Opinion
J-A17036-16 No. 1041 EDA 2015
11-28-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JAMIR WILLIAMS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0003302-2012 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Jamir Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for one count each of first-degree murder and possessing instruments of crime ("PIC"). We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
(1) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, AND VIOLATE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO
CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM SECURED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH [AMENDMENTS] TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, WHEN IT GRANTED THE COMMONWEALTH'S MOTION IN LIMINE, LIMITING APPELLANT'S CROSS EXAMINATION OF EMIL WILLIAMS WITH RESPECT TO HIS PRIOR CRIMINAL RECORD THAT WAS: 1) RELEVANT TO SHOW HIS MOTIVATIONS FOR ENTERING INTO A PLEA AGREEMENT AND FALSELY ACCUSING APPELLANT; 2) REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE WITNESS' STATE OF MIND AND BIAS TOWARD THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TIME HE ENTERED INTO HIS PLEA AGREEMENT, PURSUANT [TO] WHICH HE TESTIFIED?
(2) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS STATEMENT TO THE POLICE, AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATED TO DR. COOKE'S METHODOLOGY AND FORENSIC CONCLUSIONS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD?
(3) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND ABUSE [ITS] DISCRETION, AND VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY AND APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM SECURED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH [AMENDMENTS] TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, WHEN IT PERMITTED POLICE OFFICER RICHARDSON AND DETECTIVE NOLAN, TO TESTIFY, OVER OBJECTION, TO A DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGED SHOOTER PROVIDED BY ALLEGED WITNESS NATHAN BURRELL?
(4) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, AND VIOLATE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM SECURED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH [AMENDMENTS] TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION, AND THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY, WHEN IT PERMITTED DETECTIVE NOLAN TO TESTIFY THAT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS CROWDED AT THE SCENE OF THE OFFENSE, NO WITNESSES INITIALLY CAME FORWARD, AND THAT HE SPOKE WITH A NUMBER OF UNNAMED PEOPLE WHO WITNESSED EVENTS RELEVANT
TO THE CASE, BUT WHO WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITIES?(Appellant's Brief at 2-3).
(5) DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION WHEN IT DENIED PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE: A) TO REDACT FOUL LANGUAGE FROM APPELLANT'S STATEMENT TO THE POLICE; B) TO REDACT HEARSAY-WITHIN-HEARSAY CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S STATEMENT TO THE POLICE; C) TO REDACT REFERENCES CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S STATEMENT TO THE POLICE IMPLICATING HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS THEN-COUNSEL, WHICH ALSO VIOLATED APPELLANT'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, SECURED BY [THE] SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH [AMENDMENTS] TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION?
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable John P. Capuzzi, Sr., we conclude Appellant's issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion with Appendix, filed June 29, 2015, at 14-24) (finding: (1) court did not permit defense counsel to elicit testimony about Emil Williams' entire criminal history, conviction by conviction, or any crimen falsi convictions older than ten years, but Appellant was free to cross-examine witness about his open criminal case and crimen falsi convictions which occurred within the last ten years or for which witness remained under supervision because closed cases provided no motivation for witness curry favor with Commonwealth; jury heard testimony regarding witness' current plea agreement with Commonwealth; witness stated his sentence could have increased without plea agreement because of his past convictions; jury found witness credible regarding present case; (2) police reviewed contents of Miranda form with Appellant and Appellant signed on each page; Dr. Cooke's assessment that Appellant is "intellectually disabled" is unsupported by tests required to reach that determination; Dr. Cooke relied almost exclusively on Appellant's own statements regarding Appellant's mental capabilities; Dr. Cooke's opinion that Appellant's statement to police was not knowing or intelligent is contradicted by Appellant's criminal history, familiarity with criminal justice system, and ability to function within community on daily basis; Appellant's statement was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; (3) court permitted testimony from Officer Richardson and Detective Nolan about witness' description of shooter because such testimony was offered to show police course of conduct, based on information provided to police during on-scene investigation, rather than to prove truth of matter asserted; court also gave cautionary instruction to jury; (4) detective's statements regarding difficulty in obtaining information from witnesses about shooting was not hearsay or imply Appellant was involved in shooting; testimony was offered only to rebut Appellant's contention at trial that police were inept in their investigation; detective's statements did not violate Appellant's right to confront witnesses against him; (5) Appellant's recorded statement is relevant and not unfairly prejudicial; redacting Appellant's statement to omit foul language would have altered context of statement; statements Appellant made to police were not offered to prove Appellant was shooter or that people said Appellant shot Victim, and therefore did not constitute hearsay; Appellant's statement accusing someone else of murder was not incriminating; Appellant is not entitled to relief on any of his issues). The record supports the trial court's decision, and we see no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
"[T]he law presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court." Commonwealth v. Rega , 593 Pa. 659, 692, 933 A.2d 977, 1016 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1316, 128 S.Ct. 1879, 170 L.Ed.2d 755 (2008).
To the extent Appellant argues the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause in issues 1, 3, and 5, these arguments consist of blanket statements that are undeveloped on appeal. Appellant fails to specify how his issues implicate the Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, Appellant's contentions are waived on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh , 91 A.3d 1247, 1262 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 628 Pa. 627, 104 A.3d 1 (2014) (stating: "The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that each question an appellant raises be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority, and failure to do so constitutes waiver of the claim").
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/28/2016
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