J.), aff'd, 16 F.4th 1159 (5th Cir. 2021); see Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001). "Municipalities cannot be held liable under [§] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory, and a [county] is not liable where an injury is caused solely by one of its employees." Harmon, 478 F. Supp. 3d at 573 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)).
Monell further codified the standards for a municipal liability claim under § 1983 by articulating the three elements of such a claim: "(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' is that policy (or custom)." Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing Monell). Each of these elements is critical to a successful claim. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578.
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any of the three Monell elements with respect to her denial of due process claim. She does not allege that Tarrant County has an official policy of denying due process to inmates, nor a custom to that effect. Also, she does not allege that a policymaker had actual or constructive knowledge of her denial of due process. And further, because she does not plead that Tarrant County has a policy or custom of denying due process to inmates, Plaintiff does not successfully allege that her particular constitutional violation was the result of a Tarrant County policy or custom. Plaintiff's failure to plead the requisite elements of Monell fatally compromises her municipal liability claim against Tarrant County for denial of due process.
For this reason, Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's denial of due process claim, and Plaintiff's denial of due process claim should be DISMISSED.
2. Plaintiff's Denial of Medical Care and Unsafe Conditions of Confinement Claim Against Defendant Tarrant County
Plaintiff also brings a denial of medical care and unsafe conditions of confinement claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Tarrant County. This claim succeeds in part and fails in part.
Plaintiff's alleged facts raise an episodic denial of medical care claim and a related, yet distinct, unsafe conditions of confinement claim, which are both subject to the requirements of Monell. But before reaching the Monell analysis, the Court must ensure that Plaintiff has successfully pleaded an underlying constitutional violation. There can be no municipal liability under Monell in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation. See Albert v. City of Petal, 819 F. App'x 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting that because there was no constitutional violation, there can be no Monell claims); Brown v. Wilkinson Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 742 F. App'x 883, 884 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an underlying constitutional violation, the claims against the county and the officers in their official capacities failed); Harris v. Serpas, 745 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 2014) (upholding the district court's dismissal of the Monell claims because the plaintiffs had not shown there was a constitutional violation).
Here, Plaintiff fails to articulate an underlying constitutional violation for episodic denial of medical care. As discussed in previous sections of this opinion, Plaintiff fails to plead that Defendants Shaw, Martinez, and Cervantez were deliberately indifferent in denying her medical care. Indeed, the facts show that those Defendants provided her some—albeit insufficient—medical care. Unable to identify any actor who deprived her of medical care, Plaintiff cannot recover against Tarrant County on that claim.
However, Plaintiff does successfully plead her unsafe conditions of confinement claim against Tarrant County. Pretrial detainees can make such a claim because they are entitled to basic medical care and safe conditions of confinement pursuant to the due process rights established by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Jacobs v. Feliciana Sheriff's Dep't, 228 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2000). A conditions of confinement case is a constitutional attack on "general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement." Boyd v. Anderson, 4:13-CV-874-O, 2013 WL 6222881, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2013) (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at 644); Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing as examples claims about "the number of bunks in a cell or his television or mail privileges").
To begin, Plaintiff successfully alleges that she was harmed because of her conditions of confinement. Specifically, while she was pregnant, noncommunicative, and unable to recognize her own medical needs, Plaintiff was harmed by the fact that that she was kept in single cell at Tarrant County Jail where she was not subject to constant around-the-clock care, monitoring, and supervision. This situation caused her own injuries and the death of her daughter Z.C.H. These facts plausibly allege a constitutional violation due to unsafe conditions of confinement; therefore, the Court proceeds to the Monell analysis.
The policy or custom prong of Monell can be pleaded in two ways. "First, a plaintiff may point to a policy statement formally announced by an official policymaker." Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 2010). Alternatively, a plaintiff can offer evidence of a "persistent widespread practice of [county] officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy." Id. at 169 (quoting Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)); see also id. ("A customary policy consists of actions that have occurred for so long and with such frequency that the course of conduct demonstrates the governing body's knowledge and acceptance of the disputed conduct."). Such "[a] pattern is tantamount to official policy." Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff has successfully pleaded a custom of unsafe conditions of confinement for vulnerable pretrial detainees. Specifically, she has alleged thirty-one instances of deficient supervision at Tarrant County Jail, three instances of deficient supervision in Plaintiff's specific jail unit, and twenty-three suspicious inmate deaths around the time of Plaintiff's incarceration. Taken together at this stage of the case, these occurrences sufficiently establish a pattern or custom that "fairly represents municipal policy." Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 169.
For this claim, Plaintiff does not need to allege that Defendants Shaw, Martinez, and Cervantez violated any Tarrant County policies or customs. Indeed, the fact that these actors abided by Tarrant County policies and customs actually strengthens Plaintiff's unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim. Put simply, if Defendants Shaw, Martinez, and Cervantez abided by Tarrant County policies, yet Plaintiff's injuries and Z.C.H.'s death still occurred, then it stands to reason that the policies and customs, rather than the conduct of individual actors, are the real cause for concern.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 187-90, ECF No. 32.
