Opinion
J-A23003-15 No. 729 WDA 2014
11-25-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. KATELYN WEBSTER, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on May 1, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, No. CP-02-CR-0005521-2013 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Katelyn Webster ("Webster") appeals the judgment of sentence imposed following her guilty plea to one count each of perjury and false swearing. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4902(a), 4903(a). We affirm the judgment of sentence.
Webster also pled guilty to false reports; however, that charge was later withdrawn by the Commonwealth prior to sentencing.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in its Opinion, which we incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/14, at 1-3.
On appeal, Webster raises the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred by denying [Webster's] request to transfer the case to the juvenile division?Brief for Appellant at 2, 17 (capitalization omitted, issues renumbered).
2. [Whether] the trial court erred by sentencing [Webster] in the aggravated range without providing sufficient reasons[?]
Webster contends that the trial court erred by denying her Motion to transfer the case to the juvenile division when (1) she was under 21 at the time of her prosecution; and (2) she committed a "delinquent act" prior to reaching the age of 18. Id. at 8. Webster asserts that the course of conduct that formed the basis for the charges against her began when she was a juvenile. Id. Webster points out that she was charged with false reports, perjury and false swearing, and claims that each of the charges related to her fabricated allegations of rape against M.F. Id. at 10. Webster argues that the false reports charge pertains to her initial fabricated allegation, which was made when she was 17 years old. Id. at 11. Webster claims that, because M.F.'s preliminary hearing was postponed to a date after Webster turned 18 years old, the charges of perjury and false swearing stem from the false testimony that she provided after she turned 18 years old. Id. Webster contends that, because she committed a delinquent act before she turned 18, her case should have been transferred to the juvenile division by operation of law. Id. Webster asserts that the spirit of the Juvenile Act requires her case to be transferred to the juvenile division, as the Act favors adjudication of cases through the juvenile division as opposed to the criminal division, and because she was amenable to rehabilitation through the juvenile division. Id. at 12, 14.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301, et seq.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Webster's first claim, and determined that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/14, at 3-5. We concur with the reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis as to this issue. See id.
In her second issue, Webster contends that the trial court erred by sentencing her in the aggravated range without providing sufficient reasons. Brief for Appellant at 17. Webster asserts the trial court based its aggravated sentence primarily on the impact to the victim, M.F. Id. at 19. Webster claims that, although she presented evidence of her need of intense treatment and therapy, "the trial court's reasoning for the aggravated sentence is nearly void of any reference thereto." Id. Webster argues that her psychological issues, coupled with her immaturity and young age, weighed against an aggravated sentence, even in light of the severe consequences suffered by the victim. Id.
Webster's second claim challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence. "Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right." Commonwealth v. Moury , 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue,
[this Court conducts] a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, [ see ] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [ see ] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).Moury , 992 A.2d at 170 (citation omitted). When an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence, we must consider her brief on this issue as a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Yanoff , 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997); see also Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki , 522 A.2d 17, 18 (Pa. 1987); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
In the instant case, Webster filed a timely Notice of Appeal, preserved her claims in a timely post-sentence Motion, and included in her appellate brief a separate Rule 2119(f) statement. As such, she is in technical compliance with the requirements to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Rhoades , 8 A.3d 912, 916 (Pa. Super. 2010). Thus, we will proceed to determine whether Webster has presented a substantial question for our review.
An allegation that a sentencing court failed to consider or did not adequately consider certain mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question that the sentence was inappropriate. See Commonwealth v. Lewis , 911 A.2d 558, 567 (Pa. Super. 2006). Thus, we decline to address Webster's claims that the trial court failed to adequately consider her psychological issues, immaturity and young age.
However, a claim that a sentencing court failed to state adequate reasons on the record for the sentence imposed has been held to raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Krysiak , 535 A.2d 165, 168 (Pa. Super. 1987). Thus, we will address Webster's claim in this regard.
The trial court addressed Webster's second claim, and determined that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/14, at 5-8; see also N.T. (Post-Sentence Motion), 5/1/14, at 51-55; N.T. (Sentencing), 3/27/14, at 40-44. We concur with the reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on this basis as to this issue. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/14, at 5-8.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/25/2015
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