Opinion
J-S12014-18 No. 672 MDA 2017
04-23-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LARRY WOODSON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 29, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002033-2007 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:
Larry Woodson appeals, pro se, from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, dismissing as untimely his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm based upon the opinion authored by the Honorable Tina Polachek Gartley.
On October 10, 2009, a jury found Woodson guilty of multiple drug charges stemming from an investigation into drug trafficking in Luzerne County. Woodson was sentenced on November 19, 2009, to an aggregate term of 210 to 420 months' incarceration. This Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on August 25, 2010 and he did not seek allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, Woodson's judgment of sentence became final on September 24, 2010.
Woodson subsequently filed two PCRA petitions, both of which were denied by the PCRA court, whose orders were affirmed by this Court. Woodson filed the instant petition, his third, on March 8, 2016. Following a Grazier hearing, Woodson was allowed to proceed pro se, and standby counsel was appointed. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied relief by order dated March 29, 2017. This timely appeal follows, in which Woodson raises the following issues for our review, verbatim:
By order dated March 13, 2018, this Court granted Woodson's application to strike the Commonwealth's brief as untimely, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2188.
1. Whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), which [Woodson] contends is a new rule of [c]onstitutional law that require[s] the retroactive application of Alleyne v. United States , (2013), [] which is an extension of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey , [530 U.S. 466 (2000)].Brief of Appellant, at 3 (some brackets and italicization omitted).
2. Whether the PCRA [c]ourt erred in denying [Woodson's] [p]ost [c]onviction [r]elief petition as "untimely" filed where [Woodson] established that his after-discovered evidence claim was within the plain language of the timeliness exception set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1)(ii) and [s]ection 9545(b)(2) in accordance with Commonwealth v. Lark , [] 746 A.2d 585 (Pa. 1999), where under [s]ection [] 9545(b)(2), a petitioner has (60) days to file a petition from the date the claim could have been presented.
We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review:
On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of review is limited to determining whether the PCRA court's findings are supported by the record and without legal error. Our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party at the PCRA court level. The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court. However, this Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions.Commonwealth v. Medina , 92 A.3d 1210, 1214-15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Additionally, courts will not entertain a second or subsequent request for PCRA relief unless the petitioner makes a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Appellant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief only if he demonstrates either that the proceedings which resulted in his conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society could tolerate, or that he was innocent of the crimes for which he was charged.
Here, the PCRA court concluded that Woodson's petition was untimely and, thus, it lacked jurisdiction to consider its merits. The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Lewis , 63 A.3d 1274, 1280-81 (Pa. Super. 2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Chester , 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) ("[I]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims."). Generally, a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence is final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met, and that the claim was raised within 60 days of the date on which it became available. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) and (c). Here, Woodson's judgment of sentence became final on or about September 24, 2010, when the time for filing a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113. Thus, his March 2016 petition, filed almost 5½ years after his judgment of sentence became final, was patently untimely. Unless Woodson pled and proved one of the timeliness exceptions under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition.
The statutory exceptions to the time bar are as follows:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
In an attempt to overcome the time bar, Woodson invokes both the newly-discovered facts and newly-recognized constitutional right exceptions to the PCRA time bar. First, Woodson asserts that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Alleyne , in which the Court held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime must be treated as an element of the offense and found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, is a new rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable to his case by virtue of the Court's ruling in Montgomery. Accordingly, Woodson argues his petition is subject to the exception to the time bar set forth in section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Second, Woodson asserts that his alleged discovery in September 2016 of a photograph showing a scar on his face, taken in prison in 2006 prior to trial in this matter, is a newly-discovered fact under, section 9545(b)(1)(ii), which casts doubt on his identity as the person who sold the drugs to a confidential informant.
Upon consideration of Woodson's brief, the relevant law, and the certified record in this matter, we conclude that Judge Polachek Gartley's opinion thoroughly, comprehensively and correctly disposes of the issues Woodson raises on appeal. Specifically, we concur with the trial court's conclusions that: (1) pursuant to Commonwealth v. Washington , 142 A.3d 810 (Pa. 2016), Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review; and (2) the photograph taken in 2006 is not newly-discovered evidence, as Woodson was present when the photograph was taken and he could have obtained the photograph earlier with the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, Woodson's face was present at trial and the jury had an opportunity to observe his scar. Accordingly, we affirm based on the opinion of the PCRA court. The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 04/23/18
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