As to the second prong of Monell, a county "cannot be liable for an unwritten custom unless '[a]ctual or constructive knowledge of such custom' is attributable to a [county] policymaker." Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cnty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)). In this case, the widespread prevalence of potential violations cited by Plaintiff, if true, should sufficiently put a county policymaker on notice of the issues at Tarrant County Jail. And even if some of these alleged violations are not factually identical to Plaintiff's situation, the overall statistics that Tarrant County Jail has failed three inspections in the past seven years, has the highest inmate mortality rate in North Texas, and has a mortality rate 3.5 times higher than Dallas County Jail, should put a reasonable policymaker on notice about potential condition of confinement issues at the jail.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 189, 192, ECF No. 32.
Next, as to the third prong of Monell, Plaintiff does successfully articulate that her conditions of confinement were a moving force behind her injuries and the death of Z.C.H. As the Supreme Court has made clear, this third prong requires a causal link between Plaintiff's and Z.C.H.'s injuries and Tarrant County's unconstitutional custom or policy. See Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). In this case, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that her prolonged isolation at Tarrant County Jail actually caused her deteriorating mental condition. This in turn made Plaintiff unable to understand and articulate her medical needs. In other words, Tarrant County's conditions of confinement actively harmed Plaintiff and created the situation that led to Z.C.H.'s death.
Finally, the Court acknowledges the difficulty of this highly fact-intensive analysis. However, other judges in this division have reached similar conclusions in conditions of confinement cases against Dallas County. In Duvall v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., Judge Sam Lindsay identified a material issue of fact with respect to the plaintiff's unconstitutional conditions of confinement claim and denied the County's motion for summary judgment on that basis. No. 3:07-CV-0929-L, 2008 WL 4561563, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2008). Likewise, in Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., Tex., then-Chief Judge Sidney Fitzwater allowed an inmate to proceed to trial on his conditions of confinement claim rooted in the County's deficient medical treatment of him. No. 3:05-CV-1442-D, 2008 WL 656889, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2008). Based on the Court's own analysis, and bolstered by the findings of the other courts in this district, the Court finds that Plaintiff has successfully articulated a conditions of confinement claim against Tarrant County.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's episodic denial of medical care claim, and it should be DENIED as to Plaintiff's unsafe conditions of confinement claim. Therefore, Plaintiff's episodic denial of medical care claim against Plaintiff should be DISMISSED, but her conditions of confinement claim should PROCEED.
3. Plaintiff's ADA and RA Claims Against Defendant Tarrant County
Plaintiff brings claims against Tarrant County for discrimination on the basis of her disability under the ADA and the RA. To prove a claim under § 504 of the RA or Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must adequately allege that she (1) was a qualified individual with a disability, (2) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of the Tarrant County Jail, and (3) that such exclusion, denial, or discrimination was because of her disability. See Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff successfully proves all elements, her claims should survive at the motion to dismiss stage.
Neither party disputes that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability. And even though Defendant Tarrant County protests, Plaintiff clearly alleges that she was "segregated from staff and other inmates" at Tarrant County Jail, thus being denied services, programs, and activities with those individuals. Thus, the only question that remains is whether Tarrant County treated Plaintiff differently because of her disability.
See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 237, ECF No. 32.
On this point, Plaintiff argues that the intentional discrimination required by the RA and ADA " 'is usually shown only by inferences,' which are generally for a fact-finder." Smith Est. of Hawkins v. Harris Cnty., No. H-15-2226, 2017 WL 11611472, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2017) (citing Perez v. Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd., 624 F. App'x 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2015)). In Smith Est. of Hawkins, the court found the following allegations were sufficient to claim intentional discrimination against a person who hung himself in jail: (1) the defendant was aware of the person's disabilities; (2) doctors warned of the danger the person posed to himself and required accommodation; (3) the defendant knew that hanging was the most common form of suicide by jail inmates; (4) the defendants knew that the inmate heard voices to harm himself and had made prior attempts to hang himself; (5) the person's family had requested accommodations for the person; and (6) the defendant denied the request. 2017 WL 11611472, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2017).
Plaintiff draws a direct comparison to Smith Est. of Hawkins, and argues that: (1) Tarrant County knew of Plaintiff's disabilities; (2) medical providers had warned about the dangers presented to Plaintiff and her baby due to the fact that Plaintiff would not recognize that she was going into labor and would not be able to communicate that she was in labor; (3) Tarrant County knew that Chasity was 37-weeks pregnant, meaning that she could go into labor at any time; (4) Tarrant County knew Chasity had denied being pregnant and would not understand if she was in labor; (5) Dr. Melanie Carter recommended that Plaintiff have an induced labor because she was unable to recognize her symptoms or understand that she was in labor; and (6) Tarrant County ignored Dr. Carter's recommendation to induce labor and left Chasity in her jail cell alone where she gave birth without medical assistance, resulting in the death of Z.C.H. On these facts, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiff's arguments and finds that Plaintiff has successfully articulated claims under the ADA and the RA that survive the motion to dismiss stage.
In Smith Est. of Hawkins, the district court later ruled against the plaintiff on her RA and ADA claims at the summary judgment stage. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit took no issue with the district court's acceptance of the plaintiff's claims at the motion to dismiss stage even while affirming the district court's decision to dismiss those same claims at the summary judgment stage. See Smith v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 956 F.3d 311, 320 (5th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, while the Court makes no prediction about how Plaintiff's RA and ADA claims will fare at the summary judgment stage, the Court is convinced that they should at least survive the motion to dismiss stage.
For the forgoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED as to Plaintiff's RA and ADA claims. Therefore, those claims should be allowed to PROCEED at this stage.
4. Plaintiff's State Law Claims Against Defendant Tarrant County
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint brings state law claims for wrongful death and a survival action against Tarrant County. But in her Response to Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff agrees to dismiss all her state law claims and all exemplary and punitive damages claims against Tarrant County. Therefore, Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's state law and exemplary damages claims, and those claims should be DISMISSED.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 240-47, ECF No. 32.
Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Tarrant County's Mot. to Dismiss 18, ECF No. 52.
5. Defendant Tarrant County's Prudential Standing Objections to Plaintiff's Surviving Claims
In its Motion to Dismiss, Tarrant County joins in, and incorporates by reference, §§ II A-D of Defendants Nicole Cervantez and Leslie Martinez's Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Stay, and Supporting Brief (as to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint). By incorporating those sections, Defendant Tarrant County argues that this entire case should be dismissed, or at least stayed, due to various prudential standing concerns.
See Def. Tarrant County's Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 44; see also Defs. Martinez and Cervantez's Mot. to Dismiss 2-11, ECF No. 43.
Particularly, Defendant Tarrant County argues Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that her mother, Kimberley Hammond, is her legal guardian. This potentially jeopardizes the current posture of this case where Kimberley Hammond is bringing this suit on behalf of Plaintiff as Plaintiff's next friend. Tarrant County further argues that neither Plaintiff nor Hammond have the authority to bring suit on behalf of Z.C.H. because Plaintiff is arguably legally incompetent and Hammond's relationship to Z.C.H. as her grandmother does not entitle her to represent Z.C.H. Additionally, Tarrant County argues that Plaintiff lacks the ability to bring this suit on behalf of Z.C.H. because only the administrator of Z.C.H.'s estate can bring suit at this point. And finally, Tarrant County contends that Z.C.H.'s father has a 50% claim to her estate and thus he must be joined as a necessary party before this case can proceed.
None of these issues impede the merits of Plaintiff's claims, nor do they impede the jurisdiction of this Court. Instead, they are questions of prudential standing—that is, questions which dictate whether the right parties are bringing the right claims. Moreover, due to pending guardianship proceedings which have been running parallel to this case, some or all these issues may have been resolved since Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss was first filed.
Since the Court's jurisdiction over this case is based on federal question jurisdiction, additional parties such as Z.C.H.'s father could be joined without destroying the Court's original jurisdiction. This stands in contrast to a case dependent on diversity jurisdiction where a non-diverse added party could defeat complete diversity and deprive the Court of its original jurisdiction.
See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs. Martinez and Cervantez's Mot. to Dismiss 6, ECF No. 54.
For those reasons, the Court finds that judgment on these questions of prudential standing should be DEFERRED. Accordingly, the Court will collect further, updated briefing on these issues as necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court resolves the motions before it as follows:
1. Defendant David Nguyen's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36) should be, and is hereby, GRANTED.
2. Defendant City of Fort Worth's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42) should be, and is hereby, GRANTED.
3. Defendants Nicole Cervantez and Leslie Martinez's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 43) should be, and is hereby, GRANTED.
4. Defendant Dr. Aaron Ivy Shaw's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46) should be, and is hereby, GRANTED.
5. Defendant Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 44) should be, and is hereby, GRANTED in part, DENIED in part, and DEFERRED in part.
a. Plaintiff's denial of due process claim against Tarrant County should be, and is hereby, DISMISSED.
b. Plaintiff's denial of medical care claim against Tarrant County should be, and is hereby, DISMISSED. Plaintiff's unsafe conditions of confinement claim should, and hereby does, PROCEED.
c. Plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act
claims against Tarrant County should, and hereby do, PROCEED.
d. Plaintiff's state law claims and exemplary damages claims against Tarrant County should be, and are hereby, DISMISSED.
e. Tarrant County's prudential standing objections to Plaintiff's surviving claims should be, and are hereby, DEFERRED, pending further briefing because the underlying issues may have been resolved since Tarrant County's Motion to Dismiss was filed. Plaintiff and Defendant Tarrant County SHALL file a Joint Status Report no later than April 7, 2023 addressing the current state of the prudential issues which the Court has deferred ruling on.
SO ORDERED on this 31st day of March, 2023.